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Back to the Future and Up to the Sky:
Legal Implications of "Open Skies"
Inspection for Arms Control
David A. Koplowt
The United States, the Soviet Union, and their respective allies are
currently engaged in the negotiation of a new arms control agreement on
"Open Skies," reviving a failed concept from the 1950s. The treaty would
permit each country to overfly the others on short notice and with great
frequency, and to use diverse, sophisticated sensors to photograph key mili-
tary and defense-related installations. This type of mutual intelligence-
gathering arrangement offers great advantages for national security and
global stability, reducing the possibility of surprise attack and accordingly
mitigating the necessity for maintaining large, offsetting military deploy-
ments. At the same time, however, the intrusive inspection powers it con-
templates might also conflict with the fourth amendment's prohibitions
against warrantless governmental searches conducted inside the United
States. In this Article, the author scrutinizes the Open Skies provisions now
on the negotiating table and assesses them for constitutionality, applying
precedents and principles derived from traditional criminal law. He con-
cludes that an Open Skies treaty could be implemented consistently with
fundamental United States jurisprudence, but only with certain limita-
tions, and that the current negotiations finalizing the treaty text ought to
take carefully into account the concerns of future reviewing courts.
INTRODUCTION
Arms control' moves very quickly these days. After decades of only
incremental progress, grudgingly achieved and painstakingly deliber-
ated,2 recent months have witnessed unanticipated breakthroughs that
t Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A. 1973, Harvard University;
J.D. 1978, Yale Law School. An earlier version of this Article was prepared for the Henry L.
Stirnson Center's Multilateral Verification Project. The author thanks Bennett Ramberg and
Michael Krepon for their comments on earlier drafts of the Article.
1. This article defines "arms control" broadly, to include measures that reduce or eliminate
armaments, that create or strengthen international peacekeeping institutions, or-most relevant
here-that reduce the probability of, and the corresponding fears about, a surprise use of aggressive
military force. See generally 22 U.S.C. § 2552 (1988) (definition of terms for Arms Control and
Disarmament Act).
2. Many previous arms control agreements have required substantial gestation periods. The
SALT I negotiations, for example, ran from November 1969 to May 1972. U.S. ARMS CONTROL
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have far-reaching consequences across a wide spectrum of issues.3 Nego-
tiations regarding strategic arms, 4 chemical weapons,5 nuclear testing,6
and conventional forces7 have intensified; in some instances, negotiators
have accomplished more in a matter of months than their predecessors
had registered in years.'
Each of these burgeoning new arms limitation accords will require
mechanisms for verifying compliance, and the United States, the Soviet
Union, and other nations are exploring every avenue that could enhance
confidence in the parties' compliance with the evolving obligations. Con-
sequently, in one area, negotiators are attempting to sustain their for-
ward momentum by reaching back into history and refurbishing one of
the oldest and least successful arms control ideas of the modem era:
President Eisenhower's 1955 proposal for "Open Skies." This bold con-
cept, which lay dormant for over three decades following its peremptory
rejection by Soviet General Secretary Khrushchev,9 was inserted into
President Bush's NATO summit speech in May 1989 and was subse-
quently endorsed by the attending heads of government.10 It has also
enjoyed a warm reception from Soviet President Gorbachev. Prospects
AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS: TEXTS AND
HISTORIES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 150 (6th ed. 1990) [hereinafter ACDA TREATY BooK]. The
SALT II talks were in progress from November 1972 to June 1979. Id. at 261-63. Various
negotiations concerning limits on testing nuclear weapons have been under way, in one form or
another, since 1958. Id at 184-86.
3. Cf 9 Arms Control Rep. (IDDS) 201.1-.4 (Mar. 1990) (the March 1990 issue of this
"chronicle of treaties, negotiations, proposals, weapons, and policy" has some 33 headings for
different types of arms control negotiations, forums, or issues).
4. See 10 Arms Control Rep. (IDDS) 611.B.655 (Jan. 1991) (quoting White House press
spokesperson Marlin Fitzwater that a START agreement, limiting long-range nuclear weaponry,
was "pretty close to final" in January 1991).
5. 9 Arms Control Rep. ODDS) 704.B.457 (Nov. 1990) (surveying progress registered in
1990 on treaty providing for substantial reduction or complete elimination of stockpiles of chemical
weaponry and facilities).
6. 136 CONG. REc. S13,767-68 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1990) (Senate approves treaties limiting
underground testing of nuclear weapons).
7. The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, Nov. 19, 1990 (signed but not ratified)
[hereinafter CFE Treaty] limits the key military equipment of NATO and Warsaw Pact armies,
requiring substantial demolition of tanks, aircraft, artillery, and armored personnel carriers. See
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, CFE TREATY ON
CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE: HIGHLIGHTS AND BACKGROUND (1990).
8. Regarding conventional forces in Europe, for example, the previous negotiations, labeled
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe (MBFR), lingered for over 15 years with scant
progress. See UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra note 7, at 5.
The current set of talks, denominated Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), have bolted ahead,
achieving a significant arms reduction agreement after only 20 months of negotiations. See id.
9. M. BUNDY, DANGER AND SURVIVAL 295-305 (1988) (describing the Soviet response to
Eisenhower's proposal).
10. See ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DIV., EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND INT'L TRADE




are now bright that a treaty incorporating this vision can be drafted,
signed, and brought into force within one year.1
An Open Skies agreement would not itself contain any substantive
restrictions on arms testing or deployment, but rather would permit each
party to overfly the territory of other participating nations on short
notice for the purpose of monitoring and photographing military-related
facilities and activities. Intelligence acquired in this manner would
assure each sovereign that potential adversaries were not exceeding the
numerical limitations of other arms control pacts, mobilizing for a sur-
prise offensive attack, or otherwise engaging in threatening military
activities. Licensed aerial reconnaissance with unrestricted permission to
photograph, which is the novel contribution of Open Skies, would depart
significantly from the xenophobic policies of security-conscious states,
and would bring a powerful new tool of surveillance to the pursuit of
international peace.
Unfortunately, this preternatural movement toward arms control
sometimes threatens to outstrip our ability to deal carefully with impor-
tant legal issues. In particular, uninhibited overhead reconnaissance
using very advanced collection technology may violate the guaranties of
personal privacy and liberty found in our Constitution's fourth amend-
ment. This country has placed fundamental bounds on governmental
snooping, and these limits cannot be easily evaded even in pursuit of
important security goals. This Article addresses the potential conflict
between the imperative to "provide for the common defence"12 by reduc-
ing threats to national survival via Open Skies, and the equally compel-
ling mandates to "establish Justice" 13 and to "secure the Blessings of
Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity" 4 by prohibiting unreasonable
searches and seizures.
This Article argues that an Open Skies agreement can be imple-
mented in this country consistently with the Constitution, but only by
imposing certain important limitations. In order to conform to constitu-
tional standards, the search operations cannot extend as far as the treaty
negotiators might like. The Constitution would also severely restrict any
future follow-on accord that might attempt to expand the Open Skies
concept to include still more powerful searches. In short, the Bill of
11. There are, of course, many opportunities for this timetable to slip, and the future course of
the international negotiations regarding Open Skies is difficult to predict. Cf. Lewis, Soviet Position
at "Open Skies" Talky Puzzles West, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1990, at All, col. I (noting that the
parties achieved less progress in the first round of talks than was expected, fueling speculation that
Soviet attitudes toward Open Skies may be hardening).





Rights can accommodate most of the national security tactics of Open
Skies, but it will not prove infinitely malleable.
Following this introduction, Part I of the Article describes the his-
tory and content of the idea of Open Skies. Part I recounts President
Eisenhower's original articulation of Open Skies, the concept's thirty-five
year dormancy, and then its revival by President Bush. This Part
describes the technology currently available to implement an Open Skies
regime, and gives an account of the Open Skies proposals now under
consideration. It also describes the potentially important role of Open
Skies in international confidence-building and treaty verification.
The Article then evaluates the legal implications of Open Skies.
Part II addresses a number of threshold issues, considering the lawful-
ness of physical incursion into American airspace, the degree to which
the activities of foreign crews will implicate "state action" by the United
States government, and the propriety of the apparent "delegation" of
sovereign functions to foreign nationals. Part III addresses constitu-
tional questions, placing treaties-and arms control agreements in partic-
ular-into the appropriate legal context and establishing the centrality of
the protections of the Bill of Rights. Part III notes the imagined
"national security exception" to the usual constitutional protections and
demonstrates why any such exception would be irrelevant to Open Skies.
Part IV then turns to the central question of whether aerial inspection is
a "search" of constitutional proportions that implicates fundamental val-
ues and norms. Part IV also examines the teachings of the sparse and
still-ambiguous case law precedents on this point.
Part V next attempts to extract from these opinions the principles
that might apply to future judicial assessment of Open Skies, and identi-
fies five primary factors that courts should focus upon in deciding
whether to permit, prohibit, or somehow constrain the inspections. The
negotiators and implementers of an Open Skies agreement should there-
fore seek to manipulate these five variables in advance: (a) the power of
the collection methodology; (b) the purposes of the search; (c) the char-
acter of the places to be searched; (d) the opportunities to minimize the
invasion of citizens' privacy; and (e) the availability of suitable recourse
for abuse. Finally, the Article offers some concluding observations on
the need to adapt both constitutional law and arms control programs in
order to embrace future challenges and opportunities.
I
THE EVOLUTION OF THE OPEN SKIES CONCEPT
The current version'of the Open Skies concept is a lineal descendent
of the 1955 proposal. This Part describes the earlier iteration of negotia-
tions, the progress made in 1989-1990, and some of the factors that com-
[Vol. 79:421
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bine to make the present Open Skies idea even more relevant and
potentially even more powerful than the original.
A. Eisenhower's Original Suggestion
During the 1950s, the United States and the Soviet Union frequently
exchanged disarmament proposals regarding a variety of security-related
topics, but they managed to locate precious few areas of agreement."5 In
1955, a panel of White House experts headed by Nelson Rockefeller and
Harold Stassen, then special assistants to the President, investigated the
possibility of presenting some type of novel proposal at the upcoming
Geneva Conference of Heads of Government. 6 Open Skies attracted
support within the administration 7 as a method of mitigating the dan-
gers of surprise attack, 8 testing Soviet willingness to accept the principle
of intrusive inspection,19 and securing real advantages for American
15. See Control and Reduction of Armaments" Hearing on S. Res. 93 Before the Subcomm. on
Disarmament of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-15 (1956)
[hereinafter Rearing] (statement of Harold E. Stassen, Special Assistant to the President for
Disarmament, reviewing United States and Soviet negotiating postures); B. BECHHOEFER, POSTWAR
NEGOTIATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL 290-97 (1961) (discussing the comprehensive Soviet
disarmament program of May 1955); G. MYRDAL, THE GAME OF DISARMAMENT 78-84 (1976)
(asserting that both the United States and the Soviet Union were more interested in propaganda than
in real disarmament during most of the 1950s); W. ROSTOW, OPEN SKIES: EISENHOWER'S
PROPOSAL OF JULY 21, 1955, at 1114-19 (1982) (text of Soviet proposal); STANFORD ARMS
CONTROL GROUP, INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL: IssUES AND AGREEMENTS 94-102 (C.
Blacker & G. Duffy 2d ed. 1984) (describing United States' "Baruch Plan" and "Atoms for Peace"
proposals and the USSR's various responses).
16. See 2 S. AMBROSE, EISENHOWER 258-59 (1984) (recounting the Eisenhower
administration's preparation of the Open Skies proposal); BACKGROUNDER, supra note 10
(regarding the evolution of the Open Skies proposal generally); W. RoSTow, supra note 15, at 46-47
(recounting how Rockefeller presented the idea to Eisenhower). The concept of aerial inspection to
aid disarmament had been considered in 1946 and 1952, but the proposals had not progressed very
far. See Hearing, supra note 15, at 36; Pounds, Proposals for On-Site Inspection Over the Year= From
the Baruch Plan to the Reagan Initiatives, in ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION & THE NEW ROLE OF
ON-SITE INSPECTION 69-91 (L. Dunn & A. Gordon eds. 1990).
17. See ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DIV., EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND INT'L TRADE
CANADA, OPEN SKIES: OPPORTUNITY FOR THE 1990s, BACKGROUNDER No. 2, at 2-3 (1990)
[hereinafter BACKGROUNDER No. 2] (Open Skies was conceived by analysts working for Nelson
Rockefeller, and although Secretary of State John Foster Dulles opposed the idea, Eisenhower came
to see it as a dramatic proposal capable of capturing the public's imagination); W. ROSTOW, supra
note 15, at 46-47 (Rockefeller's plan saw resistance at first, but eventually Eisenhower warmed to it).
18. During the 1950s, the fear of a surprise attack-a Soviet version of the Nazi blitzkrieg that
had proven so effective a decade earlier-drove American military strategists, and they devoted a
great deal of planning and deployment to forestalling that possibility. See Rosenberg, The Origins of
Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-60, in 7 INT'L SECURITY 3, 31-32, 38-40
(1983) (describing Eisenhower's preparations for defending against surprise nuclear attack). Open
Skies reconnaissance seemed to promise a partial solution for that fear. See Hearing, supra note 15,
at 22; Leghorn, Aerial Reconnaissance, in SELECTED READINGS IN AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE 6, 9
(A. Katz ed. 1963); Levison, Capabilities and Limitations of Aerial Inspection, in INSPECTION FOR
DISARMAMENT 59 (S. Melman ed. 1958).
19. W. RosTow, supra note 15, at 29-30; see also Hearing, supra note 15, at 22 (American
officials described Open Skies as only the "gateway" or "threshold" to an overall disarmament plan).
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
intelligence.2 °
At the conference on July 21, 1955, Eisenhower described the gist of
the Open Skies concept:
I should address myself for a moment principally to the delegates from
the Soviet Union, because our two great countries admittedly possess
new and terrible weapons in quantities which do give rise in other parts
of the world, or reciprocally, to the fears and dangers of surprise attack.
I propose, therefore, that we take a practical step, that we begin an
arrangement, very quickly, as between ourselves-immediately. These
steps would include:
To give to each other a complete blueprint of our military establish-
ments, from beginning to end, from one end of our countries to the other;
lay out the establishments and provide the blueprints to each other.
Next, to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photogra-
phy to the other country-we to provide you the facilities within our
country, ample facilities for aerial reconnaissance, where you can make
all the pictures you choose and take them to your own country to study;
you to provide exactly the same facilities for us and we to make these
examinations-and by this step to convince the world that we are provid-
ing as between ourselves against the possibility of great surprise attack,
thus lessening danger and relaxing tension. Likewise we will make more
easily attainable a comprehensive and effective system of inspection and
disarmament, because what I propose, I assure you, would be but a
beginning.21
During this period, the Soviets favored an agreement to permit foreign inspectors to be stationed in
ground control posts at key railyards, airports, and seaports to monitor military activities on the
spot. Western proposals stressed instead the advantages of aerial photography. Levison, Air
Inspection, in FIRST STEPS TO DISARMAMENT 100, 104-05 (E. Luard ed. 1965).
20. Reconnaissance satellites were not yet available, and the closed nature of Soviet society had
meant that the United States did not have access to basic military data about the Soviet Union, such
as the number of troops, aircraft, and ships. The corresponding information about American forces,
meanwhile, was readily available to the Soviets through open sources. An Open Skies regime would
have partially redressed this asymmetry, but the Soviets feared that it would also provide the United
States with the targeting information necessary to plan a surprise first strike against them, at a time
when the Soviet Union could neither defend itself against a massive long-range bomber assault nor
credibly threaten to retaliate in kind. See A. KRAss, VERIFICATION: How MUCH IS ENOUGH? 118
(1985) (U.S. Strategic Air Command needed better intelligence); Morrison, Opening the Skies, 1989
NAT'L J. 3020 (quoting Khrushchev's opinion that Open Skies was a means of gathering targeting
information); A. Katz, Some Notes on the History of Aerial Reconnaissance, Part I (Apr. 1966)
(unpublished manuscript available from the Rand Corporation) (surveying the military applications
and utility of aerial reconnaissance).
21. Levison, supra note 19, at 103-04; Statement on Disarmament by President Eisenhower to
the Heads of Government Meeting in Geneva, Switzerland (July 21, 1955), reprinted in Meeting of
Heads of Government at Geneva, 33 DEP'T ST. BULL. 171, 174 (1955). At the opening of the summit
conference, Eisenhower stressed that the mutual fear of surprise attack was frustrating the
superpowers' pursuit of the disarmament goals of the United Nations Charter, and that in seeking to
reduce the possibility of such aggression, "nothing is more important than that we explore together
the challenging and central problem of effective mutual inspection. Such a system is the foundation
for real disarmament." Opening Statement by President Eisenhower to the Heads of Government
[Vol. 79:421
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Despite a chilly initial reception from the Soviets, 22 the concept of
Open Skies recurred in discussions at high levels. The United States cir-
culated a more detailed version of the proposal on August 30, 1955, elab-
orating the mechanics of the anticipated exchange.23 Premier Bulganin,
in a September 19, 1955 letter to President Eisenhower, voiced reserva-
tions about the scope of the proposal,24 but during 1956 the two sides
appeared to be nearing agreement on a test run of the idea, which would
have applied to only a limited sector of Europe.25 Although they also
Meeting in Geneva, Switzerland (July 18, 1955), reprinted in Meeting of Heads of Government at
Geneva, supra, at 172.
22. See M. BUNDY, supra note 9, at 295, 301 (stating that the Geneva proposal "died the day it
was born"--the Soviet language in response to Open Skies was formally polite, but never reflective of
sincere interest). Former Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin has suggested that Khrushchev,
believing that the United States would be more nonplussed by a Soviet acceptance of the proposal
than by a predictable rejection, wanted to confound American expectations by responding positively.
The Politburo rejected that strategy, however. Morrison, supra note 20, at 3020. Eisenhower
himself concluded that, despite his own good faith, the Soviet leadership considered the Open Skies
proposal "nothing more than a bald espionage plot against the Soviet Union." 2 S. AMBROSE, supra
note 16, at 265; BACKGROUNDER No. 2, supra note 17, at 4.
23. Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. before a Subcomm. of the U.N. Disarmament
Comm'n (Aug. 29, 1955), reprinted in Inspection as the Key to Disarmament, 33 DEP'T ST. BULL.
438, 439-40 (1955). The United States submitted a detailed plan to the Disarmament Subcommittee
of the United Nations Commission on Disarmament. The plan included both ground-based
observers (which the Soviets appeared to prefer) and aerial inspection. Levison, supra note 19, at
104. American negotiators followed up on the proposal by submitting additional details to the
Disarmament Subcommittee later in 1955. See Teltsch, U.S. Asks Priority for Aerial Check in UN.
Arms Talks, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1955, at Al, col. 8; Statement by Harold Stassen before a
Subcomm. of the U.N. Disarmament Comm'n (Oct. 7, 1955), reprinted in Disarmament and the
President's Geneva Proposal, 33 DEP'T ST. BULL. 703 (1955). However, there is also evidence that in
late 1955, the United States hardened its position regarding Open Skies and, accordingly, consensus-
building became more problematic. See G.A. Res. 914, 10 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 19) at 5, U.N.
Doc. A/3116 (1955) (urging the Disarmament Commission to pursue Eisenhower's proposals for
Open Skies); B. BECHHOEFER, supra note 15, at 311 (statement of U.S. representative to U.N.
Disarmament Commission); G. MYRDAL, supra note 15, at 82-83 (discussing lack of public
support).
24. Letter from Nikolai A. Bulganin to President Eisenhower (1955), reprinted in President
and Soviet Premier Exchange Views on Inspection, 33 DEP'T ST. BULL. 643 (Oct. 24, 1955); see also
W. RosTow, supra note 15, at 64 ("the Bulganin letter did not rule out the possibility of mutual
aerial inspection playing an ultimate role in arms control proposals, but it flatly rejected
Eisenhower's fundamental proposition" that arms control measures could not succeed without
mutual confidence that verification was possible and reliable); Levison, supra note 19, at 104
(Bulganin stressed that actual reductions in arms, rather than merely the mechanisms for monitoring
reductions, should be the primary objective of the negotiations; he also stressed that the anticipated
provisions for exchange of blueprints and for aerial overflight should apply to all countries, not just
to the superpowers). Secretary of State Dulles assured the Soviets that once the basic bilateral Open
Skies program was in place, the United States would negotiate extending the program to other
countries. Hearing, supra note 15, at 8 (describing Dunes' statements at Geneva in Nov. 1955).
25. In March 1956, Harold Stassen proposed a plan for reciprocal aerial inspection of an area
of 20,000-30,000 square miles in the United States and Soviet Union. On November 17, 1956, the
Soviet Union counter-proposed aerial and ground-based inspection of a zone 1000 miles wide down
the center of Europe. Levison, supra note 19, at 105. The negotiators almost achieved agreement in
mid-1957 regarding a zone of inspection covering much of Europe, almost half of Siberia, and a
portion of the continental United States. B. BECHHOEFER, supra note 15, at 343-49; Levison, supra
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:421
considered various other candidate zones of inspection over the next two
years, the two sides were never able to find sufficient common ground.26
By the end of 1958, the tenuous consensus on Open Skies had dis-
solved amid a host of other political and technical issues,27 and no agree-
ment was ever implemented.2" In 1960, the downing of Gary Powers' U-
2 reconnaissance aircraft over the Soviet Union poisoned the atmosphere
for further consideration of aerial surveillance,2 9 and arms control nego-
tiators turned their attention to other opportunities.3 ° The idea of Open
Skies was shelved as an interesting and promising suggestion that never
went anywhere.31
note 19, at 106. In 1958, the Soviet Union vetoed a Security Council resolution that would have
endorsed the concept of aerial inspection for much of the territory above the Arctic Circle. 2 U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT, 1957-1959, at 1005 (1960).
26. The United States incorporated aerial reconnaissance into another proposal in May 1957,
but when Britain, France, and West Germany objected to the inspection provisions, the United
States withdrew the proposal from consideration. Levison, supra note 19, at 106. There were also
suggestions that the United States or the United Nations should implement a unilateral program of
Open Skies overflights even if the Soviet Union objected. The United States would build aircraft to
penetrate Soviet airspace at high altitudes, and the inevitable occasional losses would simply be part
of the price of obtaining adequate intelligence about enemy military activities. See Leghorn, supra
note 18, at 9-10, Leghorn, How Aerial Inspection Would Work, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 29,
1955, at 83. The United States did briefly use very high-altitude balloons to carry reconnaissance
cameras over the Soviet Union, but these had limited utility since they were uncontrollable, not
directed at specific targets but rather drifting with the winds. Blair & Brewer, Verifying SALT
Agreements, in VERIFICATION AND SALT 7, 9 (W. Potter ed. 1980).
27. Negotiations in Geneva took place from November 10 to December 18, 1958, but the two
sides remained far apart regarding Open Skies. The Western delegates focused on the technical
aspects of the inspection scheme, whereas the Eastern representatives first wanted to address the
political underpinnings. The two sides never bridged their differences. Levison, supra note 19, at
106.
28. The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency continued research into aerial
and other inspection methodologies, see 4 U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY,
ANN. REP. 24-25 (1965), but the issue of Open Skies disappeared from the negotiators' agendas after
1958. See Levison, supra note 19, at 107.
29. See Cohen, The Evolution of Soviet Views on SALT Verification: Implications for the
Future, in VERIFICATION AND SALT, supra note 26, at 49, 56; Moser, The Time of the Angel: The
U-2, Cuba, and the CIA, AM. HERITAGE, Oct. 1977, at 4. U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, even
when they were possible, could hardly be an adequate substitute for Open Skies. The spy planes did
not have nearly the capacity for coverage of the Soviet Union that a treaty could have provided, and
the limitations on the U-2 program were "almost shocking." W. RosTOW, supra note 15, at 74
(quoting personal communication from Paul Worthman).
30. Limitations on the testing of nuclear weaponry came to the forefront at this time, and the
Limited Test Ban Treaty, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43, was
concluded in 1963.
31. The Open Skies proposal at least temporarily served the function of seizing for the United
States the moral and political initiative in the world's search for appealing disarmament ideas. It
also helped establish Eisenhower as a leader in the efforts to achieve peace. See W. RoSTow, supra
note 15, at 57-58; cf Baldwin, Arms Control: Can U.S. Plan Work?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1955, at
B6, col. I (although Open Skies marked a shift from an idealistic U.S. goal of eliminating nuclear
weapons to a practical goal of monitoring and preventing their use, the proposal convinced neutral
nations that the U.S. supported peace efforts). By late 1960, the United States (and by 1962, the
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B. Open Skies Revived
For the next three decades, Eisenhower's proposal received little
active attention. 2 Then, in September 1986, the Stockholm Document
on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe33 announced
East-West accord on a variety of steps to increase the "transparency" of
each bloc's military apparatus.34 The Stockholm Document included
four provisions establishing the principle of aerial reconnaissance as an
easy and high-confidence means of monitoring questionable military
activities throughout the continent. 5
The real resurgence of Open Skies, however, came when President
Bush invoked Eisenhower's ideas in a May 12, 1989, speech at Texas
A&M University, his first major address as President on U.S.-Soviet rela-
tions.3 6 He called for reconsideration of Open Skies, "but on a broader,
more intrusive and radical basis."'3 7 The NATO heads of government
Soviet Union) had developed reconnaissance satellites that partially fulfilled the original surveillance
goals of Open Skies overflights. W. Rosrow, supra note 15, at 10.
32. There were occasional suggestions that Open Skies might play a role in the verification of
modem arms control accords, but these were almost wistful in tone, regretting the lost opportunity
of the 1950s to effectuate a helpful inspection process. Perry, The Forces of Verification: Strategic
Arms Control for the 1980s, THE RAND PAPER SERIES, Aug. 1977, at 19-20. The concept of aerial
inspection appeared from time to time; for example, provisions of the Antarctic Treaty declare that
"[a]erial observation may be carried out at any time over any or all areas of Antarctica" in order to
verify compliance with the treaty's disarmament and other provisions. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1,
1959, art. VII, § 4, 12 U.S.T. 794, 797, 402 U.N.T.S. 71, 76.
33. Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures
and Disarmament in Europe, reprinted in 1987 SIPRI Y.B. 365 [hereinafter Stockholm Document].
34. In the Stockholm Document, the 35 negotiating parties (including the United States and
the Soviet Union) agreed to pursue a variety of mechanisms for airborne and terrestrial monitoring
of military facilities, equipment, and exercises. Although only partially implemented, the agreement
nonetheless reflected the great increase in the various states' willingness to accept the principle of
intrusive inspection for arms control purposes. BACKGROUNDER, supra note 10, at 2-3.
35. Provisions 89 through 92 of the Stockholm Document specify that personnel from the
inspecting state (1) may use airplanes or helicopters, (2) are entitled to a "continuous view of the
ground during the inspection," (3) may enter the inspection area "without delay," (4) may use
navigational maps and charts, and (5) may stay in the inspection area up to 48 hours. Stockholm
Document, supra note 33, at 366; BACKGROUNDER, supra note 10, at 2-3.
36. See Krepon, With Lack of High-Up Interest, "Open Skies" Treaty Falls by Wayside, L.A.
Times, Oct. 7, 1990, at M2, col. 1.
37. N.Y. Times, May 13, 1989, at A6, col. 1; Address by President George Bush, Texas A&M
Univ. Commencement Ceremony (May 12, 1990), reprinted in Bush, Change in the Soviet Union,
U.S. Dep't of State, Current Policy No. 1175, at 2. During the Summer of 1989, President Bush
"decided to go forward with a policy of maximum openness and maximum flexibility, after the U.S.
intelligence community conducted a net assessment of the benefits and risks." HENRY L. STIMSON
CENTER, OPEN SKIES 2 (1989) [hereinafter STIMSON CENTER] (general background presentation by
a Bush administration official delivered at the Multilateral Verification Project). The most complete
publicly available works analyzing the history and current status of the Open Skies negotiations are
L. DUNN & B. HENRY, OPEN SKIES AND CFE AERIAL INSPECTION: REPORT OF A WORKSHOP
SPONSORED BY THE ARMS CONTROL PROGRAM OF Los ALAMOS NATIONAL LABRATORY (Aug.
30, 1990) (published by Science Applications Int'l Corp.); B. HENRY & R. DAVIS, OPEN SKIES AND
CFE AERIAL INSPECTION: BACKGROUND PAPER FOR WORKSHOP ON OPEN SKIES AND AERIAL
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endorsed the principle in a communiqu6 issued from Brussels on May 30,
1989,38 and propounded an elaborate set of "Basic Elements," outlining
many of the details, on December 15, 1989.39
This time, the Soviets' initial response was supportive. 40 At their
meeting in Wyoming on September 22 and 23, 1989, Secretary of State
James A. Baker III and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
"agreed in principle" to the concept of Open Skies, which they said
"could make a genuine contribution to openness and confidence-build-
ing.",41 They also expressed their willingness to attend an international
conference on the subject.42
The first round of that international conference, which initially
involved the foreign ministers of the participating nations, took place in
Ottawa, Canada, on February 12 through 28, 1990.13 Although partially
overshadowed by discussion of German reunification and conventional
force reductions in Europe, Open Skies was again a "hot" topic," with
several states offering additional wrinkles on the concept, and with little
if any important dissent. Secretary Baker declared that Open Skies was
"potentially the most important measure to build confidence ever under-
taken" by NATO and the Warsaw Pact.4" Representatives of the two
blocs sought to outdo each other in floating increasingly far-reaching
proposals.46
INSPECTION (May 31, 1990) (published by Science Applications Int'l Corp.); Hawes, Open Skies:
From Idea to Negotiation, NATO REVIEw, Apr. 1990, at 6; Tucker, Back to the Future: The Open
Skies Talks, 20 ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Oct 1990, at 20; see also Krepon, Conditions Ripe to
Puncture Aerial Borders, Defense News, Oct. 30, 1989, at 27, col. 1 (noting the parallels in
formulation, strategy, and diplomacy between Eisenhower's proposal in 1955 and Bush's in 1989).
38. See BACKGROUNDER, supra note 10, at 1, 3; Tucker, supra note 37, at 21-22.
39. NATO Press Service, Open Skies: Basic Elements Agreed by the North Atlantic Council
Meeting in Ministerial Session at NATO Headquarters, Brussels (Dec. 15, 1989).
40. There were, however, some Americans (both inside and outside the Bush administration)
who were at least initially unreceptive to the idea of reviving Eisenhower's proposal. See Grossman,
Keep the Eyes in the Skies, Christian Science Monitor, June 30, 1989, at 19, col. 1 ("It would be
difficult to think of any proposal less relevant."); Krepon, supra note 37, at 27, col. 1 ("most
observers dismissed the idea as a public relations stunt"). The idea was described as a "top down"
rather than a "bottom up" proposal, indicating that it originated with senior White House advisors
rather than percolating up through the bureaucracy. Smith, Bush Plan Predates Satellite, Wash.
Post, May 13, 1989, at A14, col. 1.
41. Joint Statement on Arms Control by James A. Baker III and Eduard Shevardnadze,
Jackson Hole, Wyo. (Sept. 23, 1989), reprinted in 19 ARMs CONTROL TODAY, Oct. 1989, at 22.
42. Id.
43. Lewis, US. Presents Plan-for German Unity, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1990, at AI0, col. 1.
44. Lewis, Accord in Ottawa, N-Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1990, at Al, col. 6.; Open Skies Conference
Communiqu6 (Feb. 13, 1990), reprinted by U.S. Arms Control and Development Agency
[hereinafter "Open Skies Communiqu6"]. While issues surrounding German unification dominated
the headlines, work on Open Skies continued at the conference, and the three days of ministerial
meetings were followed by an additional ten days of deliberations at the technical level, to
concentrate more fully on Open Skies. Lewis, supra, at AI0, col. 4.
45. Lewis, supra note 43, at AI0, col. 1.
46. See, eg., Opening Statement by Sergiu Celac, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Romania, Open
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The second round of the conference was held in Budapest, Hungary,
from April 23 through May 10, 1990. This session was disappointing,
registering less progress than treaty adherents had anticipated, and the
negotiators have not yet scheduled a third round of talks.47 Nonetheless,
the general perception remains that only a relatively small number of
important issues now separate the negotiators, and that if the leading
states demonstrate sufficient political will, a treaty could be ready for
signature in the near future.48
In the interim, some countries have already undertaken partial
measures of implementation. Canada and Hungary, for example, experi-
mented with a trial Open Skies overflight on January 4 through 7, 1990.
The trial was designed to test flight planning and safety procedures and
to investigate the arrangements necessary to ensure smooth reciprocal
monitoring.49  Reportedly, the mock inspection was "quite
Skies Conference, Ottawa (Feb. 12, 1990); Opening Statement by Gyula Horn, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Hungary, Open Skies Conference, Ottawa (Feb. 12, 1990); Statement by Jiri Dienstbier,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Czechoslovakia, Open Skies Conference, Ottawa (Feb. 12, 1990) (all
expressing support for Open Skies). The government of Canada has been particularly active in
promoting the concept of Open Skies. See eg., BACKGROUNDER No. 2, supra note 17, at 6-7
(Canada supports Open Skies because it will provide smaller nations with the technological means to
monitor areas of concern, will distribute the burden of monitoring among the North American and
European allies, and will represent a practical step in improving East-West relations).
47. See Krepon, supra note 36, at M2, col. 1. During their June 1990 summit meeting, Bush
and Gorbachev spent more time on Open Skies than on any other arms control topic except START.
Id.; see also 9 Arms Control Rep. (IDDS) 409.B.18 (Dec. 1990) (Canada proposes third round of
negotiations); N.Y. Times, June 4, 1990, at A14, col. 1 (Following the summit, Bush was "hopeful
that the good discussion between President Gorbachev and-the one we had about the importance
of 'open skies'--will revive those negotiations."); 10 Arms Control Rep. (IDDS) 409.B.21 (Feb.
1991) (NATO is developing a package of new Open Skies negotiating positions designed to elicit a
favorable response from the Soviet Union)
48. See Tucker, supra note 37, at 24 (suggesting that a treaty could be reached in one more
round of negotiations, if the U.S. and Soviet Union are ready to compromise); Leopold, U.S. Begins
Efforts to Revive Open Skies Talks With Soviet Union, Defense News, Dec. 10, 1990, at 27, col. 1
(U.S. will launch high-level effort to revive talks over next several months); Krepon, supra note 36,
at M2, col. 1 (Bush administration has concentrated on other arms control initiatives, and has not
invested sufficient energy in Open Skies negotiations to overcome Soviet resistance); Lewis, supra
note 44, at AI0, col. 6 (negotiators concluded first round of talks with a broad agreement that an
Open Skies accord was desirable, and hoped to complete such an accord during the second round of
talks).
49. Adams & Lowman, Canadian Flight Over Hungary Marks Trial Run of U.S. Open Skies
Initiative, Defense News, Jan. 15, 1990, at 25, col. 1; Canadian Gov't Press Release, Canada and
Hungary Conduct a Trial "Open Skies" Overflight (Jan. 1990). In the mock overflight, a Canadian
C-130 Hercules military airplane traversed Hungary for three hours at a variety of altitudes,
simulating the flight plan an Open Skies aircraft might wish to follow. The exercise included
overflying a Soviet military base. Hungarian officials inspected the plane before and after the flight
and had observers inside the plane at all times. The observers had full access to all areas of the
aircraft and continuously monitored its performance. In contrast to an actual Open Skies overflight,
this experiment included no photographic or other sensors; it thus tested only the flight procedures.
Canada has invited Hungary and the Soviet Union to undertake a corresponding overflight of




In addition, the basic concept behind Open Skies-reliance upon
aerial overflight and observation to promote military transparency and
mutual confidence-has also been incorporated into the new Treaty on
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)."' That multilateral
accord obligates parties to accept "an agreed number of aerial inspec-
tions"52 and contemplates ongoing negotiations to develop acceptable
quotas "and other applicable provisions." 3 The relationship between
the Open Skies talks and the CFE Treaty process has traditionally been a
close one and the issues involved have substantially overlapped. 4
Although the two regimes are similar in concept-both rely on interna-
tional overhead reconnaissance-there are important differences in their
respective goals,15 equipment, 56 and geographic coverage, 57 and the two
negotiations continue to proceed independently.
C. Open Skies Technology
In the thirty-five years since Eisenhower announced his initial vision
of Open Skies, stunning technological advances have vastly expanded the
potential power and intrusiveness of aerial reconnaissance. Open Skies
today would permit observation of unprecedented intensity, revealing
50. Adams & Lowman, supra note 49, at 25, col. 1 (quoting Edward Rowny, Special Assistant
for Arms Control to the Secretary of State). But see 9 Arms Control Rep. (IDDS) 409.B.7 (Mar.
1990) (noting "problems showing up in the test flight over Hungary").
51. CFE Treaty, supra note 7.
52. Id. art. XIV, 6.
53. Id Those implementing talks, dubbed "CFE IA," began in November 1990, but there is
no agreed timetable for their completion.
54. Originally, the negotiating parties contemplated that the Open Skies negotiations would
progress more rapidly, elaborating the details of an aerial inspection program that could then be
adapted for CFE Treaty purposes. However, when the Open Skies talks stalled in Spring 1990 and
the CFE talks bolted ahead, many expected that the contemplated relationship would then reverse,
with Open Skies eventually building upon the CFE Treaty's evolving model. See L. DUNN & B.
HENRY, supra note 37, at 15-17; B. HENRY & R. DAVIS, supra note 37, at 15-16; Hitchens, NATO
Pegs Sensors to Verify Treaties, Defense News, Sept. 24, 1990, at 18, col. 1. Eventually, the CFE
Treaty was drafted with only a general commitment to aerial inspection, deferring negotiation of the
details to subsequent talks. Questions of overflight, equipment, and use of data therefore remain
active in both fora.
55. The CFE Treaty relies upon aerial inspection as a supplemental tool of verification to
monitor compliance with provisions that limit the deployment of specified armaments, while Open
Skies is considered more of a confidence-building measure, independent of any specific program of
weapons reductions.
56. The CFE and Open Skies negotiations may lead to somewhat different outcomes on such
critical unresolved issues as the types of aircraft and sensors and the use of acquired data. See infra
notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
57. The most important distinction between Open Skies and the CFE Treaty concerns
geographic scope. The CFE Treaty is applicable to the continent of Europe "from the Atlantic
Ocean to the Ural Mountains." B. HENRY & R. DAvls, supra note 37, at 16. Open Skies, on the




many more details of military activity than have previously been avail-
able.58 The technology used to render military structures "transparent,"
however, would inevitably also expose intimate aspects of nonmilitary,
nongovernmental private life protected by the Constitution.
Reciprocity is an indispensable aspect of any arms control arrange-
ment, and under an Open Skies regime, each nation would serve as both
inspector and host.59 Thus, foreign monitors would be legally empow-
ered to overfly the entirety of the United States, with little if any advance
notification to the intended targets of scrutiny. Military installations and
other government facilities would certainly be of the greatest interest,"
but private businesses and individual dwellings would also be subject to
unrestricted and unannounced observation.6 The vast size of the United
States would ensure that, as a practical matter, no particular location
would encounter very frequent overflights. Nonetheless, nothing in the
treaty would prevent repeated observation, either through direct over-
flight or through the use of "slant photography," which allows aircraft to
monitor targets located many miles to the side.6'
Open Skies observation will be unique not only in the frequency of
overflights, but also in the sophistication of the monitoring technology.
58. See Spitzer, Aerial Observation and Overflights in VERIFICATION OF CONVENTIONAL
ARMS IN EUROPE: TECHNOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 89-122 (R. Kokoski & S.
Koulik eds. 1990).
59. The traditional dynamic of modem arms control negotiations has usually involved the
United States pressing for, and the Soviet Union resisting, intrusive measures of inspection to verify
compliance with the terms of any agreement. Most observers, including many Soviets, came to think
in terms of the United States principally advocating the interests of the "inspecting state" and the
Soviet Union mainly championing the concerns of the "host state." See Stovall, A Participant's View
of On-Site Inspections, PARAMETERS, June 1989, at 2 ("Mhe Soviets are most concerned with
foreign intrusion while the U.S. is most concerned with compliance verification."). But see Krass,
The Soviet View of Verification, in VERIFICATION AND ARMS CONTROL 37-38 (W. Potter ed. 1985)
(Soviet leaders' actions have always reflected their concern for verification of compliance). Of
course, any inspection rights incorporated into a disarmament treaty would have to be fully
reciprocal as between the two superpowers, and in recent years, the tables have turned somewhat,
with the Soviet Union now sometimes calling for intrusive inspection powers and the United States
expressing wariness that the verification process might compromise legitimate privacy interests.
60. Foreign arms control inspectors under an Open Skies treaty would be seeking principally
evidence of military activities, and would focus their primary attention on such installations as
military bases, government laboratories, and military production facilities. But private factories or
warehouses suspected of producing or storing weapons would also be monitored, as would almost
any industrial facility that could be adapted for producing weapons clandestinely. Indeed, the
mobility and small size of many modem weapons suggests that almost any place could be converted
into a covert storage depot and thereby be an appropriate subject of Open Skies monitoring.
61. Regardless of which targets they sought to monitor, foreign inspectors would inevitably
overfly and collect information from private property located near their intended targets. As
discussed below, see infra Part IV, this practice would raise issues of the conversion of trade secrets,
the invasion of privacy, and the detection of contraband.
62. Blair & Brewer, supra note 26, at 34. The side-looking radar of the United States' SR71
reconnaissance aircraft has a peripheral vision of up to 80 miles. Sloyan, Spies in the Sky, Wash.
Post, Feb. 25, 1990, at B1, col. 1, B4, col. 1.
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The types of sensors, their degree of sensitivity, and the details of the
resulting imagery would be unprecedented. Regarding "ordinary"
photography, for example, although nations closely guard the exact
capabilities of their current photoreconnaissance satellites, publicly dis-
cussed estimates suggest a resolution capability under optimal conditions
of as fine as a few inches." Photography from aircraft would have even
better resolution and could regularly reveal items only a few square
inches in size, and maybe smaller.6"
In addition to relatively familiar types of visible-light photography,
Open Skies overflights could employ a host of esoteric technologies. For
example, sophisticated non-optical systems could collect images at night
or through some cloud cover.6 Infrared sensors could reveal phenom-
ena invisible to the human eye, such as the difference between live and
cut vegetation, perhaps indicating the presence of camouflage. Thermal
sensors could reveal heat gradients, which can suggest activity occurring
underneath opaque roofs.67 Modern airborne radars can also be
extremely revealing, even in adverse weather,68 in some cases even being
capable of penetrating thin wooden roofs.6 9 Advanced computerized sys-
63. The SR71 "Blackbird," recently grounded by Air Force budget constraints, was the most
advanced American reconnaissance aircraft. It is capable'of flying at four times the speed of sound
and at altitudes in excess of 100,000 feet. Sloyan, supra note 62, at B4, cols. 1 & 3. Under optimal
conditions, it could "pick out the numbers on a license plate or street sign." Id. at col. 1. Imagery
from this aircraft helped locate American prisoners of war in Vietnam, support the attempted rescue
of the American hostages in Iran, and identify Moammar Qaddafi's personal tent prior to the 1986
American air strike against Libya. Richelson, Technical Collection and Arms Control, in
VERIFICATION AND ARMS CONTROL, supra note 59, at 169, 177-78; Sloyan, supra note 62, at B4,
col. 4.
64. D. BARASH, THE ARMS RACE AND NUCLEAR WAR 245 (1989) (reporting that "ground
resolution on the order of 10 cm is regularly achieved" by photoreconnaissance satellites); Blair &
Brewer, supra note 26, at 19 (satellite photoreconnaissance resolution is now on the order of three or
four inches, which is probably the best attainable, given the light-scattering effects of the
atmosphere). See generally A. KAss, supra note 20, at 16-28 (describing the development and
procedure of satellite photography); Spitzer, supra note 58, at 89-118 (discussing the capabilities of
numerous forms of aerial reconnaissance technology).
65. THE MITRE CORP., OPEN SKIES AIRCRAFT: A REVIEW OF SENSOR SUITE
CONSIDERATIONS 6 (Jan. 1990) [hereinafter OPEN SKIES ARCRAFT]. The observers could also use
other sensors to acquire large-scale images. For example, the SR71 in one hour could film
panoramas of 100,000 square miles. Sloyan, supra note 62, at B4, col. 1.
66. See generally J. RiCHELSON, THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 107-38 (1989)
(describing moderm remote imaging systems and capabilities).
67. See generally A. KRASS, supra note 20, at 30-32 (describing capabilities and limitations of
thermal infrared sensing). Existing equipment can detect temperature variances as small as one-half
degree Fahrenheit, indicating phenomena such as heated buildings or engines that have operated
recently. STIMSON CENTER, supra note 37, at 3.
68. INTERA TECH. LTD., AIRBORNE REMOTE SENSING FOR MULTI-LATERAL VERIFICATION
2 (Nov. 1989) (paper presented to the Multi-Lateral Verification Project of the Henry L. Stimson
Center).
69. OPEN SKIES AIRCRAFT, supra note 65, at 6 ("Synthetic Aperture Radars can be used to




tems can dramatically enhance imagery or compare current information
with data acquired on previous passes, enabling observers to obtain still
more detailed and accurate information about the target.70 Particulate
samplers could collect dust or other debris that might indicate the occur-
rence and nature of events such as clandestine nuclear tests.71
If the contemplated Open Skies agreement or a subsequent elabora-
tion of it72 permitted the use of other types of equipment, collectively
known as "signals intelligence" or "SIGINT," even more hitherto pri-
vate activities would be precipitously revealed.73 Modem eavesdropping
equipment can intercept telephone, telegraph, and fax transmissions. If
Open Skies inspectors chose to focus their most sophisticated equipment
on a particular target, they could detect and decipher the noise or vibra-
tions from a typewriter or computer, see and read documents from afar,
and monitor ordinary conversations-including those occurring inside a
closed office or home.74
Of course, the superpowers today already collect much of this type
of intelligence, utilizing an impressive array of sensors designed to moni-
tor one another's activities.75  These include the "national technical
70. A. KRASS, supra note 20, at 49-59 (technical discussion of image enhancement and image
restoration); ADAM, Peacekeeping by Technical Means, IEEE SPECTRUM, July 1986, at 42, 52-53
(describing image-processing techniques to restore and enhance aerial photographs); Blair & Brewer,
supra note 26, at 25 (discussing use of false-color photography to reveal camouflaged objects);
Hafemeister, Advances in Verification Technology, 41 BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Jan. 1985, at 35
(discussing contrast enhancement and filtering techniques); Richelson, supra note 63, at 206 n.15
(technical discussion of image enhancement and image restoration).
71. Richelson, supra note 63, at 197 (discussing aerial sampling and detection of nuclear
explosions); see also OPEN SKIES AIRCRAFT, supra note 65, at 13 (Open Skies applications also
include detection of chemical weapon manufacturing); id. at 14, 17 (describing Open Skies
applications to arms control verification through "acoustic monitoring" and "electronic tagging,"
two advanced technologies that could detect military equipment and operations).
72. Even without a signed Open Skies agreement, some have proposed extending its principles
to other, even more ambitious arrangements, such as the cooperative operation of sensitive
reconnaissance satellites. See Danson, Sharing Information Is the Next Step, Globe and Mail, Jan.
23, 1990, at 7, col. 1 (suggesting that an Open Skies follow-up accord could include cooperative
satellite reconnaissance).
73. J. RICHELSON, supra note 66, at 167-80 (discussing idea of collecting signals from airborne
"platforms"). See generally Richelson, supra note 63, at 178-86 (describing a variety of signals
intelligence technologies); Lardner, National Security Agency: Turning On and Tuning In, Wash.
Post, Mar. 18, 1990, at Al, col. 3 (illustrating the use of signals intelligence technology to track
arms-for-hostage deals between the U.S. and Iran).
74. See Marx, The New Surveillance, TECH. REv., May/June 1985, at 45, 47-48 (overview of
moder surveillance technologies); Lardner, supra note 73, at A24, col. 1 (notes possibility of
recording indoor conversations from the vibration of voices on window glass). But see OPEN SKIES
AIRCRAFt, supra note 65, at 12 (suggesting that an Open Skies regime would not be especially useful
for performing a SIGINT function, because effective interception of useful communications requires
the ability to collect data over a continuous period of time).
75. See generally W. ROWELL, ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION 41-72 (1986) (surveying
various technical and cooperative mechanisms for monitoring compliance with arms control
agreements); R. SCRIBNER, T. RALSTON & W. METZ, THE VERIFICATION CHALLENGE 47-66
(1985) (discussing technical means for arms control verification); Schear, Cooperative Measures of
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means of verification" or "NTM" (such as photoreconnaissance satel-
lites, long-range seismometers, and radar facilities) enshrined in existing
arms control treaties,76 as well as a variety of overt and covert human
sources.7 7 Each of these observation tools makes a contribution, but
each also has its limitations, and Open Skies overflights could add sub-
stantially to a nation's knowledge about its potential adversaries.
Verification, in VERIFICATION AND ARMS CONTROL, supra note 59 (discussing cooperative
measures of verification).
76. See Richelson, supra note 63, at 169. Several earlier arms control agreements have
included nearly the same language to regulate the use of NTM. See Interim Agreement on the
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, May 26, 1972, United States-USSR, art. V, 23 U.S.T. 3462,
3465, T.I.A.S. No. 7504, at 4; Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26,
1972, United States-USSR, art. XII, 23 U.S.T. 3435, 3443-44, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, at 9-10; Treaty on
the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, June 18, 1979, United States-USSR, art. XV, S. Exec.
Rep. No. 14, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 319, 421 (1979), 18 I.L.M. 1138, 1155-56, reprinted in ACDA
TREATY BOOK, supra note 2, at 267, 288 (did not enter into force) [hereinafter SALT II Treaty].
These provisions generally permit the use of NTM "in a manner consistent with generally
recognized principles of international law," prohibit "interference" with NTM, and ban "deliberate
concealment measures" that impede verification by NTM.
The United States and the Soviet Union have never jointly defined the NTM protected by these
treaties, but the United States has declared that NTM include photographic reconnaissance
satellites, similar aircraft-based systems, and ground-based and sea-based systems such as radars. W.
ROWELL, supra note 75, at 51-52; Cohen, The Evolution of Soviet Views on SALT Verification, in
VERiFiCATION AND SALT, supra note 26, at 55.
77. Diplomats and tourists, as well as spies, can provide data useful to the verification of
compliance with arms control treaties, but all these human sources have become somewhat less
important in the modern era when the technical means of monitoring have proven so successful. See
J. RICHELSON, supra note 66, at 233-49 (increased capability of collecting intelligence by technical
means has reduced reliance on human sources, though the latter remain useful for filling in gaps in
intelligence); Moser, supra note 29, at 4, 6-7 (discussing the rise of sophisticated technology in the
early 1950s and President Eisenhower's desire to decrease reliance on human resources).
78. See generally Hafemeister, Romm & Tsipis, The Verification of Compliance With Arms-
Control Agreements, 252 Sci. Am., Mar. 1985, at 39 (describing a number of high-technology
surveillance methods and their limitations); see also OPEN SKIES AIRCRAFr, supra note 65, at 4
(advantages of aircraft for data collection). Several recent arms control treaties have recognized the
importance of having multiple sources for information about the weaponry to be regulated. These
treaties include provisions requiring an ongoing bilateral exchange of data that specifies the number
of weapons in each of several relevant categories. See SALT II Treaty, supra note 76, Memorandum
of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of a Data Base on the Numbers of Strategic
Offensive Arms, S. Exec. Rep. No. 14, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 319, 440-44, 18 I.L.M. 1138, 1161,
reprinted in ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 2, at 267, 295; Treaty on the Elimination of
Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Dec. 8, 1987, United States-USSR, S. Exec. Rep.
No. 100-15, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1988), 27 I.L.M. 90 [hereinafter INF Treaty], Memorandum of
Understanding Regarding the Establishment of a Data Base for the Treaty, 27 I.L.M. 90, 98,
reprinted in ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 2, at 350, 363. Some treaties have supplemented
these provisions with agreements about the conduct of on-site inspection. See INF Treaty, supra,
Protocol Regarding Inspections, 27 I.L.M. 90, 190, reprinted in ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note
2, at 350, 431; Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, May 28, 1976,
United States-USSR (signed but not ratified) [hereinafter PNE Treaty], Protocol, S. Exec. Doc. N,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 9 (1976), 15 I.L.M. 891, 893, reprinted in ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note
2, at 194, 198.
It should also be noted that commercial airlines operated by European governments or private
enterprises now routinely fly over the territory of NATO and Warsaw Pact states. These civilian
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Satellites, for example, have assumed the greatest importance for
arms control verification, 79 but they' operate within severe constraints.
Aircraft reconnaissance under an Open Skies agreement could therefore
provide nations with a flexible means of supplementing the information
they now gather, circumventing four major limitations of current satellite
verification.
First, modem satellites are extremely expensive. Because of this,
only the wealthiest nations use them, and even the superpowers can
afford fewer than they would like.8 0 By contrast, aircraft are relatively
inexpensive and are available to all states." Furthermore, the sensor
flights could be utilized for covert photography or other national intelligence purposes, achieving
some of the same effects as an effective multilateral Open Skies agreement. There is, however, a
stark asymmetry in these overflights: Soviet airliners regularly fly over virtually all of Western
Europe, but commercial aircraft from NATO states rarely fly Over the portions of the Soviet Union
east of the Ural Mountains. Even in European Russia, foreign overflights are much less common.
An Open Skies treaty could redress this imbalance. Florini, Come Spy the Friendly Skies, 46 BULL.
ATOM. ScIENTISTS, Mar. 1990, at 13.
79. W. ROWELL, supra note 75, at 44-47; Richelson, supra note 63, at 173-78.
80. STIMSON CENTER, supra note 37, at 1; Richelson, supra note 63, at 199. One expert has
estimated that modern reconnaissance satellites cost approximately $1 billion each. Sloyan, supra
note 62, at B4, col. 5. But cf De Santis, Commercial Observation Satellites and Their Military
Implications: Speculative Assessment, 12 WASH. Q., Summer 1989, at 185 (reconnaissance satellites
operated by several states or by commercial enterprises will become more common in the future);
Broad, Non-Superpowers Are Developing Their Own Spy Satellite Systems. N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1989,
at 1, col. I (Britain, Spain, France, Italy, Israel, and perhaps other countries are developing
electronic and photographic spy satellites).
Some have proposed establishing an International Satellite Monitoring Agency, through which
nations could collaborate to share the expenses of building and operating reconnaissance satellites
for arms control purposes. The U.N. General Assembly endorsed the concept in 1982, and it has
been reiterated frequently, but it is still far from operational. 8 Arms Control Rep. (IDDS) 850-
211 (Jan. 1989); Turner, Opening the World's Skies forMankind, 1 SPACE POL'Y 357, 359 (1985); see
also Jasani, Prins & Rees, Share Satellite Surveillance, 46 BULL. ATOM. SCmNTISTS, Mar. 1990, at
15 (discussing the pros and cons of a shared system of satellite surveillance). Similarly, some
commercial satellite reconnaissance systems offer imagery to the public, but these are generally
incapable of producing resolutions as great as those of the superpowers' advanced military systems.
Krepon, Peacemakers or Rent-a-Spies?, 45 BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Sept. 1989, at 12-13. For
related articles on this subject, see Kennedy & Marshall, A Peek at the French Missile Complex, 45
BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Sept. 1989, at 20; Richeson, Military Intelligence-SPOTIs Not Enough,
45 BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Sept. 1989, at 26; Spector, Keep the Skies Open, 45 BULL. ATOM.
SCIENTISTS, Sept. 1989, at 15; Zimmerman, Evidence of Spying, 45 BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Sept.
1989, at 24; Zimmerman, Photos From Space: Why Restrictions Won't Work, TECH. REv., May/
June 1988, at 47 [hereinafter Zimmerman, Photos From Space].
81. BACKGROUNDER, supra note 10, at 1, 7-8; INT'L INST. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, THE
MILITARY BALANCE 1989-90 (1989) (describing the reconnaissance aircraft many states operate
today). An airborne inspection capability costs only about one-twentieth as much as a comparable
satellite system. BACKGROUNDER, supra note 10, at 8. Of course, aircraft can be very expensive too:
the American fleet of SR71 reconnaissance planes, for example, carried annual operating expenses of
$200 million. Sloyan, supra note 62, at B4, col. 5. But the Open Skies aircraft would not require
many of the high-performance (and high-cost) characteristics necessary for the SR71 to operate
inside a hostile environment. See GULFSTREAM AEROSPACE, THE C-20F GULFSTREAM: AN IDEAL
PLATFORM FOR OPEN SKIES (undated advertising brochure for commercial aircraft deemed suitable
for Open Skies missions); supra note 63 (describing the SR71).
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:421
technology required for remote aerial photography is not especially com-
plex or costly, and suitable equipment could be readily accessible to all. 2
Second, satellites are predictable. It is relatively easy to calculate
the future trajectory of a monitoring satellite, since most have very little
ability to maneuver on demand. Even the most sophisticated American
reconnaissance satellites, such as the recently launched Advanced KH-
11, can take days to shift position in space in response to fast-breaking
events.8 3 This predictability gives target nations an easy opportunity to
halt or conceal earthborne activities prior to satellite overflight.8 4 Air-
craft, however, provide a more flexible response, since they can be dis-
patched to any location at any time, can follow innumerable flight plans,
and can "loiter," make repeat passes, or suddenly deviate from a given
course."5 Aircraft can also be quickly adapted to specialized purposes,
and can be outfitted with whatever sensors the particular occasion
requires.8 6
82. A nation could accomplish Open Skies observation using inexpensive apparatus with
sensors that do not embody the highest levels of technology. This type of photographic equipment is
already commercially available, Nordwall, Kodak Team Develops Aerial Camera with Electro-Optic,
Film Capability, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Aug. 15, 1988, at 101, and many states are now
pursuing this type of capability. See Countries Adopt Airborne Cameras As Alternative to Satellite
Systems, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Sept. 7, 1987, at 111. Because the systems are not
extremely sophisticated, U.S. laws restricting the export and transfer of sensitive equipment would
impose few impediments. Morrison, supra note 20, at 3020; Notes from Canadian Open Skies Press
Conference 2 (Feb. 8, 1990) (comments by Ambassador Burney).
American defense officials have indicated that the United States would probably not use its
most sophisticated sensors on an Open Skies mission; strategically, it would be wiser to use only
second-best equipment in an operation where Soviet inspectors could learn so much about the
equipment. The United States would reserve its top-of-the-line hardware for more confidential
purposes. DOD Will Alert U.S.-Based Forces Before Open Skies Overflights Aerospace Daily, Jan.
19, 1990, at 107 [hereinafter Open Skies Overflights].
83. Sloyan, supra note 62, at B4, col. 5.
84. Reports suggest that both the United States and the Soviet Union regularly track the
overflights of each other's reconnaissance satellites, so that they can delay, move, or conceal their
most sensitive programs in order to conduct them without observation. Richelson, supra note 63, at
201.
85. An Open Skies agreement would require an inspecting aircraft to adhere to its previously
filed flight plan (out of safety considerations, if nothing else), and it could not suddenly depart from
the pre-announced and approved pattern. The advance notification process would provide time for
the inspected state to secrete its most sensitive equipment and activities-an opportunity that
American officials have already indicated the United States would not hesitate to exploit. Open Skies
Overflights supra note 82, at 107. Nonetheless, even if the overflying aircraft cannot loiter
unannounced above a target or make surprise repeat passes, the operator can turn onboard sensors
to acquire information from different angles as the plane passes over a fixed target. The aircraft can
also simultaneously scrutinize a target with a number of different types of sensors and keep it under
constant surveillance from "standoff" range. OPEN SKIES AIRCRAFT, supra note 65, at 1, 4.
86. See BACKGROUNDER, supra note 10, at 7 (airborne reconnaissance more technically
flexible than spaceborne systems); Sloyan, supra note 62, at B4, cols. 1 & 5 (aircraft are more
technically flexible than satellites, quickly adaptable for a variety of missions). It is particularly
noteworthy in this context that half the 42,000 locations in the "target base" for American
photoreconnaissance are located outside the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China, in areas that
may not be covered well by satellites. Richelson, From CORONA to LACROSSE. A Short History of
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Third, satellites are fragile. The Challenger shuttle disaster and
resulting delays illustrate how much we still have to learn about safe
space flight.87 Furthermore, the Strategic Defense Initiative and related
anti-satellite weapons programs illustrate the potential vulnerability of
satellites to systems that can damage or destroy manmade objects in
space."5 Conversely, years of successful experience with civilian and mil-
itary aircraft have proven that they are a durable and robust form of
transportation, operated with confidence by many nations.8 9
Fourth, satellites are simply too far away to sense everything that
could be noted by low-flying aircraft. Modem satellites incorporate truly
marvelous intelligence technology, but observation from an altitude of
1000 feet is bound to be more revealing than observation from 100 miles
away, especially when cloud cover, air pollution, and darkness inter-
vene.90 Unlike satellites, aircraft can take quick advantage of favorable
weather conditions and exploit fleeting observation opportunities.
Satellites, Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1990, at B1, col. 2, B4, cols. 2-3. But see Richelson, supra note 80, at
26 (aircraft have some disadvantages as compared with satellites for reconnaissance purposes, since
aircraft have more limited range and speed).
87. The delay in the space shuttle program also caused substantial disruptions in American
plans to deploy a comprehensive network of surveillance satellites. Richelson, supra note 86, at B4,
col. 2; Sloyan, supra note 62, at B4, col. 5.
88. There has been substantial debate regarding the technical feasibility of the Strategic
Defense Initiative, but experts agree that it would be significantly easier to shoot down or otherwise
interfere with the operation of ordinary satellites (such as those performing reconnaissance or early
warning functions) than to intercept ballistic missile warheads, since the satellites typically are not
"hardened" against the threat of enemy attack. See generally OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S.
CONGRESS, BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGIES (1985) (discussing the technology and
feasibility of ballistic missile defense systems); OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS,
ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS, COUNTERMEASURES, AND ARMS CONTROL 43-45 (1985) [hereinafter
ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS] (discussing the capabilities and vulnerabilities of satellite systems).
Both the United States and the Soviet Union have long sustained vigorous research and
development programs toward anti-satellite (ASAT) weaponry. Although neither has yet perfected
a highly capable system, each has conducted extensive testing. The intermittent arms control
negotiations, meanwhile, have made scant progress toward a treaty that might impose a legal
solution to the problem of satellite vulnerability. ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS, supra, at 127-28; U.S.
DEP'T OF DEFENSE, SoviET MILITARY POWER: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE 1, 55-56 (1989); see also
Grossman, supra note 40, at 19, col. 1 (criticizing Bush administration for pursuing Open Skies
proposals while simultaneously requesting funds to pursue ASAT capabilities that could jeopardize
the best current reconnaissance systems).
89. Another advantage of an Open Skies regime may be the elimination of incidents such as the
Soviet Union's destruction of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 on August 31, 1983, in which one state
attacks another state's aircraft in the belief that it is undertaking an espionage overflight. If
reconnaissance overflights were legal and cooperative, there would be less reason for states to
undertake covert surveillance and less reason for target states to be worried or trigger-happy. See
Statement by Jiri Dienstbier, supra note 46, at 7. However, such incidents may not entirely
disappear if the Open Skies treaty does not authorize SIGINT missions, and if the states still attempt
to collect that type of intelligence via aircraft espionage.
90. Many strategically sensitive areas of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are cloud-
covered for 70% of the year, obscuring observation by satellite-based optical systems. Richelson,
supra note 63, at 199; Richelson, supra note 86, at B4, col. 3.
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Moreover, for certain purposes, such as the collection of radioactive or
chemical debris that might evidence clandestine military activities, air-
borne sensors are uniquely useful.9 1
D. Current Open Skies Proposals
Although the Ottawa and Budapest conferences did not produce a
treaty, the resurgence of interest in Open Skies has remained strong, and
a treaty could be concluded in a relatively short time whenever the
United States and Soviet Union decide to press for resolution of a few
key remaining obstacles. The current NATO proposal for Open Skies92
envisions the following critical elements, many of which represent signifi-
cant departures from the pattern of prior arms control accords:
1) All twenty-two members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact93
would agree to participate in the program, as both inspectors and hosts.94
The entire territory of the United States, the Soviet Union, Europe, and
Canada would be available for overflight, with few exclusions, 95 on an
91. OPEN SKIES AIRCRAFr, supra note 65, at 4.
92. NATO Press Service, supra note 39.
93. The original NATO proposal embraced all 16 NATO states and 7 Warsaw Pact states.
With the reunification of Germany, the number of participating countries has dropped to 22.
During the February 1990 Open Skies negotiations in Ottawa, the direct participants in the talks
were the foreign ministers of the 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact states, while Austria, Cyprus, Finland,
Ireland, Monaco, Sweden, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia sent observers. Open Skies Communiqu6,
supra note 44.
The impending dissolution of the Warsaw Pact may complicate the bloc-to-bloc structure of the
negotiations but will not affect the scope of its geographic coverage. Under the current NATO
proposal, the Open Skies program would not apply to the neutral countries of Europe, although it
would be "without prejudice" to them, and they might be invited to join the treaty at a later time
when the inspection regime was operational. NATO Press Service, supra note 39, at 5.
94. The direct participation in the negotiations of so many states is in contrast to the practice
of some other arms control agreements, in which bilateral talks between the United States and the
Soviet Union were a critical precursor to multilateral involvement. In the case of intermediate-range
nuclear forces, for example, the United States and the Soviet Union first negotiated and signed the
basic bilateral accord, the INF Treaty, supra note 78. The parties then worked out a complex
network of subsidiary agreements with the European states on whose territory the weapons were
based, permitting on-site inspection of the deployment areas. See Agreement Regarding Inspections
Relating to the Treaty Between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-
Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Dec. 11, 1987, 27 I.L.M. 58 (1988). In contrast, the CFE
Treaty, supra note 7, was negotiated bloc-to-bloc, involving all members of NATO and the Warsaw
Pact.
95. Under the NATO proposal, specific locales that pose exceptional hazards to aircraft safety
may be temporarily placed off limits to the inspectors, but even flights over militarily sensitive areas
would be restricted only for reasons of safety, such as during a missile test. NATO Press Service,
supra note 39, at 4-5.
This arrangement-providing blanket permission to inspect, subject only to specified
exceptions-is in contrast to the more restrictive inspection powers usually incorporated into other
arms control agreements. For example, in the negotiations regarding the control of nuclear
weaponry, as well as in the talks concerning an agreement on chemical weapons, the parties have
generally developed programs permitting inspection of specified installations but preventing
inspectors from going wherever they might wish, such as into facilities that have no overt connection
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"anytime, anyplace" basis.96
2) The inspecting state would not need to supply any "reason" for
its inspection, and the inspectors would not be required to justify their
presence, explain the basis for their proposed flight plan, or provide evi-
dence supporting any suspicions.97 The inspectors would conduct their
overflights pursuant to a legal right, and the host would be obligated to
permit the flights to occur. No additional forms of legal permission, such
as licenses or search warrants, would be contemplated. 98
3) The overflights would occur with only very short warning. The
inspecting state would give sixteen hours advance notice of its arrival at a
port of entry. It would then have six hours to file a flight plan, followed
by twenty-four hours of preflight preparation time.99 During the notifi-
cation period, the states would inspect and service the aircraft and equip-
ment, and coordinate flight plans for safety purposes. 1°°
4) Personnel of the host country would be permitted to undertake
intrusive but nondestructive testing of the aircraft and its sensors to
to the particular type of weapons or industry being regulated. Morrison, Trusting, But Verfying,
1989 NAT'L J. 2580.
96. Toth, NA TO, East Bloc Near Accord on Open Skies, L.A. Times, Feb. 13, 1990, at A18, col.
2. In other arms control contexts, such as the START and chemical weapons treaty negotiations,
the concept of "anytime, anyplace" inspection for verification has proven controversial, and both the
United States and the Soviet Union have shied away from such a high degree of intrusiveness.
Morrison, supra note 95, at 2582.
97. NATO Press Service, supra note 39, at 2. A different sort of arms control inspection
regime relies upon "challenge." Under a challenge regime, a party suspicious about events occurring
inside another state would present the evidence that triggered its fears and seek an explanation. The
challenged state would then supply clarification or agree to host on-site inspection. This sort of
regime has been considered most fully in the context of agreements to limit the testing of nuclear
weapons. See H. YORK, MAKING WEAPONS, TALKING PEACE 304 (1987). The CFE Treaty also
uses a similar concept. CFE Treaty, supra note 7, Protocol on Inspection, § VIII.
.98. NATO Press Service, supra note 39, at 2. The principle of reciprocity provides an
important protection against abuses, since each state knows that if it misbehaves (as either inspector
or host) and frustrates the purposes of the Open Skies regime, then it will likely be treated poorly in
return inspections. L. HENKIN, ARMS CONTROL AND INSPECTION IN AMERCAN LAW 22-24
(1958).
99. NATO Press Service, supra note 39, at 4. This time frame is comparable to that
incorporated into the INF Treaty, in which the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that the
inspecting party will give sixteen hours advance notice of its entry into the inspected state. The
inspecting party will then have four hours to specify which particular facility it wishes to inspect,
and the host will then have nine hours to transport the visitors to their intended target. INF Treaty,
supra note 78, Protocol Regarding Inspections, 27 I.L.M. 90, 190, reprinted in ACDA TREATY
BOOK, supra note 2, at 350, 431; Morrison, supra note 95, at 2582; see also CFE Treaty, supra note
7, Protocol on Inspection, § VIII (establishing similar timetable).
100. NATO Press Service, supra note 39, at 4. The Open Skies aircraft would follow a wide
variety of routes, differing from those customarily used by civil aviation, and would want to use
starkly varying altitudes at different locations. This would require complex clearances and air traffic
control for safety purposes, and a significant portion of the Open Skies regime would include efforts
to streamline the existing bureaucratic mechanisms that coordinate this type of transit. Canadian
Gov't Press Release, supra note 49, at 1.
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ensure that it contained no weapons or impermissible equipment.101
Observers from the host country would remain on board the aircraft
during the flight, monitoring its operation and sensors, and they would
be permitted unrestricted movement throughout the aircraft at all
times. 10
2
5) Each participating state would furnish its own aircraft and sen-
sors for use during the inspection. These could include custom-built sur-
veillance aircraft or unarmed military planes adapted for the purpose.10 3
Allies could collaborate in performing and hosting their inspections. 14
6) Sensors could include optical photographic systems, infrared and
thermal sensors, radar imagers, and particulate samplers, but not wire-
tapping or eavesdropping equipment. 10 5 Sensors would be of very high
quality, capable of acquiring detailed data.
10 6
7) There would be a quota system, based upon the relative geo-
graphic size of each participating state, to allocate the number and dura-
tion of the overflights, with provisions to ensure rough equality between
the two blocs. The United States would be overflown roughly once per
week; the Soviet Union twice to three times per week.107
8) The inspecting state would share with its allies 08 the information
101. NATO Press Service, supra note 39, at 4. This arrangement is in partial contrast to that
employed in earlier arms control agreements, such as the PNE Treaty, which provided that the
inspecting personnel would bring two identical sets of sensing equipment, and the host state would
select one set for use by the inspectors and one set for the host to retain and examine to ensure that
no illegitimate extra sensors were hidden inside. PNE Treaty, supra note 78, Protocol, art. IV, 6,
S. Exec. Doc. N, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 15-17 (1976), 15 I.L.M. 891, 896-97, reprinted in ACDA
TREATY BOOK, supra note 2, at 194, 203-04.
102. NATO Press Service, supra note 39, at 4.
103. Id. The current NATO proposal would not permit the use of helicopters. Id. American
officials have contemplated use of large aircraft such as the Lockheed C-135, especially to inspect a
large country like the Soviet Union. Smaller aircraft, such as the Boeing DHC Dash 8-300, could be
used for more geographically limited missions. Air Force personnel would probably operate the
planes. Open Skies Overflights, supra note 82, at 107.
104. NATO Press Service, supra note 39, at 4. Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg have
already indicated that they would plan to pool their resources and undertake joint inspection flights
in order to save costs. Adams, Smaller Countries Hope to Reduce Open Skies' Cost, Data Limits,
Defense News, Feb. 19, 1990, at 8, col. 1.
105. BACKGROUNDER, supra note 10. Under the NATO proposal, the states would develop and
update a list of prohibited categories of sensors each year. NATO Press Service, supra note 39, at 4.
106. The United States would be willing to modify existing export restrictions and sell to the
USSR some types of advanced sensors for use in Open Skies. See Hughes, U.S., Soviet Differences
Could Prevent Planned Signing of Open Skies Treaty, AviATroN WEEK & SPACE TECH., Apr. 2,
1990, at 41-43; Morrison, supra note 20, at 3020; Notes from Canadian Open Skies Press
Conference, supra note 82, at 2 (comments by Ambassador Burney).
107. NATO Press Service, supra note 39, at 4. Under the NATO proposal, a country would get
a quota on the basis of its geographic size. Id at 3. Since the Soviet Union is more than twice as
large as the United States, the United States could conduct more than twice as many surveillance
flights over the Soviet Union as the Soviets could conduct over the United States. STIMSON
CENTER, supra note 37, at 2.
108. The ongoing political reconfiguration of Europe complicates the prior focus on the bloc-to-
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obtained from Open Skies overflights,1 °9 but the host state and its allies
would not receive copies of the data. 110
Most of the Warsaw Pact countries' 1 ' have not dissented from these
propositions in critical ways, but the Soviet Union has expressed con-
trary views on several outstanding questions." 2 Primary among these
points of contention have been the Soviet suggestions that:
1) The overflying aircraft should be owned and operated by the host
state, or perhaps jointly owned and operated by both countries, instead of
belonging to the inspecting state. The states could develop and build a
dedicated multinational fleet of reconnaissance aircraft for this purpose,
and could use a common package of sensors.'
bloc negotiation and implementation of Open Skies. Analysts have pondered who would have the
responsibility and authority to overfly a reunited Germany, whether Greece and Turkey would
overfly each other, and how the former satellite states of Eastern Europe would now relate to the
Soviet Union. Horgan, Open Skies 262 Sci. AM., May 1990, at 5, 20-21.
109. NATO Press Service, supra note 39, at 4-5. American officials concede that the
interpretation of the data obtained from Open Skies overflights will be challenging, but contend that
existing procedures for sharing similar information within the NATO alliance can continue.
STIMSON CENTER, supra note 37, at 6; see also Katz, The Fabric of Verification: The Warp and the
Woof in VERIFICATION AND SALT, supra note 26, at 199 (photographs can be very compelling
evidence about behaviors, but interpretation by skilled analysts is necessary before photos can be
meaningful to non-experts).
110. NATO Press Service, supra note 39, at 4-5. In contrast, most other arms control
agreements, such as the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, have dealt with this question by
specifying that host country personnel should accompany the inspectors, replicate any
measurements as they see fit, and obtain copies of all photographs. The two parties then jointly
control the release of any information acquired during the inspection. PNE Treaty, supra note 78,
Protocol, art. III, 5, art. IX, % 2, S. Exec. Doc. N, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 13-14, 22 (1976), 15
I.L.M. 891, 895-96, 900, reprinted in ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 2, at 194, 202, 209.
111. Diplomatic fissures have appeared within the Warsaw Pact on the question of Open Skies.
During the Ottawa conference, Czechoslovakia and Hungary distanced themselves somewhat from
the position adopted by the Soviet Union. 9 Arms Control Rep. (IDDS) 409.B.11 (Mar. 1990).
Some fear that this disarray may delay an agreement on Open Skies. Howard, Soviets Gain Little
Support for Proposal, Globe and Mail, Feb. 5, 1990, at A4, col. 6.
112. See L. DUNN & B. HENRY, supra note 37, at 5-13; B. HENRY & R. DAVIs, supra note 37,
at 6-7; Tucker, supra note 37, at 22-23. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations issued their
own point-by-point "basic elements paper" in response to NATO's position paper, see Warsaw
Treaty Organization, Basic Elements Paper on Open Skies, Opens Skies Conference, Ottawa (Feb.
12, 1990), and other aspects of their views have emerged in speeches at Ottawa and in informal
contacts. See 9 Arms Control Rep. (IDDS) 409.B.9-11 (Mar. 1990); USSR Foreign Ministry Press
Center, Questions From the Press, VESTNIK, Mar. 1990, at 80 (interview with Soviet arms negotiator
Viktor Karpov) (VESTNIK is a joint publication of the USSR Foreign Ministry and the Austrian firm
of Allgemeine Bauten-Vertriebsgesellschaft); Lewis, supra note 11, at All, col. 1; Statement by Jiri
Dienstbier, supra note 46; Statement by Boyko Dimitrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bulgaria,
Open Skies Conference, Ottawa (Feb. 12, 1990).
113. See Open Skies Overflights, supra note 82, at 107; Adams & Lowman, supra note 49, at 25,
col. 1. Some commentators speculate that one reason for this preference is that the Soviet Union's
surveillance equipment is not as sophisticated as that of the United States. See Morrison, supra note
20, at 3020. Pooling resources would equalize the types of data collected and perhaps permit the
Soviets to acquire Western technology. See Howard, Open SkiesrdOpen Secrets, Globe and Mail,
Jan. 23, 1990, at A7, col. 1. Reliance upon host-owned aircraft and sensors would also eliminate the
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2) There should be a smaller quota of permitted overflights, such
that the Soviet Union might host approximately fifteen to twenty-five
Open Skies inspections per year, with another fifteen to twenty-five annu-
ally for the rest of the Warsaw Pact. Each flight would be of limited
duration, with the sensors operating for only three hours of the fight. 14
3) A more restricted package of sensors should be available for
Open Skies flights, using only photography and relatively primitive syn-
thetic aperture radars, while eliminating the most technologically sophis-
ticated devices. The permitted sensors should possess relatively limited
capabilities and would not be the best available in the West. 11 5
4) The treaty should permit broader exclusions from observation,
and certain sensitive locations should be declared off limits to Open Skies
overflights.
5) The participants should be allowed to overfly one another's over-
seas military bases as well as their home territories.' 16
6) Each inspecting state should share the photographs and other
data it acquires with all the other parties to the treaty, not solely with
members of its own military alliance." 7
7) The spirit of the negotiations should also lead to a subsequent
treaty embracing exchanges of information about military activities on
the high seas and in outer space ("open seas" and "open space" as well as
"open skies"), since these, too, are areas where potential threats exist. 18
E. The Importance of Open Skies
Why are the superpowers and their allies, after ignoring the concept
of Open Skies for so long, suddenly so eager to pursue it?" 9 What is its
possibility that the inspectors could secretly insert additional types of equipment beyond those
authorized by the treaty.
114. See Krepon, supra note 36, at M2, col. 3.
115. See 9 Arms Control Rep. (IDDS) 409.B.16 (July 1990); Krepon, supra note 36, at M2,
col. 3.
116. See 9 Arms Control Rep. (IDDS) 409.B.15 (July 1990). The Soviet Union has noted that
the United States maintains a far-flung network of naval and air bases around the world, and has
argued that these installations, too, ought to be subject to Open Skies inspections. Howard, Soviets
Seek Changes in Scheme for Surveillance, Globe and Mail, Jan. 9, 1990, at A9, col. 1. Many of the
states participating in Open Skies negotiations have important military bases or other activities
inside other countries. See SIVARD, WORLD MILITARY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURES, 1987-88, at
12-13 (12th ed. 1987) (listing 29 countries with a total of 1,771,360 troops based abroad in 1987).
117. USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center, supra note 112, at 80; Warsaw Treaty Organization,
supra note 112, at 1.
118. Lewis, supra note 43, at A10, col. 1; Statement by Eduard Shevardnadze, Open Skies
Conference, Ottawa (Feb. 12, 1990), at 3-4, reprinted in Shevardnadze, Open Thinking Opens the
Skies, VE rIK, Apr. 1990, at 60-61.
119. Many delegations praised the effectiveness of the Ottawa round of negotiations and




place in the modem world of arms control and national security? Both
political and military considerations help explain the sudden
renaissance. 120
Politically, agreement on an Open Skies treaty would provide an
important demonstration of mutual good will. Secretary Baker has sug-
gested that an Open Skies agreement would provide "a tangible and pow-
erful symbol of emerging East-West cooperation that our public can
readily see and understand." 121 This treaty and the unprecedented expo-
sure it mandates could highlight a dramatic break with past policies of
secrecy and distrust.12  Open Skies could help symbolize a new era in
which nations, motivated by the hope that greater mutual openness could
reciprocally reduce the fear of surprise attack, willingly exposed them-
selves to foreign scrutiny. 123 This openness could also reduce the dual
tendency to apply "worst case scenarios" to perceived threats from the
other side and to respond by maintaining a large, expensive, and threat-
ening military apparatus.' 24
Open Skies by itself does not reduce the number of armaments a
state may possess. Indeed, paying the costs associated with conducting
inspections and performing host fumctions would marginally increase
total military expenditures. 12  Nonetheless, Open Skies would eventually
120. See L. DUNN & B. HENRY, supra note 37, at 14 (listing the possible purposes of Open
Skies); B. HENRY & R. DAVIS, supra note 37, at 8 (same); Tucker, supra note 37, at 20 (describing
the utility of an Open Skies treaty).
121. Lewis, supra note 43, at AI0, col. 1; Statement by U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker
III, Open Skies Conference, Ottawa (Feb. 12, 1990), reprinted in Baker, Open Skies and the New Era
in Security, U.S. Dep't of State, Press Release No. 17 (Feb. 14, 1990).
122. Some earlier arms control negotiations witnessed exceptionally difficult and painstaking
deliberations regarding what, if any, photographs the inspecting personnel would be allowed to take
and what procedures would be necessary to protect the interests of the host state when photography
was permitted. See PNE Treaty, supra note 78, Protocol, art. III, 5, S. Exec. Doc. N, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 5, 13-14 (1976), 15 I.L.M. 891, 985-96, reprinted in ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 2, at
194, 202; Heckrotte, Verification of Test Ban Treaties, in VERIFICATION AND ARMS CONTROL,
supra note 59, at 63, 67-68.
123. Of course, the states have already exposed themselves, willingly or not, to satellite
reconnaissance, and this type of surveillance-both by the superpowers' military satellites and by
privately owned commercial satellites operated for news-gathering and other purposes-is becoming
more intrusive and pervasive. Lindgren, Commercial Satellites Open Skies, 44 BULL. ATOM.
SCIEN-rISTS, Apr. 1988, at 34.
124. President Lyndon Johnson described the value of the early reconnaissance satellites in
similar terms, noting that the $35-40 billion the United States spent on the space program was a
valuable investment:
[l]f nothing else had come out of it except the knowledge we've gained from space
photography, it would be worth ten times what the whole program has cost. Because
tonight we know how many missiles the enemy has and, it turned out, our guesses were
way off .... We were harboring fears we didn't need to harbor.
Richelson, supra note 86, at Bl, col. 3, B4, col. 1.
125. One expert has estimated that the cost of building and outfitting a small airplane for an
Open Skies operation would be $12 million, with another $3 million in annual operating costs.
Morrison, supra note 20, at 3020.
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promote other weapons cuts by evidencing states' benign intentions and
easing international tensions. For example, one commentator has noted
that the justification for expensive, radar-evading Stealth bombers could
be undercut by an Open Skies treaty that provided for regular unencum-
bered reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union. 26
Open Skies also quiets the hoary debates about how much verifica-
tion is necessary and appropriate for what measure of disarmament. The
United States and the Soviet Union have long disagreed over whether the
"control" provisions of an international system could come before, with,
or only after the "disarmament" provisions had been implemented. The
United States has traditionally argued that it would not be safe to reduce
armaments before establishing a workable verification apparatus, and the
Soviets have frequently countered that no invasive monitoring arrange-
ments would be worthwhile or necessary before truly significant arms
reductions were achieved.127 By establishing the precedent that, at least
in some areas, the verification system can comefirst, with the substantive
arms control measures to follow, an Open Skies treaty would help resolve
this particular point of contention. At a time when Europe, and the
world as a whole, are racing toward mutual accommodation, 128 Open
Skies could be a timely and salient gesture.1 29
Reaching an agreement on aerial inspection, however, will serve
more than purely symbolic ends. Open Skies also has a vital military
component because of its considerable value to strategic and tactical
intelligence. As noted previously, aircraft can perform some reconnais-
sance functions more deftly, reliably, and cheaply than satellites, 130 and
certain types of data can be acquired only through the proximate sensing
126. Krepon, "Open Skies"--Money in the Bank N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1990, at A17, col. 1.
127. See A. KRAss, supra note 20, at 116; see also STANFORD ARMS CONTROL GROUP,
INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL: ISSUES AND AGREEMENTS 71-72 (J. Barton & L. Weiler eds.
1976).
128. There is a strong connection between Open Skies and other arms control efforts designed as
"confidence-building measures." Steps like those being considered in the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe will not directly reduce the size of the participating states' military
forces, but are intended to reduce the potential for, and the fear of, surprise attack. See NATO Press
Service, supra note 39, at 1. American and Soviet officials agreed that an Open Skies treaty should
not be legally connected to other ongoing negotiations, such as those that produced the CFE Treaty,
supra note 7, in November 1990, even though there is an important military and political link
between them. 8 Arms Control Rep. (IDDS) 1 850-211 (Nov. 1989). An Open Skies treaty would
cover a larger geographic area than the CFE Treaty, and would permit overflight and photography
without regard to any particular program of arms reductions. See Notes from Canadian Open Skies
Press Conference, supra note 82 (comments by Ambassador Burney).
129. An Open Skies regime would not be foolproof; its proponents recognize that there would
always be opportunities for obstructionist parties to frustrate it without overtly violating its
provisions. Nevertheless, they argue, the treaty can be a useful step in building and sustaining the
joint political will necessary to make the inspection program succeed. BACKGROUNDER No. 2,
supra note 17, at 11.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 79-91.
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that Open Skies would authorize."'
Moreover, even if Open Skies inspections were nothing more than a
backup means of verification, and the treaty were simply an authoriza-
tion for a redundant system of aerial overflight, it would still make a
contribution at the margin, further complicating the task of any potential
arms control violator and providing insurance against failure of the pri-
mary system.132 The combination of a satellite's technical elegance and
an airplane's robustness and flexibility provides the kind of synergistic
assurance that neither system standing alone could offer. 133
A solid Open Skies agreement could therefore contribute to interna-
tional security by increasing each side's confidence that its potential
adversaries were not undertaking threatening military activities in con-
templation of war.134  Aerial overflight could complement more distant
or episodic forms of inspection,135 assisting in the performance of a vari-
ety of intelligence functions. By establishing a system of regular, close,
and focused observation, Open Skies could help ensure compliance with
current or future arms control treaty terms such as those that require a
party reliably to: (a) count the strategic nuclear weapons of other states
131. See supra text accompanying notes 63-74.
132. Modem arms control agreements depend upon multiple verification systems. No single
mechanism, no matter how powerful, is ordinarily considered sufficient to monitor compliance, and
a network of overlapping and partially redundant means of detection provides the greatest assurance
of adequate verification. A. KRAss, supra note 20, at 98-10 1.
133. Moreover, the imagery that satellite photoreconnaissance produces for national security
purposes has traditionally been heavily classified in order to prevent the compromise of intelligence
sources and methods that might accompany public release. See Lindgren, supra note 123, at 37.
Aerial photography, on the other hand, could probably be disseminated freely, which could further
increase confidence by facilitating informed public debate. OPEN SaES AIRCRAFr, supra note 65, at
4; Krepon, supra note 37, at 27, col. 1.
134. No state is willing to accept uncorroborated, unilateral assertions that a potential rival has
scrupulously complied with all treaty obligations. Some mechanism for verifying such performance
is therefore necessary. While the standards defining the "adequacy" or "effectiveness" of verification
remain controversial, there is general acknowledgment that no realistic system of monitoring could
ever provide 100% certain detection of violations. See D. BARASH, supra note 64, at 240-41 ("The
probability of obtaining absolute verifiability would seem to be very low, almost zero."); see also
Krepon, The Political Dynamics of Verification and Compliance Debates, in VERIFICATION AND
ARMS CONTROL, supra note 59, at 135 ("lIt was not reasonable to expect either perfect confidence
in U.S. monitoring capabilities or treaty constraints that allowed absolute certainty in monitoring
compliance.").
135. Arms control agreements increasingly provide for "on-site inspection"; under such an
arrangement, foreign personnel would be dispatched . to observe events firsthand and take
appropriate measurements and samples to resolve compliance ambiguities. See PNE Treaty, supra
note 78, art. IV, l(b), S. Exec. Doe. N, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 6 (1976), 15 I.L.M. 891, 892,
reprinted in ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 2, at 194, 195; INF Treaty, supra note 78, Protocol
Regarding Inspections, 27 I.L.M. 90, 190, reprinted in ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 2, at 350,
431. In many instances, these on-site inspections would provide a valuable verification tool,
deterring violations and complicating the task of evasion, but even then they would not be foolproof.
Heckrotte, On-Site Inspection to Check Compliance, in NUCLEAR WEAPON TEsTS: PROHIBITION OR
LIMrATION 247-60 (J. Goldblat & D. Cox eds. 1988). See generally Schear, supra note 75, at 24-30
(discussing the importance and limitations of on-site inspection).
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and assess their capabilities;136 (b) determine the status and location of
intermediate-range nuclear forces and the progress made toward disman-
tling them;13 7 (c) monitor various types of traffic into and out of potential
chemical weapons facilities;138 (d) observe events at nuclear weapons
testing grounds and collect any telltale radioactive debris from clandes-
tine explosions; 139 (e) oversee miliary maneuvers and formations in order
to count and classify conventional troops and equipment;' 40 and (f) per-
form other types of monitoring activities that are more difficult or expen-
sive when confined to earthborne or satellite sensors.1 41 Open Skies
overflights will not by themselves suffice for these diverse applications,




Before evaluating in detail the constitutional implications of an
Open Skies regime, we must resolve three threshold inquiries. These
concern (a) the legality of overflight of American territory; (b) the degree
136. See SALT II Treaty, supra note 76, arts. III & IV, S. Exec. Rep. No. 14, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 319, 360-89 (1979), 18 I.L.M. 1138, 1144-48, reprinted in ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 2,
at 267, 274-81.
137. See INF Treaty, supra note 78, art. XI, 27 I.L.M. 90, 95-96, reprinted in ACDA TREATY
BOOK, supra note 2, at 350, 359-61.
138. See Memorandum of Understanding Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experiment and
Data Exchange Related to Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Sept. 23, 1989, United States-USSR,
28 I.L.M. 1438 (1989); U.S. Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, submitted
to the Conference on Disarmament, Apr. 18, 1984 (bilateral verification experiment and data
exchange related to prohibition of chemical weapons); Tanzman, Constitutionality of Warrantless
On-Site Arms Control Inspections in the United States, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 21, 44-55 (1988).
139. In the context of treaties regulating or prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons, aerial
overflights could be useful for purposes of detecting the emission of telltale radioactive particles.
Din, Means of Nuclear Test Ban Verification Other Than Seismological, in NUCLEAR WEAPONS
TESTS 241-43 (J. Goldblat & D. Cox eds. 1988); see Heckrotte, supra note 135, at 256 (specifying
where to concentrate attention in an on-site inspection); Richelson, supra note 63, at 197 ("[A]erial
sampling is employed to detect the atomic particles emitted by a nuclear explosion.").
140. See B. MANDELL, THE SINAI EXPERIENCE: LESSONS IN MULTIMETHOD ARMS CONTROL
VERIFICATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT 21-22 (1987) (discussing use of overflights to monitor
Egyptian and Israeli troops and armaments); Stovall, supra note 59, at 4-12 (describing inspections
undertaken pursuant to Stockholm Document); Krepon, supra note 37, at 27, col. 3 (noting that
during the process of disengagement from the Sinai Peninsula, Egypt and Israel relied upon the
United States to conduct periodic aerial overflights and immediately release the imagery to both
sides).
141. If an Open Skies agreement is implemented and aerial overflights become commonplace,
the resulting data would become a routine component of each participating state's intelligence
structure. The states could then apply the photographs and other products to the full range of
national security issues, including as yet unimagined applications in arms control and other fields.
142. See Perry, supra note 32, at 19-20 (describing utility of Open Skies in monitoring modem
arms control agreements effectively yet unobtrusively); Krepon, supra note 37, at 27, col. 1 (states
should adopt an Open Skies regime, which would complement other monitoring arrangements for
arms limitation); see also Danson, supra note 72, at 7, col. 1 (suggesting that a follow-on accord to
an Open Skies agreement could provide for cooperative satellite reconnaissance).
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of state action by United States officials; and (c) the delegation of sover-
eign functions to alien personnel.
A. Overflight of American Territory
Under international law, each sovereign nation has plenary author-
ity to regulate the navigable airspace above its territory.'43 A nation-may
exclude alien aircraft altogether, limit their presence, or authorize vari-
ous sorts of overflights and landings."4 Airspace differs sharply in this
respect from outer space, where international law generally forbids a sub-
jacent country from asserting sovereign authority. 145
In the United States, it is well settled that the federal government,
rather than the states, exercises this sovereign authority over airspace,
and most legal issues relating to flight are federal questions.' 46 Accord-
ingly, the federal government has established programs to regulate and
monitor air traffic, and it has assumed responsibility for air safety and
other public functions. It is also well settled that the federal government
retains the authority to use or license the superjacent airspace of private
landowners. Terrestrial property rights do not include the right to keep
143. See Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, art. 1, 61 Stat. 1180, 1180,
15 U.N.T.S. 295, 296. No state concedes or claims any inherent right of "innocent passage" through
the airspace of another state. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACTER & H. SMrr, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 842 (2d ed. 1987). Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, each state
also controls the airspace above its territorial sea, but aircraft of other states do have a right of
"transit passage" over international straits and archipelagic waters. United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, arts. 2, 37-39, 42-44, 53-54, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf.62/122 (1982), reprinted in U.N., THE LAW OF THE SEA: OFFICIAL TEXT OF THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA WITH ANNEXES AND INDEX, U.N. Doc. LOS/
Z/l, U.N. Sales No. E.83.V.5 (1983), 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1272, 1276-79 (1982).
144. D. ARONOWrrz, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARMs CONTROL VERIFICATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 50 (1965). Ordinarily, states negotiate treaties to ensure reciprocal rights to overfly each
other's territory and to land for various commercial and other purposes. A complex network of
bilateral and multilateral agreements governs international air traffic. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0.
SCHACTER & H. SMIT, supra note 143, at 267. An Open Skies agreement would have the effect of
"'streamlining' existing bureaucratic mechanisms for handling international air traffic so that
requests for overflight clearances on complex and unique routes can be dealt with expeditiously by
national authorities." OPEN SKIES: PREPARING FOR THE 1990S, BACKGROUNDER No. 3, REPORT
ON THE CANADA-HUNGARY TRIAL "OPEN SKIES" OVERFLIGHT 1 (1990).
145. See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, art. II, 18 U.S.T. 2410,
2413, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, 208; L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACTER & H. SMIT, supra note 143, at
1366-67. The United States, the Soviet Union, and most other countries have generally
acknowledged the legality of satellite overflight and reconnaissance, although the matter is not
entirely free from controversy. See Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth From Outer
Space, G.A. Res. 41/65, 41 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 115, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986); Krass,
supra note 59, at 4648. AS satellite surveillance, including sensing by privately owned commercial
spacecraft, becomes more common and more powerful, see Lindgren, supra note 123, at 35-37, more
legal controversies may arise.
146. See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1508(a) (1988); id. app. § 1304 (1988); D. ARONOWrrZ, supra note
144, at 136-37; L. HENKIN, supra note 98, at 33, 51.
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others out of the navigable airspace,147 and overflight of a landowner's
domain does not constitute a trespass or a "taking" unless the flights are
so noisy, low, and frequent that they seriously disrupt enjoyment of the
property. 148 Therefore, with regard to the physical use of American air-
space, the federal government could lawfully create a regime of Open
Skies overflights, and the concerns of local governments or of individual
property holders would not create substantial impediments.
B. Degree of State Action
The fourth amendment limits the activities of the United States gov-
ernment, not private or foreign actors. 149 Therefore, if courts construed
Open Skies overflights not as U.S. Government actions but merely as the
actions of foreign countries or of individual foreign nationals, then no
fourth amendment restrictions would likely apply."s' Under that scena-
147. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946) ("The airspace, apart from the
immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public domain.").
148. See Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 88-89 (1962) (aircraft greatly disrupting a
property owner's use of the overflown land constitutes a taking); Causby, 328 U.S. at 266 (aircraft
overflights causing direct and immediate interference with the use of private land constitute a
taking). But see Pueblo of Sandia ex rel. Chaves v. Smith, 497 F.2d 1043, 1046 (10th Cir. 1974)
(traversing air space over plaintiff's unimproved land is not a trespass). For a discussion of property
owners' right to airspace, see D. ARONowrrz, supra note 144, at 137. See generally Annotation,
Airport Operations or Flight of Aircraft as Constituting Taking or Damaging of Property, 22 A.L.R.
4TH 863 (1983) (reviewing cases claiming inverse condemnation based on aircraft overflights at
varying altitudes or on aircraft testing).
149. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (fourth amendment protects individuals
from government searches and does not protect against action by nongovernment actors). Later
cases have attempted, with limited success, to establish what constitutes a government search. See
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333 (1985) (fourth amendment protects individuals from
searches by all government agents, not solely from those by law enforcement officers); United States
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (government may repeat, and somewhat expand, the plain
view observations made by a private party without enlarging the private intrusion into a government
search); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967) (Constitution protects personal privacy
from governmental invasion, but person's "right to be let alone by other people" is a matter of state
law); Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1976) (if German police
automatically implemented United States Army's "suggestions" about installing wiretaps against
American nationals residing in Germany, the activity would be a joint venture and constitutional
restraints would apply).
150. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982) (government can be held liable for
actions of private parties only where it has "exercised coercive power or has provided such
significant encouragement, either overt or covert," that it is responsible for the private parties'
actions); Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 946-47
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (where U.S. government funded operation of Nicaraguan rebels but did not
participate in their activities, there was insufficient state action to implicate fourth amendment); cf
United States v. Ramirez, 810 F.2d 1338, 1342 (5th Cir. 1987) (fourth amendment inapplicable
where hotel manager who searched defendant's luggage was not acting as government agent or
instrument); United States v. Walsh, 791 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1986) (where airline employee's
original private search of briefcase revealed contraband, subsequent investigation by federal
authorities was not a search); Williams v. State, 257 Ga. 788, 364 S.E.2d 569 (1988) (where police
did not instruct or request hospital staff regarding removal of a bullet from defendant, operation was
not a government search).
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rio, only state tort laws protecting against invasion of privacy 151 or con-
version of trade secrets through the unfair competition of illicit spying'5 2
would regulate the activity. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,5 3
which prohibits the assertion of jurisdiction over a foreign state or official
regarding his or her "discretionary function," ' would hamper even
these private remedies.
One might argue that courts should not characterize Open Skies
overflights as federal actions. Under the current NATO proposal, the
foreign state-not the United States Government-would own and oper-
ate the aircraft.'55 Foreign personnel would guide and direct the aircraft,
and would also decide where and when to fly, what altitudes to use, what
pictures to take, and how to make use of the acquired imagery.' 56 The
United States would simply facilitate the operations, ensure compliance
151. The tort of "invasion of privacy" or "intrusion upon seclusion" is applicable to "one who
intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his
private affairs or concerns... if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). The elements of the tort do not usually require
any physical entry into a private space (the invasion can be accomplished through the use of human
senses, including senses augmented by artificial means), or that the intruder use or publicize the
acquired information in any way. Id; see Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 323-26 (2d Cir.
1978) (defining a violation of the freedom from unreasonable intrusion as a part of the tort of
invasion of privacy); Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 704 (D.C. Cir.) (tort of intrusion upon privacy
does not require physical trespass into private space, or use or publication of the obtained
information), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969). But see Anderson v. Fisher Broadcasting Co., 300
Or. 452, 712 P.2d 803 (1986) (television broadcaster's commercial use of videotape of accident
victim held not an invasion of privacy).
152. The tort of misappropriating trade secrets is established when an actor takes valuable
commercial facts improperly, either by breaching a confidential relationship or otherwise. See E.I.
duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir. 1970) (Texas law provides a
cause of action for use of improper means of industrial espionage, where a competing firm hired
aircraft to overfly a chemical plant under construction and the resulting photographs could reveal
trade secrets that could have been protected only via unreasonably expensive roofing), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1024 (1971); USM Corp. v. Marson Fastener Corp., 379 Mass. 90, 101, 393 N.E.2d 895,
902 (1979) (corporation need undertake proper and reasonable protective steps, but not heroic
measures, to preserve the privacy of trade secrets).
153. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391, 1441, 1602-1611 (1988). The "act of state doctrine" would not be
applicable to Open Skies activities, since that legal principle bars judicial inquiry into the legitimacy
of state actions only when the acts in question were undertaken by a foreign sovereign inside its own
territory. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 443 (1986). For Open Skies, in contrast, the foreign state's acts of inspection would be
accomplished entirely inside United States territory. See Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47
(2d Cir. 1965) (act of state doctrine would not be applied where government of Iraq attempted to
nationalize bank deposits and shares of stock held in New York by deposed King).
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A) (1988); see Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 36 (1953) (a
discretionary act is one in which "there is room for policy judgment and decisions"); cf. Letelier v.
Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980) (Chile not entitled to immunity because the
statutory exception for discretionary functions did not cover illegal actions such as political
assassination).
155. See Nato Press Service, supra note 39, at 3.
156. See id. at 4-5.
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with legal regulations, and guard against abuses.'1 7 According to this
characterization, the federal government would be no more liable for
Open Skies overflights than the federal government is now liable for com-
mercial airline overflights.' 58
Moreover, in contrast to most other arms control inspection sys-
tems, Open Skies requires no "entry" onto private property and no overt
"compulsion" of the citizenry. 159 Overflown individuals or businesses
would not be required to cooperate in any way; the treaty would leave
them free to conceal their activities and otherwise to deny information to
the aircraft sensors.1 6° Because Open Skies does not rely upon govern-
ment authority to mandate disclosure or collaboration by the citi-
zenry,16 1 and because a state would impose no punishment for thwarting
the inspectors,1 62 the program is arguably not state action at all. 163
157. See id. at 4.
158. See Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 89 (1962) (where aircraft frequently and
noisily overflew private property on landing and takeoff, responsibility for the infringement on
property rights lay with the local county airport authority, instead of with the federal government,
which had merely established regulations for safe flight plans).
159. STIMSON CENTER, supra note 37. Under an Open Skies treaty, the inspectors would
simply fly over the target and not disturb the activities below. The verification arrangements in some
arms control treaties, in contrast, could call for the foreign inspectors physically to enter regulated
facilities to ensure that no impermissible weapons-related activities are occurring inside. The host
government would be obligated to find a legal mechanism to permit these on-site inspections, which
could include forcible entry into commercial-or even residential-buildings without the owner's
consent. See Tanzman, supra note 138 (describing the verification provisions and the attendant legal
complications of the nascent chemical weapons convention).
160. Many existing arms control agreements prohibit both "interference" with national
technical means (NTM) of verification and "deliberate concealment" of relevant activities from
NTM. See Cohen, supra note 29, at 60-65; supra note 76. Under these agreements, for example, the
United States Government would be prohibited from damaging a Soviet reconnaissance satellite in
space or building an opaque shelter over the American missile silos that the satellite was attempting
to monitor. Moreover, the government would be obligated to ensure that no private American
citizens were undertaking similar activities that could undercut the object and purpose of the treaty.
Under an Open Skies agreement, in contrast, the obligations on both the government and the
citizenry would be less onerous. The treaty would probably prohibit "interference" with the
operation of the aircraft and its equipment; for example, neither the government nor private persons
could lawfully shoot at the plane, shine blinding lights into its cameras, or electronically "jam" its
other sensors. But the Open Skies treaty would not prohibit any kind of "deliberate concealment"
by the government or the citizenry. STIMSON CENTER, supra note 37. Thus, unless some other
current or future arms control agreement requires that a particular item or site be exposed to view,
its owner or operator could legally withdraw it from observation by erecting a roof over it, bringing
it indoors, camouflaging it, or using it only under the cover of darkness or clouds or when no
overflights are occurring.
161. See Nato Press Service, supra note 39 (aerial surveillance is the only means of inspection
provided for in the Open Skies proposal).
162. See id. (Open Skies proposal contains no provision for punishment).
163. A somewhat analogous area concerns "administrative searches" (for example, inspections
by municipalities to ensure compliance with zoning codes, fire safety ordinances, or public health
standards). At one time, the Supreme Court had determined that because these searches were short,
nonpenal, and relatively nonthreatening to the target, they had only "peripheral" importance for
constitutional concerns and were wholly outside the scope of the fourth amendment's warrant
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The better view, however, is that Open Skies does involve state
action and therefore implicates constitutional concerns. ' The United
States would be intimately involved in the program and should have
responsibility for maintaining fourth amendment standards. As an initial
matter, the entire scheme of Open Skies is a government undertaking,
authorized by the constitutional grant of power over foreign affairs,16
and designed to enable the federal government to accomplish important
public purposes; it is not simply the licensed commercial activity of pri-
vate foreign actors. 166 Moreover, federal officials will actively participate
in the enterprise by inspecting aircraft and equipment for compliance
with treaty provisions, and federal officials will accompany all ffights. 67
They will monitor the performance of the airborne plane and its sensors,
and they may replicate the measurements. They will constantly accom-
pany the foreign personnel while in this country, assuming responsibility
for trouble-free operations. In some instances, federal officials may help
fly the airplane. 161
The law remains unclear regarding what level of governmental par-
ticipation suffices to convert an otherwise private action into a public
action for fourth amendment purposes. 169  As the official presence
increases-for example, where police instruct or direct a private person
in conducting a search,' 70 where private security guards are deputized to
requirement. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 367 (1959). Later, however, the Court reversed
itself, finding that even these minor government incursions were "searches" under the fourth
amendment and ruling that constitutional requirements-albeit modified by the exigencies of the
special circumstances--should apply. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967) (search of
private commercial property requires warrant); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534
(1967) (overruling Frank v. Maryland). But cf Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (federal
mine inspections exempt from warrant requirement).
164. Cf Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961) (where government
enjoys a symbiotic relationship with a private entity, government may be liable for private
discrimination in the facility).
165. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the President the power, with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to make treaties and to appoint ambassadors, ministers, and consuls).
166. Under an Open Skies agreement, the United States government would have a profound
interest in ensuring the success of Soviet and other overflights inside the United States. The
government would want these inspections to proceed smoothly and effectively in order to:
(a) demonstrate that the United States has scrupulously complied with its international obligations;
(b) reassure other states that the United States is not undertaking plans for the offensive use of force
and those states consequently need not increase their own military activities; and (c) ensure that the
United States can credibly insist upon similar cooperation from other states when American aircraft
overfly their territories.
167. See Opening Statement by Sergiu Celac, supra note 46, at 4 (need for a sound cooperative
relationship between the inspecting state and the target state).
168. STIMSON CENTER, supra note 37, at 2;
169. See generally 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 1.8 (2d ed. 1987) (discussing alternative rulings on determination of threshold for
state action).
170. See Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1, 5-6 (9th Cir. 1966) (where customs agents asked
airline employee to open suspicious package and assisted him in doing so, the activity was a
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perform essentially public functions, 17 1 or where American law enforce-
ment officials are deeply involved in the operations of foreign police172 -
courts are more likely to insist upon fourth amendment protections. In
the case of Open Skies, the level of official United States participation
will probably surpass this threshold, rising to the level of a "joint
endeavor"1 73 and triggering intense constitutional scrutiny. The likely
outcome, therefore, is that courts will consider Open Skies operations
sufficiently governmental in character, purpose, and implementation to
mandate full application of the fourth amendment. 74
C. Delegation of Sovereign Functions
Finally, some might attempt to challenge an Open Skies regime
government search); People v. Fierro, 236 Cal. App. 2d 344, 46 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1965) (where motel
manager entered defendant's room at the request of sheriff to obtain drug samples, official
involvement was sufficient to implicate fourth amendment concerns); People v. Barber, 94 Ill. App.
3d 813, 419 N.E.2d 71 (1981) (where police requested that landlord enter defendant's apartment,
landlord was acting as government agent in conducting a search).
171. See Dobyns v. E-Systems, Inc., 667 F.2d 1219, 1223 (5th Cir. 1982) (where private firm
contracted with U.S. Government to supply personnel and equipment for military surveillance and
peacekeeping, it was performing public function, and fourth amendment applied); People v. Zelinski,
24 Cal. 3d 357, 594 P.2d 1000, 155 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1979) (applying exclusionary rule to ban
introduction of evidence seized by private department store personnel who were fulfilling a public
function); Alston v. United States, 518 A.2d 439 (D.C. 1986) (ordinary department store security
officers are not public employees, but if vested with special arrest powers, they perform
governmental actions and are subject to the fourth amendment).
172. See United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1231 (11th Cir. 1986) (fourth amendment is
generally inapplicable to searches conducted by foreign sovereign inside its own territory, unless
participation of American agents is "so substantial as to convert the activity into a joint venture"),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 919 (1987); Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Air Force
officers' search of defendant's home in Japan, pursuant to search warrant issued by Japanese court,
was subject to fourth amendment limitations). But cf United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S.
Ct. 1056, 1060 (1990) (fourth amendment inapplicable to search by foreign government against its
own citizen inside foreign territory, even where American agents participated fully in the search).
See generally Annotation, Application of Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule to Evidence
Obtained Through Search Conducted by Official of Foreign Government, 33 A.L.R. FED. 342 (1977)
(reviewing cases in which parties sought to exclude evidence gathered by overseas searches that did
not meet fourth amendment standards).
173. See Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949) ("It is immaterial whether a federal
agent originated the idea or joined in it while the search was in progress."); Corngold v. United
States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966) (when a federal agent participates in a joint public/private
endeavor, it is a search); Moody v. United States, 163 A.2d 337 (D.C. 1960) (where police observed
and encouraged private person's search of apartment and received evidence from him, there was a
search under the fourth amendment); State v. Becich, 13 Or. App. 415, 509 P.2d 1232 (1973) (where
police arranged with private person to observe him removing stolen goods from defendant's home,
there was a sufficient government participation in the total enterprise to make it a search). But cf
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (overruling Lustig).
174. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 615-16 (1989) (where the
federal government "removed all legal barriers" to drug testing of employees by privately owned
railroads, and "made plain not only its strong preference for testing, but also its desire to share the
fruits of such intrusions," the degree of state action was sufficient to implicate the fourth
amendment).
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based upon the assignment of public functions to alien nationals. This
issue has sometimes appeared as a major threat to arms control inspec-
tion,17 as questions lingered regarding the propriety of the exercise of
police powers inside the United States by officials who were loyal to
another sovereign and not sworn to uphold the Constitution. 76
The better view, however, based upon judicial acceptance of other
forms of delegation 77 and upon the uncontested practice of foreign
inspection under other arms control agreements,17 is that Open Skies
could survive any such challenge.1 79 The United States cannot, of
course, delegate to these foreign officials more power than it possesses
itself,18 but within the constraints of the fourth amendment, it can
assign certain formerly American functions to be performed by Open
Skies crews from other nations.
III
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND ARMS CONTROL
The principles underlying much of the above discussion are that
arms control agreements, like all other treaties, are subservient to the
Constitution and that no international accord can confer powers or
responsibilities that are free from the constraints of the fourth
175. See Kennedy, The Constitution and On-Site Inspection, 14 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 1, 20-24
(1988).
176. See id.; L. HNKIN, supra note 98, at 55-58, 114-16 (noting the few precedents that suggest
that official U.S. powers may be lawfully delegated to foreign or international bodies); see also D.
ARONoWrrz, supra note 144, at 74, 101-02 (describing how courts are likely to sustain delegation of
federal inspection functions). But see Tanzman, supra note 138, at 52-53 (noting that the Supreme
Court is unlikely to relinquish to an international panel its power to determine the constitutionality
of ad hoe on-site inspections).
177. See Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940) (upholding delegation of
congressional authority to administrative agency and to private industry group for the purpose of
setting coal prices); United States v. Rock Royal Coop., Inc., 307 U.S. 533 (1939) (affirming
delegation of congressional authority to private trade association for the purpose of establishing
parity in milk prices).
178. In the first year of operations under the INF Treaty, the United States conducted 244 on-
site inspections at various Soviet military facilities inside Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
Conversely, the Soviets conducted 96 inspections at American bases in Western Europe and the
United States. In addition, each superpower maintained one "permanent" on-site team to monitor
activities full-time at a former missile production plant inside the other country. INF. The First
Year, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Aug. 1989, at 31. See generally Kennedy, supra note 175, at 20-24
(assessing the question of delegation to Soviet inspectors of United States governmental search
powers).
179. But see P. SHANE & H. BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 85 (1988) ("There
may be some life in the delegation doctrine yet."); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)
(upholding legislation authorizing judiciary to appoint independent counsel to investigate ethics in
government case); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (invalidating Gramm-Rudman-Holings
deficit control legislation because Congress had purported to delegate to the Comptroller General
the executive responsibility for reducing government expenditures).
180. STIMSON CENTER, supra note 37, at 2.
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amendment.181 This Part briefly summarizes the inchoate tension that
Open Skies might reveal between the foreign affairs power and the pro-
tection of individual rights, especially in the context of the asserted
"exception" for national security matters.
The President has a wide range of discretion in managing the
nation's foreign affairs." 2 The traditional balancing of domestic powers
among the branches of government gives way when the United States
confronts other sovereigns, 8 3 and courts underscore the importance of
enabling the country to "speak with one voice"-necessarily that of the
chief executive-in international life.1 84
On the other hand, the courts also jealously protect the rights of the
individual. In many instances, the judiciary's insistence upon strict fealty
to constitutional procedures has frustrated the executive's fondest
desires, even in the area of foreign affairs."8 5 The fourth amendment has
proven to be a resilient bulwark against law enforcement excesses, and
courts frequently invalidate, or tightly constrain, the search and seizure
activities that the executive branch would otherwise employ. 186
181. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 302(2)
(1986). But see D. ARONOWrrZ, supra note 144, at 19-20 (courts will be reluctant to strike down a
treaty, especially one concerning national security, and will give it every presumption of validity).
182. See generally P. SHANE & H. BRUFF, supra note 179, at 507-608 (discussing the scope of
presidential powers in foreign policy).
183. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § I
reporter's notes 2 & 3 (1986) (the separation of powers in foreign relations is different from that in
domestic matters; when dealing with other nations, the President has exceptional powers); cf id.
reporter's note 3 (noting that Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), is frequently cited in foreign relations cases for the proposition that
international affairs is often a "twilight zone" of shared constitutional powers, where either the
President or the Congress can act).
184. See Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (courts
should leave the conduct of foreign policy to the political branches of government); United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (President is the "sole organ of the nation in its
external affairs"); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 608 (3d Cir.) (courts should not place
limits on the President's powers to discharge responsibilities for foreign affairs), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 881 (1974). The President's powers are not, however, unlimited. See Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (President without power to authorize seizure of steel mills
despite war in Korea); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (warrant required
even for search under the direction of the President acting in the name of foreign-intelligence
gathering for purposes of national security), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
185. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (declaring unconstitutional a statute
forbidding members of the Communist Party from working in a defense facility); Afroyim v. Rusk,
387 U.S. 253 (1967) (invalidating a statute that stripped United States citizenship from naturalized
citizen who voted in foreign political election); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965)
(declaring unconstitutional a federal statute requiring Postmaster General to detain international
mall containing communist propaganda); Faruki v. Rogers, 349 F. Supp. 723 (D.D.C. 1972)
(invalidating statute that imposed a ten-year citizenship requirement before a naturalized citizen
could join the Foreign Service).
186. See generally 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 169, ch. 1 (surveying the history and current
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Some have asserted that American jurisprudence has developed, or
should now develop, a "foreign affairs" or "national security" exception
to the usual requirements of the fourth amendment, to permit extraordi-
nary latitude when law enforcement or other federal officials act in fur-
therance of essential international functions. 187 Arms control might be
thought a prototypical setting for this exception, as it can readily be
argued that day-to-day concerns about proper police procedures should
defer to the exigencies of survival in a hostile global environment. 188
The Supreme Court has never resolved the uncertainty over whether
such an exception exists or what its parameters might be. In fact, in Katz
v. United States, 189 while the Court greatly enlarged the class of cases in
which a judicial search warrant would be required for electronic surveil-
lance, it explicitly reserved the question of "[w]hether safeguards other
than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth
Amendment in a situation involving the national security." 190 This pos-
sible distinction sharply divided the Court, with Justice White's concur-
rence strongly advocating the creation of such a national security
exception'9 1 and Justice Douglas (joined by Justice Brennan) vigorously
opposing it.192 The Court in a later case confirmed that "the issue
remains open." 193
operation of the exclusionary rule, which is the leading remedy for violation of the fourth
amendment).
187. See J. MOORE, F. TIPSON & R. TURNER, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 1004-14 (1990);
Connolly, Warrantless On-Site Inspections for Arms Control Verification: Are They Constitutional?,
24 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 179, 211-23 (1987); Tanzman, supra note 138, at 41-44; see also Wasserstrom,
The Court's Turn Toward a General Reasonableness Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 27
AM. CRiM. L. REv. 119, 127, 129 (1989) (identifying other areas in which the Supreme Court has
upheld warrantless searches based upon "special governmental needs").
188. See Turner, supra note 80, at 361-62 ("Civil libertarians at home and abroad might also
object to the potential of [a program similar to Open Skies] to invade individual privacy even
inadvertently. There is no way to gainsay such a possibility, but there are many other more
egregious means of intrusion today which we all must live with, and do.... [They are a price that
will have to be weighed against the benefits in considering whether or not to proceed in this
direction."). Legal scholars have only recently begun to address the constitutional questions
presented by the possible application within the United States of the modern, intrusive inspection
programs that might be included in future arms control treaties. See generally Tanzman, supra note
138 (considering potential fourth amendment infirmities of warrantless searches for verifying
compliance with arms control agreements); Kennedy, supra note 175 (same); Connolly, supra note
187 (same).
189. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (FBI's electronic surveillance outside a public telephone booth
requires antecedent judicial authorization).
190. Id. at 358 n.23.
191. Id. at 364 ("We should not require the warrant procedure and the magistrate's judgment if
the President of the United States or his chief legal advisor, the Attorney General, has considered
the requirements of national security and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable.").
192. Id. at 359 (arguing that the fourth amendment does not distinguish between different types
of crimes in extending protection against unreasonable government intrusions).
193. Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310, 314-15 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring). The
legislative branch, too, has shied away from the issue. In the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
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The Supreme Court's only other contribution to the consideration of
a national security exception to the fourth amendment came in United
States v. United States District Court. 194 There, the government, without
a prior search warrant, had wiretapped the telephones of three people
suspected of participating in the dynamite bombing of a CIA office in
Ann Arbor, Michigan. When the suspects challenged the surveillance,
the government asserted a national security exception, arguing that the
heightened interest'in preserving the integrity and stability of the govern-
ment itself justified the unusual exercise of power. The Supreme Court,
however, focused on the facts that the accused persons were all Ameri-
can nationals, members of an entirely domestic United States organiza-
tion, and that "[t]here was no evidence of any involvement, directly or
indirectly, of a foreign power." 195 In this situation of "domestic secur-
ity," the Court ruled, the fourth amendment applies fully and officials
may not dispense with the usual warrant requirements. Again, however,
the Court preserved the possibility of at least a limited national security
exception, noting that it was not then expressing any opinion about cases
involving a foreign power or foreign agent.1 96
With this ambivalent guidance, the lower courts have generated a
body of divided and ambiguous case law. In United States v. Truong
Dinh Hung, 197 for example, the Fourth Circuit permitted the FBI to con-
duct wiretapping and other electronic eavesdropping without a search
warrant where the target was suspected of passing classified documents
to North Vietnamese diplomats during the Vietnam War. The primary
purposes of the surveillance were to acquire "strategic intelligence" and
to disrupt the espionage, rather than to compile evidence for a criminal
prosecution.1 98 The court determined that the executive's need for
"stealth, speed, and secrecy" was especially compelling in intelligence
operations aimed at foreign powers, and that insistence upon the custom-
ary warrant procedure would impermissibly undercut the President's
flexibility in combatting the threats presented.199 Other circuits have
also approved warrantless searches in factually similar situations, where
a foreign country or agent assertedly threatened the security of U.S.
Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1988), Congress established close regulation over most
applications of electronic surveillance, but specified that the new legislation was deliberately crafted
so as to avoid altering, or commenting upon in any way, the possible scope of inherent presidential
power to engage in warrantless wiretapping for national security purposes. Id. § 2511(3); see also
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (section 2511(3) did not affect
presidential power to conduct national security surveillance).
194. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
195. Id at 309.
196. Id at 321 n.20.
197. 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980), cerm denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982).
198. Id at 915.




In Zweibon v. Mitchell,2"' on the other hand, the D.C. Circuit
rejected the warrantless wiretapping of a domestic organization whose
suspected terrorist activities had targeted a foreign country and had
thereby threatened to disrupt the conduct of United States foreign pol-
icy.20 2 The court determined that even this "foreign connection" did not
justify suspending the usual fourth amendment protections applicable to
citizens' organizations.20 3 The court concluded that there was no consti-
tutional distinction between warrantless wiretapping undertaken to accu-
mulate foreign intelligence and warrantless wiretapping undertaken in
anticipation of criminal prosecution. Indeed, the court came close to
asserting that there was no national security exception at all. The hold-
ing of the case, however, was more narrow, asserting that the key inquiry
was whether insistence upon a warrant procedure would frustrate the
government's purpose for the search, and finding that there would be no
such frustration in cases involving domestic organizations.2° Other
courts confronted with comparable situations have also ruled against
warrantless searches.20 5
Even if a national security exception exists, 20 6 however, it would not
200. United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir.) (no warrant necessary to wiretap Soviet
national suspected of conspiring to transmit classified defense information to foreign government,
where purpose of surveillance was to acquire strategic intelligence and not to assemble case for
criminal prosecution), cert denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426
(5th Cir. 1973) (national security exception permits warrantless wiretapping to gather strategic
intelligence), cert denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974); United States v. Hoffman, 334 F. Supp. 504 (D.D.C.
1971) (permitting warrantless wiretapping to acquire foreign intelligence, but prohibiting it when
aimed at domestic organization).
201. 516 F.2d 594, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
202. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 363 F. Supp. 936, 939 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). In Zweibon, the Jewish Defense League was accused of
engaging in a campaign of terrorist violence against the embassies and diplomatic personnel of the
Soviet Union and various Arab states. The Soviet Union frequently protested to the United States
government about these "harassments," and the Attorney General affirmed that the incidents caused
the United States embarrassment, could complicate American-Soviet relations, and could lead to
reprisals against American personnel in Moscow.
203. Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 648-51.
204. Rd. at 632.
205. See, eg., Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 156-57 (D.D.C. 1976)
(United States officials need search warrant to wiretap American nationals abroad); United States v.
Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424, 429 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (judicial warrant is required to wiretap domestic
organizations).
206. The current uncertainty about a constitutional national security exception is likely to
persist. Warrantless wiretapping of suspected foreign agents and collaborators-the type of
government search that has heretofore generated the most problematic cases-is now closely
regulated by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1988)). This legislation created a specialized court to consider
applications and to issue warrants authorizing electronic surveillance of foreign agents for the
purpose of gathering strategic intelligence.
This process has been upheld by the courts, see United States v. Belfield, 692 F.2d 141 (D.C.
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apply to an Open Skies situation. The cases that carve out a dispensation
from the usual fourth amendment standards typically do so in special
circumstances and with specified limitations that do not correlate with
Open Skies proceedings.
For example, one salient thread running through the precedents
suggests that a national security exception would apply only where the
target of the warrantless observation was a foreign agent or was other-
wise acting on behalf of a foreign state. Thus the exceptional search and
seizure authority might be justified where the United States government
acted to protect itself from a threat posed by a foreign power, but not
where the target of the investigation was an American citizen acting
without any connection to a foreign entity.20 7 Open Skies, however,
presents precisely this latter scenario: the observations would be per-
formed by a foreign power, and they would be observations of United
States nationals. Where the Open Skies monitoring detects ordinary
Americans acting in the course of their everyday, "non-international"
lives, even a broadly drawn national security exception would be
inapplicable.
Similarly, the sparse case law suggests other important constraints
applicable to any national security exception. For example, the excep-
tion applies only where the purpose of the extraordinary search mecha-
nism is to acquire "strategic intelligence" useful to the chief executive in
dealing with threats from potentially hostile foreign states; 208 it applies
Cir. 1982); United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 729 F.2d 1444 (2d
Cir. 1983); J. CARR, ThE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 9.3(c) (2d ed. 1986 & Supp.
1989), and seems to be working satisfactorily. Consequently, relatively fewer cases might arise in the
future to test the general concept of a national security exception to the fourth amendment or to
define its parameters. See P. SHANE & H. BRUFF, supra note 179, at 497-506; see also J. MOORE, F.
TIPSON & R. TURNER, supra note 187, at 1018-26 (in cases where foreign intelligence is at stake and
the U.S. government is pitted against other governments, the definition of reasonable behavior is
different from that used in ordinary criminal cases). But see Lardner, Intelligence Panel's Secrecy
Criticized, Wash. Post, Aug. 1, 1990, at A17, col. I (reviewing legislative proposals to amend
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to regulate searches in national security cases).
207. See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980) (discussed at supra
text accompanying notes 197-99), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d
594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (discussed atsupra text accompanying notes 201-04), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944
(1976); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir.) (discussed at supra note 200), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 881 (1974); United States v. Hoffman, 334 F. Supp. 504 (D.D.C. 1971) (discussed at supra
note 200).
208. See, eg., Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d at 913-14 (need for executive flexibility in areas of
foreign intelligence surveillance renders warrant requirement impractical); United States v. Brown,
484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973) (President may, by virtue of his inherent power to protect national
security, constitutionally authorize warrantless wiretaps for the purpose of gathering foreign
intelligence), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974); United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165, 171-72 (5th Cir.
1970) (recognizing constitutional and statutory soundness of ordering wiretap surveillance to obtain
foreign intelligence), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 698 (1971); Hoffman, 334 F. Supp. at 507
(President may possess implied constitutional authority to conduct warrantless searches where
necessary in the conduct of foreign affairs). But see Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 614 (warrant required to
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only in exigent circumstances, where special powers are essential;z°9 it is
subject to a general "minimization" requirement, confining the warrant-
less activity to the lowest level possible;21 0 it has heretofore been utilized
exclusively in the unique context of wiretapping, and has had no impor-
tant applications to other forms of search and seizure;211 and the author-
ity to invoke the exception has been attributed solely to the President and
the Attorney General, who may not delegate it to lower-ranking
officials.212
Open Skies, however, would depart from all these standards. It
would entail warrantless observation of the activities of ordinary Ameri-
cans and would acquire information unrelated to strategic intelligence
concerns about foreign agents or countries. States would conduct their
Open Skies observation on a routine, nonemergency basis, and on a
grand scale instead of a minimal one. It would involve remote sensing by
optical and other means, rather than wiretapping. The targets of the
observation would by selected by foreign nationals assisted by Americans
in relatively junior positions in the bureaucracy. Thus, Open Skies could
not fall within any national security exception, even if courts were to
recognize such an exception in other contexts.
As important as the Open Skies agreement may be, therefore, it
would have to yield to the fourth amendment's limitations on searches
and seizures, and it would be subject to the established constraints on
government investigatory techniques. The government may lawfully
undertake even its critical international functions only when they are
consistent with the Constitution. The balance between foreign policy
goals and domestic liberties remains, even when national security inter-
ests are at stake.21 3
install wiretap on domestic organization that is neither an agent of, nor acting in collaboration with,
a foreign power).
209. See, e.g., Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d at 916 (underscoring the limited nature of the
foreign intelligence exception); Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1200-01 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(special powers of the executive must be limited to instances of immediate and grave peril to the
nation), aff'd in part, cerL dismissed in part, 452 U.S. 713 (1981); Shinyu Noro v. United States, 148
F.2d 696, 698-99 (5th Cir.) (warrantless search allowed under the urgent circumstances and sudden
emergency of war), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 720 (1945).
210. See, eg., Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d at 915; Halperin, 606 F.2d at 1200-01; Shinyu Noro,
148 F.2d at 698.
211. See United States v. Ehrlichman, 376 F. Supp. 29, 33 (D.D.C. 1974) (intelligence exception
limited to issues of wiretapping, which is considered a "relatively nonintrusive search"), aff'd, 546
F.2d 910, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977). But see United States v. Smith,
321 F. Supp. 424, 429 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (suggesting that electronic surveillance is the most
objectionable of all searches because it is carried out against an unsuspecting individual).
212. United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S.
1120 (1977).
213. See Smith, 321 F. Supp. at 430 ("The Constitution... was written so as to strike a balance
between the protection of political freedom and protection of national security interests. To




Is OPEN SKIES A "SEARCH"?: PRECEDENTS
The central question concerning the constitutionality of Open Skies
is whether the functioning of Open Skies aircraft constitutes a "search"
of constitutional proportions, triggering the full panoply of fourth
amendment protections. This question is critical because if Open Skies is
deemed a search, it is probably illegal and the treaty regime incorporat-
ing it will fail.2 14
The question arises in this stark form because of the nature of the
Open Skies inspection regime itself. The treaty would contemplate no
procedure for obtaining a search warrant prior to the overflight. Indeed,
an essential aspect of the "anytime, anyplace" character of the arrange-
ment would be the explicit rejection of any need for local authorities to
approve an inspector's search.215 The Supreme Court, however, has
declared that warrantless searches are "per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few specifically established and
well-defined exceptions. 2
16
While some of these exceptions, such as "pervasively regulated
democracy. It is unthinkable that we should now be required to sacrifice those freedoms in order to
defend them.").
214. Cf Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307, 311 (6th Cir. 1984) (if aerial
surveillance of chemical facility is deemed a search for constitutional purposes, it violates the fourth
amendment; if it is not a search, law enforcement officials may proceed without warrant), aff'd, 476
U.S. 227 (1986).
215. Under an Open Skies treaty, the United States would not depend upon the tolerance of a
court of, for example, the Soviet Union in order to conduct an overflight. This arrangement would
be necessary for U.S. interests, as the United States would not want to submit its flight plan for
review and approval, even in camera, where the dangers of delay, dispruption, or denial might arise.
Under the symmetry imposed by an Open Skies treaty, however, the United States would not be able
to insist that other states apply for search warrants from American courts to authorize Open Skies
overflights in this country.
216. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). But see Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 375 (1974) (categories of exceptions to the warrant
requirement have proliferated); Gildea & Weiler, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 26 AM. CRIM.




industries,"2 17 "administrative searches, '2 18  and international border
incidents,219 may apply to certain aspects of Open Skies, they do not pro-
vide blanket permission for warrantless aerial observation.220 In order
217. Some industries (such as mining, food preparation, distilleries, and firearms
manufacturing), in which the historical pattern of government oversight and inspection is especially
thorough, are deemed to possess a diminished expectation of privacy, and extraordinary government
intrusions are therefore constitutionally tolerable. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598 (1981)
(recognizing greater latitude to conduct warrantless searches of commercial property because the
privacy interest is not the same as in private homes); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313-
14 (1978) (recognizing an exception to search warrant requirement for "closely regulated" industries
traditionally subject to inspection and scrutiny); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972)
(warrantless search allowed in the context of a system for the regulatory inspection of business
premises, dictated by statute and limited in time, place, and scope).
This exception might permit arms control inspectors the latitude to enter and inspect selected
types of business facilities, but would not provide legal justification for invasive monitoring of
American homes and ordinary commercial establishments. See Connolly, supra note 187, at 200-11
(warrantless inspections already authorized by statute for such "pervasively regulated" industries as
nuclear facilities, common carriers, producers of certain biological agents, electronics, and air
carriers); Tanzman, supra note 138, at 44-48 (pervasively regulated industry exception to fourth
amendment warrant requirement provides leeway in some commercial inspections, whereas other
businesses and private homes receive more constitutional protection).
218. Administrative searches include a variety of inspections undertaken by local authorities to
monitor compliance with such regulations as housing codes, zoning rules, and health and safety
regulations. The relatively minor, non-punitive nature of these inquiries has resulted in a relaxed
warrant procedure, but the fourth amendment remains relevant. See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S.
541, 545 (1967) (suitable warrant procedure required by fourth amendment to enter and inspect
private commercial premises without consent); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 34 (1967)
(administrative searches premised on nonemergency housing code violations represent a significant
intrusion upon interests protected by the fourth amendment). The district court in Dow Chemical
Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1359 (E.D. Mich. 1982), rev'd, 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984),
aff'd, 476 U.S. 227 (1986), concluded that legal analysis of aerial overflight and photography
"roughly" fits into the category of administrative searches, but the higher courts did not pursue that
approach. Arms control inspectors might shelter some of their activities under this rubric, but it will
not justify all the activities of Open Skies. See Koplow, Arms Control Inspection: Constitutional
Restrictions on Treaty Verification in the United States, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 229, 305-08 (1988)
(arguing that Camara and See created an unprecedented apparatus for authorizing administrative
search warrants, which departs from individuated probable cause analysis); see also Kennedy, supra
note 175, at 7-9 ("probable cause" showing for issuing a warrant to conduct an administrative search
is less onerous than the showing generally required in a criminal context).
219. Law enforcement authorities are accorded exceptional powers to deal with persons or
objects crossing a border into the United States. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616
(1977) (border searches are per se reasonable, given the country's need to protect itself, and fourth
amendment does not apply); United States v. Weil, 432 F.2d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1970) (upholding
warrantless search of items found near the border, even if unknown whether items crossed the
border recently); Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1966) (warrantless search
of vehicle in interior of country justified because vehicle had recently crossed the border and had
been under constant surveillance). While this extraordinary category of powers may be relevant to
some applications of arms control verification, it will cover only a small portion of future Open Skies
operations.
220. During most Open Skies observations, the targets being overflown will not notice or care
that they are being monitored. Conceivably, such disregard could be construed as implied consent,
and consent of the searched individual can provide a legal justification for a warrantless search. See
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); W. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS &
CONVICTIONS §§ 9.1-9.2 (1985); see also Tanzman, supra note 138, at 58-62 (discussing the
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for the Open Skies arrangement to be constitutional, therefore, its investi-
gative activities must not rise to the level of a fourth amendment search.
The decision in Katz v. United States22 still provides the leading
definition of a search. The court there determined that the fourth
amendment does not protect what a person "knowingly exposes to the
public," but it does protect what he or she "seeks to preserve as pri-
vate." '222 Justice Harlan's concurring opinion elaborated this distinction,
establishing a two-part test for the coverage of the fourth amendment:
First, has the person exhibited an actual expectation of privacy? Second,
is that expectation one that society is prepared to accept as reasonable?223
The Court has thus directed attention to whether a person has vol-
untarily accepted the risk of being seen or heard,224 and it has eschewed
the earlier focus on the narrow question of whether the government
obtained its data through a physical trespass.225 Where a person con-
ducts activities in "plain view" of the general public and allows anyone
passing by to notice his or her activities, no lingering expectation of pri-
vacy remains and the government may observe without a warrant the
activities that anyone else could also observe. Conversely, where the per-
son has actually and reasonably withdrawn from public scrutiny, the
government may not probe further without conducting a search and
extending the protections of the fourth amendment.226
The application of these principles to cases involving aerial over-
ffight has proven especially vexatious. Police or other law enforcement
officers often seek to conduct aerial surveillance of someone's backyard,
farm, or business in order to locate or identify illegal activities, 227 some-
possibility of requiring contractors to provide contractual consent to inspection prior to entering into
a contract with the federal government).
221. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
222. Id. at 351.
223. Id. at 361.
224. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (fourth amendment protection of
reasonable expectation of privacy does not apply to activities undertaken in open fields).
225. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (rejecting the almost exclusive focus on the question of physical
invasion of a protected space-the standard that had prevailed under Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438 (1928)).
226. But see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (warrantless use of pen register
simply to record the telephone numbers dialed from a particular telephone is not a search, since it
acquires only information that is routinely exposed to the telephone company without accessing the
contents of the conversation).
227. It is noteworthy that, in some instances, state law enforcement officials have utilized U-2
aircraft-originally dedicated to collecting covert intelligence against other countries for national
security purposes-to assist in the process of aerial surveillance to locate, identify, and photograph
marijuana plantations in California as part of a criminal investigation. See National Org. for
Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen, 608 F. Supp. 945 (C.D. Cal. 1985). In at least one other
instance, the government used NASA satellite photography to assist a law enforcement prosecution,
during a 1978 enforcement action against Reserve Mining Company for dumping taconite tailings
into Lake Superior. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 39 n.29 (D. Minn. 1974),
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times without first obtaining a judicial search warrant.228 For years, this
practice sharply divided the lower courts, not only with regard to the
legitimacy of the warrantless sightings, but also with regard to the appro-
priate methodology and factors to consider in evaluating the police
conduct.229
In 1986, the companion cases of California v. Ciraolo230 and Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States,231 both decided in the Supreme Court by
five-to-four votes, provided a substantial measure of guidance232 in a
fashion that would permit, but place limits on, the exercise of Open Skies
inspections. In Ciraolo, local police officials received an anonymous tele-
phone tip that the accused was growing marijuana plants in his back-
yard. As that information alone was insufficient to obtain a search
warrant, and as the configuration and fencing of the property in question
modified, Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1976); Tell, Suits Sight Spies in the
Sky, 3 NAT'L L.J., Dec. 15, 1980, at 1, 28.
228. The less problematic surveillance cases are those in which officers on the ground, in a
public place, or in a place the public has a right to be, observe activities (such as a smoke plume
emanating from a factory) that anyone else could also have observed. In such instances, the target of
the observation has done nothing to prevent monitoring by police or by anyone else, and courts have
found no expectation of privacy. See, eg., Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416
U.S. 861 (1974) (inspector's entry onto corporation's land was not a search, as long as the public at
large was not excluded from that space, and the inspector merely saw what anyone else could have
seen).
229. Compare United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir.), amended, 675 F.2d 1373 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981); and United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078
(W.D. Mich. 1980); and Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973);
and Randall v. State, 458 So. 2d 822 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); and United States v. Knight, 63
Haw. 90, 621 P.2d 370 (1980); and State v. Stachler, 58 Haw. 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977); and State
v. Ryder, 315 N.W.2d 786 (Iowa 1982); and State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 688 P.2d 151 (1984)
(en banc) (all upholding warrantless aerial surveillance) with United States v. Mullinex, 508 F. Supp.
512 (E.D. Ky. 1980); and People v. Sabo, 185 Cal. App. 3d 845, 230 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1058 (1987); and Commonwealth v. Oglialoro, 377 Pa. Super. 317, 547 A.2d 387
(1988), aff'd, 579 A.2d 1288 (1990) (all invalidating warrantless aerial searches). See also Note,
Warrantless Aerial Surveillance" A Constitutional Analysis, 35 VAND. L. REV. 409, 416 (1982)
(majority of courts agree that warrantless aerial surveillance is constitutional, but courts are divided
over whether to employ an "open fields," "open view," or "no reasonable expectation of privacy"
rationale); Note, The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Aerial Surveillance: Curtains for the
Curtilage?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 725, 726 (1985) (courts disagree about the appropriate analytical
framework for determining the constitutionality of warrantless aerial surveillance).
230. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
231. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
232. See United States v. Bassford, 812 F.2d 16, 18-19 (1st Cir.) (decision in Ciraolo, issued
after briefs were filed on Bassford's appeal, controlled the case and validated warrantless aerial
surveillance of defendant's marijuana farm), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1022 (1987); United States v.
Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1986) (warrantless overflight was not a search because no
reasonable expectation of privacy). But see People v. Sabo, 185 Cal. App. 3d 845, 853, 230 Cal.
Rptr. 170, 175 (1986) (holding that Ciraolo does not declare a rule governing aerial surveillance in
all circumstances, at any altitude, from any platform), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1058 (1987);
Commonwealth v. Oglialoro, 377 Pa. Super. 317, 325-26, 547 A.2d 387, 391 (1988) (explaining that
Ciraolo validates only those naked-eye observations made from a helicopter hovering within
navigable airspace), aff'd, 579 A.2d 1288 (1990).
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prevented ground-level observation of the backyard, the police decided to
conduct a warrantless aerial surveillance. Two officers trained in mari-
juana identification accordingly hired a private plane and flew over the
property within navigable airspace at an altitude of 1000 feet. They iden-
tified the contraband plants and photographed them with a standard
thirty-five millimeter camera. Based on these facts, the officers later
obtained a search warrant and seized seventy-three marijuana plants.233
The defendant was then tried on charges of marijuana cultivation.
When the trial court denied his motion to suppress the evidence from the
search, he pled guilty. The California Court of Appeal reversed the sup-
pression ruling, finding that the warrantless overflight was a search of
constitutional proportions because the defendant had held a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the shelter of his backyard.2 34  The United
States Supreme Court reversed this decision on the ground that, although
the defendant satisfied the first prong of the Katz test, since he had a
subjective ,expectation of privacy based upon the opaque fencing, 235 he
did not satisfy the second Katz criterion. The Court focused on the fre-
quency of aerial overflights conducted by all sorts of people for all sorts
of purposes, indicating that any private person could easily have
observed Ciraolo's backyard from above.236 In those circumstances, it
was simply unreasonable for him not to anticipate overflight.237 It was
therefore not a search for the local police to use the same type of moni-
toring capabilities available to private citizens generally.238
233. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209-10.
234. People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 1090, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, 97-98 (1984), rev'd, 476
U.S. 207 (1986).
235. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211. The majority conceded only that through the erection of the
fencing, the defendant had manifested an expectation of privacy against "normal sidewalk traffic."
The majority raised, but did not answer, the question of whether the ten-foot-high fence precluded
warrantless observation by police officers who were "perched on the top of a truck or a 2-level bus"
from which they could peer over the fence into the backyard. Id. The dissenters argued, however,
that under well-established precedents, the defendant had fully met the first Katz test, and "the
Court would certainly agree that [the police officer] would have conducted an unreasonable search
had he climbed over the fence, or used a ladder to peer into the yard without first securing a
warrant." Id. at 222-23 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also United States v. McMillon, 350 F. Supp.
593, 597 (D.D.C. 1972) (not a search for police to look over defendant's fence and into his backyard
while standing on the porch of a cooperating neighbor); George v. State, 509 S.W.2d 347, 348 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1974) (not a search to peer through minute cracks and knotholes in high fence).
236. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14.
237. Id. at 212-13. The Court agreed with the defendant that the backyard was within the
"curtilage" of the home, the area immediately surrounding the dwelling and sharing many of the
traditional protections accorded to the most intimate private spaces. The Court nonetheless
concluded that open-air activities conducted in the backyard were voluntarily exposed to overhead
viewings. But see id. at 222 n.7 (Powell, J., dissenting) (majority failed to mention that in addition to
the marijuana garden, Ciraolo's backyard included a small swimming pool and sun deck used for
sunbathing and other private activities closely associated with the home).
238. See id. at 213-14. The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Powell and joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, contended that the majority had not been faithful to the Katz
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In Dow, the Court extended the authorization for warrantless over-
flights to industrial operations, a context particularly relevant to Open
Skies. At the same time, the Court included an important caveat about
the very types of high-technology sensing that Open Skies monitors
might adopt. In 1978, the Environmental Protection Agency wanted to
inspect the emissions from two coal-fired power plants located inside
Dow's 2000-acre chemical manufacturing facility at Midland, Michi-
gan.239 Dow refused voluntary entry,2' and its elaborate security proce-
dures effectively precluded adequate observation from ground level.241
Undaunted, the EPA hired a commercial airplane to overfly the facility
and take photographs.242 The airplane made six low-altitude passes over
the complex and acquired seventy-five color photographs of various por-
tions of the installation and equipment, using a $22,000 floor-mounted
Wild RC-10 mapping camera described as "the finest precision aerial
camera available."243 The resulting imagery revealed "a great deal more
than the human eye could ever see": a resolution of one inch to
twenty feet or better, with no loss of detail, displaying items such as pipes
and power lines as small as one-half inch in diameter.245
Dow challenged the EPA action as, inter alia, an illegal search.246
The federal district court ruled in favor of Dow, finding that the com-
pany's security apparatus had created a subjective expectation of privacy,
and that general societal support for the protection of trade secrets from
tests. The dissenters argued that the majority's rationale was simply that members of the general
public engage in air traffic and might look down and see something. This fact, however, did not
explain why the opportunity for such fleeting and casual observation should so completely destroy
the landowner's reasonable expectation of privacy. Even if everyone must accept that public use of
the navigable airspace may result in occasional overflights, this modern reality should not
automatically afford police the unencumbered right to conduct dedicated overflights of such focused
intensity. See id. at 222-24 (Powell, J., dissenting).
239. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229 (1986).
240. Id.
241. Id. Dow allocated $3.25 million annually to provide security for its facility, and the
physical measures included a chain link fence, a closed-circuit television monitoring system, alarm
systems, motion detectors, roving patrols, and close liaison with local law enforcement officials.
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1364-65 (E.D. Mich. 1982), rev'd, 749 F.2d 307
(6th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
242. Dow, 476 U.S. at 229. The Environmental Protection Agency has also reportedly obtained
high-resolution photography of American commercial facilities directly from the national security
community, which operates aerial and satellite photo-reconnaissance programs inside the United
States for training purposes. Sloan, Big Brother Strikes Again, FORBES, May 12, 1980, at 50.
243. Dow, 536 F. Supp. at 1357 & n.2. The plane made repeat passes at 12,000, 3000, and 1200
feet. IeL At all times, it was within legal navigable airspace. Dow, 476 U.S. at 229.
244. Dow, 536 F. Supp. at 1367.
245. Id. at 1357.
246. Id. at 1358. Dow also argued that the EPA action was a taking of property (trade secrets)
without due process of law in violation of the fifth amendment, and asserted that the agency had
exceeded its statutory authority by using warrantless aerial surveillance instead of judicially
approved investigatory techniques. IaL
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competitors' airborne snooping indicated that society considered this
expectation "reasonable." 2 47 The Sixth Circuit reversed, limiting Dow's
expectation of privacy to only the specific type of intrusion against which
it had protected itself (i.e., ground-level observation) and finding that
Dow had voluntarily assumed the risk of exposing itself to overhead
observation.248
The Supreme Court also concluded that no search had occurred,
since "'[w]hat is observable by the public is observable without a war-
rant, by the Government inspector as well.' ",249 Although Dow did not
necessarily have to undertake the absurdly expensive alternative of erect-
ing an opaque shield over its entire facility,250 it could not claim an
expectation of privacy where it had tacitly decided to expose portions of
its operations to plain overhead view.251
In downplaying the quality of the EPA photography and the inti-
macy of detail it presented,252 the Court contrasted this type of "ordi-
nary" technology with more advanced hypothetical kinds of intrusions-
the sorts of inspections that Open Skies might prescribe:
[S]urveilance of private property by using highly sophisticated surveil-
lance equipment not generally available to the public, such as satellite
247. Id at 1365-67.
248. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307, 313 (6th Cir 1984), aff'd, 476 U.S. 227
(1986).
249. Dow, 476 U.S. at 238 (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 315 (1978)). Dow
had conceded that an overflight relying solely upon observation by the naked eye-like ordinary
observation from a nearby hillside-would not be a search. Id. at 234; see United States v. Allen,
675 F.2d 1373, 1381 (9th Cir. 1980) (surveillance with binoculars from hill overlooking ranch was
not a search), cert denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981).
250. Dow, 476 U.S. at 236. The open-air design of the plant stemmed partly from safety
considerations. In addition, constructing a roof over just one part of the facility would have cost
some $15 million. Id. at 240 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
251. See iL at 237-39. Much of the Court's opinion considered whether the facility could
appropriately be characterized as constituting an "industrial curtilage" with special protections,
comparable to those accorded to the area surrounding a dwelling. The Court determined that the
factory fell somewhere between "open fields" and curtilage. Id. at 235-36.
The dissenters in Dow argued vigorously that the majority decision was inconsistent with Katz
and "may signal a significant retreat from the rationale of prior Fourth Amendment decisions." Id.
at 244 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent contended that Dow had
done everything plausible to remove itself from observation, and that society should require no
greater degree of self-protection. Dow had in fact undertaken several programs to protect its facility
from unwanted aerial observation. The company monitored overflights, attempted to contact
airplanes engaged in "suspicious" behavior, and tried to dissuade photographers from utilizing
pictures that might reveal confidential information. Id. at 241-42.
252. See id. at 238. The Court stated that "[t]he photographs at issue in this case are essentially
like those commonly used in mapmaking. Any person with an airplane and an aerial camera could
readily duplicate them." Id. at 231. The Court also noted that although power lines as small as one-
half inch in diameter were revealed on the photographs, these items were observable only because of
their great length and their high contrast with the snow-white background. Other objects of a
similar diameter, such as a class ring, were not visible, and the resolution of the photography was
insufficient to identify individual persons or to reveal the contents of documents. Id. at 238 n.5.
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technology, might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant. But
the photographs here are not so revealing of intimate details as to raise
constitutional concerns. Although they undoubtedly give EPA more
detailed information than naked-eye views, they remain limited to an out-
line of the facility's buildings and equipment. The mere fact that human
vision is enhanced somewhat, at least to the degree here, does not give
rise to constitutional problems. An electronic device to penetrate walls
or windows so as to hear and record confidential discussions of chemical
formulae or other trade secrets would raise very different and far more
serious questions; other protections such as trade secret laws are available
to protect commercial activities from private surveillance by
competitors.2 53
The Dow Court thus aligned itself with, but did not cite, an earlier line of
cases regarding police "enhancement" of ordinary human senses. These
precedents established that in a "plain view" situation, law enforcement'
officers could freely look, listen, and smell without converting their
observation into a search, 25 4 and that they could also enhance their ordi-
nary human powers of perception to some extent through the use of
modest mechanical or other means such as flashlights, binoculars, or
trained dogs.255 More substantial enhancement, however, such as that
provided by a high-resolution night-vision telescope (which provides an
image no longer within the officer's "plain view"), transforms the inspec-
tion activity into a warrantless and presumptively illegal search.2 56
253. Id. at 238-39 (footnote omitted). In Ciraolo, the Court also noted that the state had
conceded that aerial observation "may become invasive, either due to physical intrusiveness or
through modem technology which discloses to the senses those intimate associations, objects or
activities otherwise imperceptible to police or fellow citizens." California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
215 n.3 (1986).
254. See State v. Dickerson, 313 N.W.2d 526, 533 (Iowa 1981) (police may look through
window of door to defendant's home, photograph items inside, and enlarge photographs without
warrant); State v. Powell, 99 N.M. 381, 385, 658 P.2d 456, 459 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (approving
police officer's looking through window of pickup truck even without warrant); State v. Planz, 304
N.W.2d 74, 80 (N.D. 1981) (not a search for police to look through window of parked car); 1 W.
LAFAvE, supra note 169, § 2.2, at 245.
255. See United States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1982) (approving use of binoculars,
telescope, and other vision-enhancing devices to scrutinize open areas of defendant's land); United
States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373, 1381 (9th Cir. 1980) (placement of seismometers to monitor vehicle
traffic into and out of defendant's ranch could raise complex questions), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833
(1981); United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir. 1978) (permissible without warrant
to use "beeper" for covert trailing of a suspect); United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977)
(police permitted to use beeper without warrant to assist in monitoring the location of a package
while it was being transported upon public highways, but not when it was inside a home), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978); United States v. Wright, 449 F.2d 1355, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(approving warrantless use of flashlight to look into garage through gap in garage doors), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 947 (1972); State v. Denton, 387 So. 2d 578, 583-84 (La. 1980) (approving officers'
use of "night scope" to observe defendant's activities conducted in darkness on public pier 100 feet
away).
256. See United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1980) (observation by naked eye
of activities conducted inside defendant's apartment was not a search, but use of vision-enhancing
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Three years later, in Florida v. Riley, 2 7 the Supreme Court revisited
the question of warrantless overhead reconnaissance and reinforced its
earlier holdings. In Riley, another anonymous tip had alerted a county
sheriff that the accused was growing marijuana in a greenhouse at the
back of his property. Again, enclosures and vegetation precluded terres-
trial observation. This time, the investigating officer used a helicopter to
obtain a better vantage point, circling the property twice at an altitude of
only 400 feet and peering through holes in the greenhouse left by some
missing roofing panels.258
When the defendant was charged with marijuana possession, the
state trial court suppressed the evidence from the search. The Florida
Court of Appeals reversed that judgment, and the Florida Supreme
Court then reversed the appellate decision. The United States Supreme
Court, too, reversed the court below it, and decided not to suppress the
evidence, finding that, consistent with Ciraolo, there had been no
search.2 5
9
A four-Justice plurality2" determined that while Riley no doubt
intended and hoped for privacy in his greenhouse, society was not pre-
pared to accept that claim as reasonable, because the holes in the green-
house made its contents visible to the flying public. 2 6 1 There was no
constitutional distinction between observation by helicopter and observa-
tion by fixed-wing aircraft, since no evidence suggested that helicopter
overflights were unusual in that part of the country.262 The plurality also
stressed that although the helicopter was flying at lower than the mini-
telescope to detect items not otherwise visible was a search); United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp.
1252, 1258 (D. Haw. 1976) (warrantless use of 800 mm telescope to look inside defendant's
apartment from a quarter of a mile away violated fourth amendment); People v. Arno, 90 Cal. App.
3d 505, 512, 153 Cal.Rptr. 624, 628 (1979) (use of binoculars to see through window into office
building is a search where naked eye would not be able to see inside at all); State v. Knight, 63 Haw.
90, 93, 621 P.2d 370, 373 (1980) (use of binoculars to see marijuana inside greenhouse from 100
yards away is a search); Commonwealth v. Williams, 494 Pa. 496, 500, 431 A.2d 964, 966 (1981)
(disapproving warrantless use of "startron" device that enabled police to view, from across the
street, activities inside apartment in the dark); see also 1 LAFAvE, supra note 169, § 2.2(d), at 347-55
(discussing the difficulty of assessing the warrantless use of devices such as magnetometers, X-ray
scanners, and ultraviolet lights); Warrantless Aerial Surveillance, supra note 229, at 426 (describing
courts' attitudes toward technologically enhanced surveillance). See generally, Granberg, Is
Warrantless Aerial Surveillance Constitutional?, CAL. ST. B.J., Nov. 1980, at 451-54 (same).
257. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
258. Id. at 448.
259. Id. at 449.
260. The judgment of the Court was prepared by Justice White and joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy. Justice O'Connor filed a separate concurring opinion.
Id. at 452. Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Marshall and Stevens
joined. Id. at 456. Justice Blackmun filed a separate dissent. Id. at 467.
261. Id at 450.
262. Id. The Court observed that in 1980 there were 1500 helicopters in use by police in every
state in the nation. More than 10,000 private and public helicopters were registered. Id. n.2.
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mum legal altitude established by the Federal Aviation Administration
for conventional aircraft, it was lawful for a helicopter to hover at that
height. The sheriff therefore had a legal right to be where he was, and he
could make whatever plain view observations he wished.263
Certain assumptions about the pervasiveness and notoriety of ordi-
nary aircraft overflights in this country underlie the Court's logic in
Ciraolo, Dow, and Riley. The Justices have stressed that the overhead
vantage point is now a familiar one, and that law enforcement officials in
these cases saw no more than anyone else could have seen. According to
the Court, no one could reasonably claim ignorance about the possibility
of being observed from above, and no one could rationally suppose that
protections against ground-level scrutiny suffice to foreclose all other
monitoring attempts.
In fact, in the United States today, overhead surveillance has
become quite common. A wide range of civilian activities such as traffic
monitoring, weather prediction, land-use planning, agricultural surveys,
and natural resource identification2. (not to mention industrial espio-
nage265), regularly employ aerial photography and other forms of
263. Id. at 451-52. The majority opinion concluded by noting that in this case, "no intimate
details connected with the use of the home or curtilage were observed, and there was no undue noise,
and no wind, dust, or threat of injury." Id. at 452. The first factor-the precision of observation
capability-is similar to the critical passage in Dow, quoted at supra note 252, but the latter issues-
the lack of damage or danger to the observed party-are new to fourth amendment jurisprudence.
Riley, 488 U.S. at 461-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment of the Court, agreeing that Riley's expectation of
privacy was unreasonable, but declining to base her assessment so heavily upon the fact that the
sheriff's helicopter was operating within legal altitude limitations established by the FAA. Justice
O'Connor instead argued that regardless of the FAA provisions, the frequency of overflights at the
altitude in question was so great that landowners could not reasonably expect privacy. Her opinion
was thus based on the pattern of usage of the airways and not on the FAA regulation. Id at 452-55
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
The Brennan dissent, recalling Dow and Ciraolo, argued that the defendant had done everything
feasible to protect his privacy, and that even society's toleration of commercial overflights did not
completely erode the expectation that law enforcement officials would not oversee a backyard. Id at
456-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
264. See De Santis, supra note 80, at 188 (Landsat satellite reconnaissance imagery could help
"discover new mineral resources, determine crop yields, facilitate search-and-rescue operations and
identify areas of drug production"); white, The Camera Keeps Watch on the World, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 3, 1966, Magazine, at 27, 58, 60, 63-64 (use of aerial photography for such purposes as street
surveys, industrial estimates, and community planning); Zimmerman, Photos From Space, supra note
80, at 47-48, 50-53 (many countries now employ satellite reconnaissance capabilities for diverse
military and scientific purposes, and private industry is developing similar equipment for journalistic
use).
265. Dow Chemical was not alone in thinking that overhead reconnaissance could compromise
valuable unpatented trade secrets revealed in the physical layout of a production facility. See E.I.
duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970) (aerial overflight that
observed and photographed the construction process of a new methanol production plant could
compromise trade secrets and could constitute improper industrial espionage), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
1024 (1971).
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reconnaissance. The Supreme Court has thrown open the door to gov-
ernment overflights and monitoring, at least when inspectors use sensors
that are relatively ordinary in their sensitivity and relatively unintrusive
in their operations.
Nevertheless, these cases also illustrate an intellectual poverty and
uncertainty typical of the most recent Katz progeny that an Open Skies
regime will have to confront. Regarding the first prong of the Katz test,
for example, it is not at all clear how the inspecting party can know
whether a particular person has a subjective expectation of privacy. A
mere "hope" that one will not be observed is insufficient, of course, even
if buttressed by a significant investment in devices and procedures aimed
at frustrating most observation attempts. But it remains unclear how
much more a person must do to withdraw legitimately from public scru-
tiny, especially from high-technology observation that might not yet have
attained a substantial degree of public familiarity. 2"
Similarly, the Court seems blithely to have assumed that low-alti-
tude overflights, by both airplanes and helicopters, are commonplace
everywhere; at the least, it has shifted to the defendant the burden of
proving that such overflights are rare in a particular locality.267 The
Court has also ruled on the question of the public's "expectations" about
aerial observations, without offering any real empirical surveys to deter-
mine what the populace really understands about overflights, what it
thinks is the probability of privacy in a backyard, or what it knows about
266. See Amsterdam, supra note 216, at 402. Discussing "the question ofhow tightly the fourth
amendment permits people to be driven back into the recesses of their lives by the risk of
surveillance," he observes that
so far as I am presently advised of the state of the mechanical arts... anyone can protect
himself against surveillance by retiring to the cellar, cloaking all the windows with thick
caulking, turning off the lights and remaining absolutely quiet. This much Withdrawal is
not required in order to claim the benefit of the amendment because, if it were, the
amendment's benefit would be too stingy to preserve the kind of open society to which we
are committed ....
Id.
In United States v. Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1986), the prosecutor had argued that
the defendants' substantial investment in security apparatus and procedures (designed to protect a
greenhouse used to grow marijuana) actually demonstrated that they had expected to be observed by
the public and the police, rather than that they had, by dint of their labors, expected privacy. The
Ninth Circuit, however, dismissed this argument as an attempt to turn Katz on its head. Id. at 854
n.5.
267. In Riley, the Court twice noted that nothing in the record indicated that helicopter flights
at 400-foot altitudes were uncommon in the locality. 488 U.S. at 450, 451. However, the Court did
not state the converse: that there was anything in the record to establish that such overflight activity
was so frequent and well-known as to destroy any expectation of privacy. Justice O'Connor's
concurrence explicitly assigned to the accused the burden of proving that this type of overflight was
so rare as to violate an expectation of privacy. Id. at 455. Dissenting opinions by Justices Brennan,
id. at 465-66, and Blackmun, id. at 468, would have the government bear the burden of providing
information about customary local flight patterns. See also United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373,
1381 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting frequency of helicopter overflight by Coast Guard in area near U.S.
coastal border), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981).
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the powers of modem reconnaissance. Nor has the Court itself surveyed
the frequency of overflights, or of other forms of "aerial" observation
such as the patterns of deployment of double-decker buses capable of
overlooking tall fences, or the frequency of power outages that legiti-
mately send utility crews scrambling up telephone poles, affording them
a special perspective on a neighborhood.268 Instead, the Court has relied
upon its members' own common sense and experience, hardly a clear
guide for future Open Skies inspectors.269
Regarding the second prong of the Katz test, the Court's inquiry
into what expectations society deems reasonable has become largely an
exercise in question-begging. The Court itself determines what is reason-
able, based upon its own instinctive and entirely unpredictable sense of
what seems overly intrusive.2 70 The traditional law of trespass no longer
guides this judgment about reasonableness, 271 because some nontrespas-
sory investigations are nonetheless deemed invasions of protected inter-
ests,272 while some trespassory incursions onto private property are
nonetheless considered to have obtained only information exposed to
plain view.2 73 Similarly, the law of unfair trade practices does not govern
268. In United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1987), police had installed a
videotape camera on top of a utility pole where it could overlook activities conducted behind a ten-
foot-high fence surrounding the defendant's backyard. The police there had obtained a judicial
warrant before installing the camera, and the appeals court sustained the practice but sharply
differentiated the case from Ciraolo. The court noted that unlike one-time overflights, this type of
activity intrudes so closely into the private sphere that it could not be justified without a warrant.
Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d at 251.
269. See The Supreme Cour4 1985 Term-Leading Cases. 100 HARV. L. Rnv. 100, 135-43
(1986) (criticizing the Ciraolo and Dow decisions for concluding that if there is a chance that a
private person might observe an activity from an airplane, then there can be no lingering expectation
that police officials will not do so); Joyce, The EPA's Use of Aerial Photography Violates the Fourth
Amendment: Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 15 CoNN. L. REv. 327, 329 (1983) (supporting
the district court's decision in Dow as more consistent with fourth amendment jurisprudence).
The existing case law is also not illuminating on the issue of satellite monitoring. Satellites are
so expensive and so heavily regulated that ordinary private citizens could not launch or operate
them, whereas the government does so with great frequency. What set of "expectations" about the
likelihood of being observed would develop under these circumstances?
270. See United States v. white, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("We should
not, as judges, merely recite the expectations and risks without examining the desirability of saddling
them upon society.").
271. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183-84 (1984) (police trespass was a violation of
local law but did not violate the fourth amendment); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58-59
(1924) (trespass in open fields does not violate fourth amendment). See generally Comment, Dow
Chemical and Ciraolo: For Government Investigators, the Sky's No Limit, 36 CATH. U.L. Rnv. 667
(1987) (tracing the erosion of the linkage between trespass laws and fourth amendment protections).
272. See, eg., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (even where police did not physically
invade the telephone booth, the act of wiretapping infringed defendant's expectation of privacy).
273. See, ag., Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182-83 (police trespass upon fenced and posted private lands,
even if in violation of local criminal law, was not a search under the fourth amendment where there
was no breach of a legitimate expectation of privacy); Hester, 265 U.S. at 58-59 (trespass in open
fields does not violate fourth amendment).
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the jurisprudence of the fourth amendment; while an industrial rival is
not permitted to steal secrets by overflying a facility under construction,
those state laws do not define the parameters of constitutional protec-
tion.274 The Court, however, has not indicated what other sources of law
are more reliable or appropriate in this context.
In essence, the Court has relied upon introspection to determine
whether a particular investigatory technique exceeds tolerable levels.
While there are some advantages to admitting that "I can't define a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, but I know it when I see it,"' 275 there are
social costs in this indeterminacy: Open Skies inspectors and planners




IS OPEN SKIES A "SEARCH"?: PRINCIPLES
Against this background, the evaluation of Open Skies and the con-
sideration of any possible constitutional limitations on its implementa-
tion will rest upon an assessment of five factors. Treaty negotiators
should address these factors in advance, attempting to build into the
treaty legal and institutional arrangements that could satisfy the con-
cerns of the United States judiciary.
A. The Power of the Collection Methodology
The Dow dicta about high-technology investigatory techniques277
are of great importance to Open Skies. Accordingly, the first inquiry
should focus on the strength of the surveillance system. Negotiators
274. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 232, 239 n.6 (1986) (state tort law
governing unfair competition does not define the limits of the fourth amendment); E.I. duPont
deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970) (tort of unfair competition in Texas
includes obtaining information via nontrespassory aerial overflight, but tort might not apply to
objects in "plain view"), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971). But see Dow, 476 U.S. at 248-49
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (state tort law reflects the legitimacy of Dow's
privacy interest, showing that Dow had a "reasonable expectation of privacy" under the fourth
amendment).
275. Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I shall not
today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that
shorthand description [of hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly
doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.").
276. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 672, 677-78 (1989)
(Court upholds mandatory drug testing of Customs Service agents who carry firearms, because they
have a diminished expectation of privacy, but asserts inability to assess the corresponding rights of
other categories of customs officials); see also Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182-83 (test of legitimacy of the
expectation of privacy is whether the government's action intrudes unacceptably upon values
protected by Constitution); Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of
Fourth Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 968, 983 (1968) (expectation of privacy must be
both reasonable and justifiable).
277. See supra text accompanying note 253.
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must examine three different aspects of the monitoring procedure:
(a) the familiarity and prominence of the "collection platform"; (b) the
types of sensors used; and (c) the power of individual sensors.
First, how familiar and apparent is the collection platform, the vehi-
cle upon which the Open Skies sensors might be carried?27 Katz and its
progeny direct attention to the state of public awareness about govern-
ment information-gathering activities, and ask to what extent reasonable
people are "on notice" that particular search capabilities exist. Where a
person conducts activities in apparent disregard for known opportunities
for oversight by government inspectors, that activity is less likely to be
judicially protected than if the presence or potential presence of the
inspectors was a carefully guarded secret.
For Open Skies, this calculation probably means that ordinary air-
planes are superior platforms: they are so familiar and nonthreatening
that no one could be ignorant of the possibility of being overflown by
them.279 Helicopters, by contrast, fly less frequently in many parts of the
country. As a result, it may be less reasonable to expect that the public
at large should be responsible for protecting against helicopters' special
capabilities for hovering and low-altitude flight.280  Moreover,
unmanned, remotely piloted drones and reconnaissance satellites are
even less familiar to the public. Therefore, failing to guard against those
types of observation platforms should not be considered a de facto deci-
sion to expose oneself to their plain view.28 '
Second, courts will explore the types of sensors used by Open Skies
investigators. Again, the more familiar the device and the more pedes-
trian the types of data it collects, the easier will it be to conclude that
failure to protect oneself is effectively consenting to a "plain view"
278. The Ciraolo and Dow courts required the defendant to protect his or her privacy against
the particular mode of observation the government might employ. In those cases, guarding against
ground-based observation was held insufficient to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy from
airborne sensors. Comment, supra note 271, at 687-88. This logic suggests that future courts
considering an Open Skies agreement might differentiate between several types of aircraft (or
spacecraft) that government inspectors might operate.
279. In a similar vein, no one could plausibly claim constitutional surprise if police observed his
or her activities by taking advantage of natural vantage points accorded by a nearby hillside or a
neighboring building. Even Dow Chemical conceded that warrantless oversight from natural terrain
would be unobjectionable. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 234 (1986).
280. See National Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen, 608 F. Supp. 945, 957-59
(N.D. Cal. 1985) (differentiating helicopters from ordinary aircraft based upon capacity for low-
altitude flight and for hovering); People v. Sabo, 185 Cal. App. 3d 845, 852-53, 230 Cal. Rptr. 170,
174-75 (1986) (helicopter hovering at low altitudes in non-navigable air space should be treated
differently under the fourth amendment from fixed-wing aircraft and from helicopters in navigable
air space), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1058 (1987). But see Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (treating
helicopter identically with ordinary airplane).
281. The Dow dissenters disputed the majority's contrasting satellite surveillance and aerial
surveillance, stating that "[t]his type of distinction is heretofore unknown in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence." Dow, 476 U.S. at 250 n.12 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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observation. 2 2  As discussed above, a wide range of technologies
exists.283
At one end of the spectrum for Open Skies would be ordinary visi-
ble-light photography, which is probably so routine that its use could not
easily be characterized as a "search." At the other extreme would be
electronic eavesdropping and interceptions, the so-called "signals intelli-
gence" that enables the national security community to capture tele-
phone transmissions, to "bug" a room remotely, to unscramble electronic
emanations, and generally to inspect targeted individuals in a stunning,
high-technology manner. Certainly, the American public would not
have sufficient awareness of these extraordinary powers to be held legally
responsible for evading them in order to preserve privacy.2 4
Between these extremes lies an intriguing range of sensors that
future Open Skies crews might wish to employ, and that raise serious
questions about the degree of public awareness or expectation. Infrared
photography, for example, has become more familiar, but is the public at
large so accustomed to the "false color" imagery that passivity counts as
consent? What about thermal infrared sensors, which reveal heat gradi-
ents? The public probably knows that such tools exist, but assuredly
they do not know the true capabilities that could be applicable to Open
Skies. Similarly, everyone has heard of "radar," but the modem syn-
thetic aperture radar mechanisms are so sophisticated that there is seri-
ous doubt that everything they sense could be considered within "plain
view." Particulate samplers or "sniffers" that can identify invisible radi-
oactive particles spewed from a nuclear test, or that could detect minute
quantities of substances evidencing a chemical or biological weapon, are
well beyond the public ken.28 5 Even more sophisticated future airborne
sensors, such as those which measure disruptions in the local magnetic
282. For some Open Skies purposes, ordinary photography will suffice and the inspectors will
not seek to employ more exotic sensors on their overflights. For other purposes, however, the
inspecting state will want to use non-optical sensors, particulate samplers, and devices capable of
reading identification "tags" affixed to controlled weaponry. See sources cited supra note 71.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 63-74.
284. The existing Open Skies negotiations do not include an authorization for the use of
SIGINT, but some have proposed expanding the program in that way. L. DUNN & B. HENRY,
supra note 37, at 25. Courts have traditionally been more suspicious of electronic eavesdropping
than of other forms of surveillance. See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 516 (1974)
(narrow interpretation of title III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 so as to
limit the use of intercept procedures); United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153 n.12 (1974)
(wiretapping should be only a last resort); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756-68 (1971)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (electronic eavesdropping poses special type of threat to freedom); Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63 (1967) ("Few threats to liberty exist which are greater than that posed by
the use of eavesdropping devices.").
285. Recent cases have established that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage
that has been positioned for trash collectors, California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), or in
smoke that has been released into the atmosphere, Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa
Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974). Therefore, Open Skies collection of chemical or radioactive debris
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fields, might be adapted for a future Open Skies agreement. Courts will
be called upon to determine whether the use of these unprecedented
devices amounts to a "search" under the fourth amendment, or merely
provides access to information capriciously exposed to the public.286
Third, the courts will look closely at the power of the individual
sensors used by Open Skies inspectors.287 How great is the resolution
obtained by the aerial photography? How revealing is the infrared
imagery? How much information does the sniffer actually pick up? The
Dow Court, for example, stressed that the EPA photography at issue was
insufficient to read documents or to identify individual people, 218 sug-
gesting that higher levels of resolution might have occasioned a more
exacting analysis.
When considering the power of individual sensors, courts ought to
parse two different dimensions of "intrusiveness" to assess the acceptabil-
ity of the procedure.289 The first is "sensitivity," that is, how great is the
sensor's ability to detect small stimuli? The second is "selectivity," that
is, how well does the sensor focus on only particular types of informa-
tion, disregarding other data as irrelevant? In principle, the Constitution
would favor devices that were less sensitive and more selective, thereby
minimizing the intrusiveness of the surveillance, but there may be some
tradeoffs. For example, a highly sensitive but also highly selective sen-
sor, such as a hypothetical device automatically capable of excluding
information not germane to military matters, would in principle be more
tolerable than a tool that was both less sensitive and less selective.2 90
ejected into the public airways would probably not be considered a search under the fourth
amendment.
286. One intriguing possibility would be to differentiate "active" sensors from those employing
more "passive" means. Sensors such as visible light cameras, infrared cameras, and sniffers that
merely detect particles or energy emitted by, or naturally reflected from, a target would be in the
more acceptable "passive" category. See Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1, 3 (9th Cir. 1966)
(not a search for police to use scintillation detector to note radiation sent from defendant's
apartment into a public hallway from contraband wristwatches with radium-treated dials). Sensors
such as radars or cameras using artificial illumination, which actively "interrogate" a target, would
be considered more intrusive. But cf State v. Curtin, 332 S.E.2d 619, 624 (W. Va. 1985) ("A
flashlight merely provides at night what the sun provides during the day.").
287. The dissenters in Dow argued that the majority's focus on the power of the inspection
methodology was misplaced, and disapproved of the Court's distinction between satellite and aerial
reconnaissance. See supra note 281.
288. Dow, 476 U.S. at 238 n.5 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
289. Tanzman, supra note 138, at 57.
290. Courts have determined that the use of trained dogs to detect the presence of illegal drugs
by scent and to alert human inspectors is not a search under the fourth amendment. United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983); United States v. Beale, 736 F.2d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984). This type of investigation is much more "sensitive" than the use
of human senses but is tolerable because it is also much more "selective," detecting only the specific
aromas the dog has been trained to notice and ignoring all non-contraband. See also 1 W. LAFAVE,
supra note 169, § 2.2(d), at 347-55 (devices such as airport magnetometer or anti-shoplifting
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The challenge for arms control negotiators, and for the public
officials charged with the responsibility for implementing an Open Skies
agreement, will be to make some educated guesses about the conclusions
that future courts might reach in all three of these uncharted areas.
There is, unfortunately, too little precedent to predict confidently how
courts will balance the incommensurable factors in any of them.
Worse yet, the application of constitutional principles to Open Skies
will reveal some of the illogic and some of the gaps in existing jurispru-
dence in the core areas of the fourth amendment. Why, for example,
should public expectations matter so much? The text of the fourth
amendment certainly does not contain language directing attention to
that variable.291 Similarly, how should the law treat those public expec-
tations that are irrational or otherwise not grounded in fact? It is far
from apparent, for example, why the visible portion of the electromag-
netic spectrum should be deemed more accessible than others. Why is
the detection and interpretation of sound waves more suspicious than the
acquisition of photographs? Why are satellites and helicopters more sin-
ister than airplanes? Why should there be a distinction of constitutional
proportions between SIGINT and other technical means of data
collection?2
92
In some instances, moreover, the court itself is flatly wrong about its
implicit expectations. For example, the key passage in Dow in which the
Supreme Court attempts to differentiate the tolerable degree of aerial
photography from the presumptively more invasive technology of satel-
lite reconnaissance 2 93 is rooted in misconception. Satellites are not mark-
edly superior for this type of photography, and a resolution of one-half
sensormatic detection systems, which react only to certain specified items, may be relatively
tolerable).
291. The point asserted by the prosecution in United States v. Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849 (9th
Cir. 1986) (discussed at supra note 266), deserves more serious attention in this context. Some
people (such as spies, organized crime bosses, and marijuana growers) often have reason to expect
that the government will try to detect their activities. That fear is one of the key reasons for the great
precautions they take-precautions that show not that they subjectively expect privacy, but that they
are well aware of the threat that the government will attempt to discover their activities. They
certainly hope they will escape notice, and each one of them probably thinks that he or she has
managed to avoid detection-otherwise, they would not conduct the particular conversation, sale, or
other transaction while they are under surveillance. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751
(1971).
But this concept of "expectations" has a different meaning from its usual application to people
who have no special cause to suppose that they might come under government surveillance, and the
concept is attenuated in the nationwide context of Open Skies. See Amsterdam, supra note 216, at
384-85 (courts' concern with expectations should not focus on a prediction about the actual degree
of privacy expected, but on justified reliance on society's rejection of this type of warrantless
surveillance).
292. See I W. LAFAVE, supra note 169, § 2.2(e), at 359-60 (discussing differences between
police observation via visual and audio surveillance).
293. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1986).
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inch (as obtained by the EPA airplane) is extremely good under any cir-
cumstances. Indeed, one of the primary justifications for Open Skies is
the prospect that close-flying aircraft could provide even better imagery
and data collection than orbiting satellites.294
Similarly, the judicial fealty to public expectations, coupled with the
fact that public knowledge and opinions can change over time, raises the
specter that the government might someday deliberately attempt to alter
public expectations. Could federal or local authorities legitimately
expand the scope of Open Skies nonsearch investigations by persuasively
advertising the true power of their satellite and aerial reconnaissance? If
the government, instead of keeping its intelligence-gathering capabilities
a secret, aggressively displayed them, highlighting the nature and power
of modern oversight strengths, public expectations would surely change.
Under current jurisprudence, such a change in public expectations could
restrict the coverage of the fourth amendment precisely when its protec-
tions were most needed.295
The special role of the United States government in the Open Skies
surveillance program also raises other problems. In Ciraolo and Riley,
the Supreme Court stressed that any other members of the public could
lawfully position themselves where the police had been and could there-
fore make and record the same observations.296 In Dow, this argument
was presented as a major factor supporting the legality of the govern-
ment's activities.297 Every parent, however, has learned the necessity for
formulating a better response than the Court's to the argument that "all
the other kids can do it, so why can't I?" Some things are tolerable when
done by private persons, but should be prohibited when done by the gov-
ernment; the aerial reconnaissance cases have glossed over that distinc-
tion too quickly.298 Perhaps future Open Skies litigation will require us
to revisit that troublesome issue more carefully.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 63-74 and 79-91.
295. But see Amsterdam, supra note 216, at 384 (government announcements about new
surveillance practices could not suffice to undercut the coverage of fourth amendment).
296. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-52 (1989); Dow, 476 U.S. at 231.
297. The dissenting opinion, however, noted that in view of the prohibitive cost of the camera
used by EPA, members of the public would be unlikely to replicate the reconnaissance. Dow, 476
U.S. at 251 n.13 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
298. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 54 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The mere
possibility that unwelcome [nongovernmental] meddlers might open and rummage through the
[trash] containers does not negate the expectation of privacy in their contents any more than the
possibility of a burglary negates an expectation of privacy in the home .... (emphasis in original));
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971) ("Our cases have long since
rejected the notion that the Fourth Amendment proscribes only such conduct as would, if engaged
in by private persons, be condemned by state law."); The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Leading
Cases, supra note 269, at 141 (the Court in Dow proceeds on the "dubious assumption" that a
person's willingness to accept exposure to casual overflight by high altitude commercial airliners is
automatically also a willingness to accept inspection at close range by police).
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B. The Purpose of the Search
When a court in a fourth amendment case gets to the hard work of
balancing the government's interest in conducting the search against the
target's interest in retaining privacy,299 part of the calculation requires a
fine analysis of the government's motivation for the investigation and the
importance of the inquiry.
In the typical fourth amendment case, the government's purpose is
quite straightforward: to accumulate evidence of a crime and prove a
link between a particular defendant and the crime's commission. The
individual's stake is equally obvious: to preserve his or her liberty by
suppressing illegally obtained evidence.
An Open Skies regime, however, serves a different set of purposes
and a different constellation of interests. The purpose of the search is to
demonstrate American compliance with the terms of international agree-
ments and otherwise to establish the absence of threatening military
activities. The United States government will approach the investiga-
tions with an interest in presenting the evidence to the Soviet Union or to
other states in the court of world opinion, and not with an interest in a
domestic criminal prosecution of any individual citizen. 3°° The goal is
not to threaten an individual's liberty, but to demonstrate American
bona fides to the satisfaction of other states.3 °1
The constitutional balancing will therefore focus on the importance
of Open Skies to a regime of international arms control. As noted
above,30 2 we can expect American courts to defer in large measure to the
government where search activities implicate foreign affairs and national
security concerns. But the judicial inquiry is nevertheless likely to be
299. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (identifying interests to be balanced in
fourth amendment criminal cases). Some authorities consider that this type of balancing is inherent
in fourth amendment litigation, and that despite the seemingly stark prohibitive language of the Bill
of Rights, courts will always trade off the social values and try to develop an outcome that is
reasonable under the circumstances. See Amsterdam, supra note 216, at 354, 403 (court must make
value judgments that accommodate the conflicting interests of law enforcement and civil liberties);
Wasserstrom, supra note 187, at 129 (court has adopted a balancing test of general reasonableness).
300. The United States Government will, of course, have a continuing interest in the
suppression of crime, and the other parties to an Open Skies agreement may also have a stake in a
criminal case where an individual American is charged with violation of a law relevant to the
limitations of an arms control agreement. But the overriding purpose of the agreement will concern
the exchange of military data, and derivative applications for criminal prosecution will be of
secondary importance.
301. Cf National Treasury Employees' Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989) (where
the purpose of employee testing for drug or alcohol consumption is public safety rather than
criminal prosecution, the "intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for
law enforcement" and a special balancing test is required to weigh the government's interest against
the individual's privacy interest); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619
(1989) (same).
302. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
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vigorous, and arms control negotiators and implementors cannot pru-
dently count on the courts to accept reflexively the assertions of the exec-
utive branch. Instead, courts will look carefully at the facts: how much
does the Open Skies treaty actually promote national security? What is
its marginal contribution to the safety of the United States, in an era
when all manner of other international accords are being fashioned?30 3
How important is it that the overflights occur, and that they occur on
short notice and without any opportunity for judicial intervention?3"
Even with a completely uninhibited regime of Open Skies, the United
States would not enjoy perfect security, and even without it, the country
would not be plunged into open hostilities. It will therefore certainly not
be sufficient to invoke a national security talisman; the courts will have to
be satisfied that this set of measures, with warrantless investigations
occurring on a vast scale, makes an important contribution to the over-
arching governmental goal.
The government can readily adapt information acquired by the
Open Skies overflights for multiple purposes in the United States and
elsewhere,30 5 complicating the analysis of the government's purpose.
Synergistic use of the accumulated data might become important in a
future Open Skies regime. Already, analysts have suggested that Open
Skies imagery and other data can profitably assist economic analysis (by
estimating factory production, agricultural status, etc.), environmental
assessment (by measuring pollution levels, deforestation, erosion, etc.)
and mapping.30 6 It does not strain the imagination, therefore, to foresee
that law enforcement might also become a routine beneficiary.30 7
In this context, Open Skies will collide with yet another area of
303. See Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 8-9 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (in law enforcement or intelligence
gathering, the significance of any one piece of information often depends upon its relationship to an
overall pattern of knowledge; data that seem trivial may become crucial when combined with other
sources).
304. The district court in Dow did not decide that the inspections and overflights could not
occur, only that they could not occur without a prior warrant, because the admittedly valid purpose
behind the government's inquiry would not be unduly frustrated by the interposition of a pre-search
judicial review. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1369-70 (E.D. Mich. 1982),
rev'd, 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
305. The current NATO proposal calls for sharing the Open Skies data within military blocs,
NATO Press Service, supra note 39 at 4-5; the Soviet Union has called for even wider dissemination,
USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center, supra note 112, at 80; Warsaw Treaty Organization, supra
note 112, at 1.
306. OPEN SKIES AIRCRAFI, supra note 65, at 5.
307. Courts have frequently inquired into the government's exact purposes in conducting
warrantless investigations, and have afforded greater leeway to national security cases with a
"strategic intelligence" objective (for example, gathering information about the activities of a spy,
the operation of an espionage ring, and the mechanisms for collecting and forwarding stolen secret
papers). Where the government's purpose is not to collect strategic information but to accumulate
evidence for criminal prosecution, courts have required a warrant. See, eg., Zweibon v. Mitchell,
606 F.2d 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cerL denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981).
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uncertainty in fourth amendment law, the requirement of probable cause.
Open Skies will present a unique problem here because foreign crews will
determine where and when to fly over the United States, what sorts of
sensors to use, and where to aim them. The foreign crews will have the
power to make these decisions entirely on their own, for any reason or
for no reason at all. They can proceed on the basis of clues provided by
other intelligence sources such as NTM, anonymous "tips," or random
chance.
The fourth amendment, however, was designed to preclude precisely
this type of governmental caprice. Accordingly, the drafters required the
government to accumulate a certain quantum of information indepen-
dently before it could invade the citizen's privacy.30 8 Police may not
conduct searches randomly or based on unsupported hunches, but must
do their homework in other ways before applying for a warrant.
In Ciraolo, the trial court noted that the Santa Clara police had sin-
gled out the defendant's home for overflight and photography on the
basis of evidence that would not amount to probable cause for the issu-
ance of a warrant. The court differentiated between this circumstance
and unfocused, routine patrols that might happen to overfly Ciraolo's
home and chance to look down.30 9 The Supreme Court, however, ques-
tioned whether this was a rational distinction and had "difficulty under-
standing exactly how respondent's expectations of privacy from aerial
observation might differ when two airplanes pass overhead at identical
altitudes, simply for different purposes. ' 310  Open Skies would add
another category of overflights, with aircraft operating for other pur-
poses, unconnected to either police "routine patrols" or "focused suspi-
cion." Therefore, Open Skies might force the Supreme Court to address
the issue more directly.
Open Skies might also require the Supreme Court to resolve another
aspect of the lingering ambiguity about the purposes of a search:
whether the restrictions on the government differ where no liberty inter-
ests-the core of what the fourth amendment protects-are implicated.
Specifically, in a case such as Open Skies treaty implementation (which
does not involve criminal prosecution), does the fourth amendment per-
mit the government to exercise greater power than usual, because there is
308. But see National Treasury Employees' Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989)
(authorizing warrantless drug testing of general categories of government employees without
individualized probable cause, as "suspicionless searches" justified by special governmental needs);
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989) (finding that drug testing of
railroad employees without individualized suspicion furthers important government interests and is
"reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion").
309. People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1984), rev'd, 476 U.S. 207
(1986).
310. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 n.2 (1986).
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no reason to be concerned that an individual's personal freedom is at
stake? Or does the Constitution in these circumstances provide the law
enforcement officials less power than usual, because the government's
interest in suppressing a particular activity is ordinarily not as high as in
situations that do involve crime?311
C. The Character of the Place to Be Searched
The Supreme Court has long held that "the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places.1 312 In other words, the scope of state laws
regarding trespass and other property interests does not define the nature
of constitutional protections.31a Nevertheless, the Court has also
acknowledged that the nature of the physical location or the character of
the place to be searched strongly affects the degree to which an individ-
ual can sustain a reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular
activity.314
Thus, courts have consistently differentiated commercial properties
from domiciles, 315 and within the domestic area, they have accorded
increasing protection to the concentric rings of "open fields," 31 6 "curti-
lage, ' 317 and the home itself. In both Riley and Ciraolo, for example, the
marijuana detected by aerial surveillance was within the curtilage, trig-
gering a relatively high standard of scrutiny.318 In Dow, even though the
311. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1368 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (society
is particularly likely to view intrusive government surveillance as unreasonable when it is applied in
a noncriminal context), rey'd, 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 476 U.S. 227 (1986); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967) (it is "anomalous to say that the individual and his
private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected
of criminal behavior").
312. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
313. See supra notes 271-73 and accompanying text.
314. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 182-83 (1984); Katz 389 U.S. at 361
(Harlan, J., concurring).
315. The Court has called protection of the home the basic purpose of the fourth amendment.
See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1984); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749
(1984); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211-12 (1981); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505, 511 (1961). Businesses have a reduced expectation of privacy but still enjoy a substantial degree
of fourth amendment protection. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-600 (1981) (allowing
"greater latitude" to conduct warrantless inspections of commercial property because of lesser
expectation of privacy); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311-13 (1978) (establishing that
fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches applies to administrative searches of
private commercial property); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1967) (concluding that
warrant procedure applies to nonconsensual administrative searches on business premises).
316. See, eg., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182-83 (1984); Air Pollution Variance Bd.
v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974).
317. The curtilage is defined as the area immediately surrounding the dwelling and closely
associated with it, sharing many of its uses and deserving similar protections. United States v.
Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1987); Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180.
318. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212-14
(1986).
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company attempted to argue that the entire manufacturing facility con-
stituted an "industrial curtilage," the Supreme Court decided that for
purposes of aerial inspection, the plant was more akin to "open fields"
and thus deserved much less protection.319
Open Skies aircraft, however, would ignore these fine legal distinc-
tions. The arms control inspectors would have authority to overfly the
entire country, and would be free to keep their cameras clicking over
farms, forests, factories, and homes. Military structures, of course,
would be of the greatest interest, and, on most occasions, peering into
someone's backyard would waste time and film. Nevertheless, a major
purpose of Open Skies flights would be to explore "ambiguous circum-
stances," and such circumstances will undoubtedly present themselves on
or near private property. Consequently, there can be no broad exclusions
from the blanket power to overfly and use high-powered sensors. The
constitutionality of the overflight regime can be no stronger than its
weakest legal link, and the entire treaty regime will fall if residential scru-
tiny is deemed impermissible.
The "character of the place" analysis may also implicate the types of
sensors employed on an Open Skies mission.320 One "place" ordinarily
considered "safe" is indoors; people generally have a very high expecta-
tion of privacy regarding activities conducted inside buildings.321 Unless
a missing roofing panel, 22 an unclosed door,323 or a window without
curtains3 24 provides an unobstructed view from a public area, courts gen-
319. The concept of an "industrial curtilage" was a novel argument in fourth amendment
litigation. The Court reasoned that Dow's facility "can perhaps be seen as falling somewhere
between 'open fields' and curtilage, but lacking some of the critical characteristics of both." Dow
Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236 (1986).
320. See supra notes 28286 and accompanying text.
321. In Dow, the district court was careful to explain how the scenes depicted in the EPA
photographs more closely approximated "interior" regions of the overall facility, even though only
the "exteriors" of individual buildings and pipes were visible. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 536
F. Supp. 1355, 1357 & n.3 (E.D. Mich. 1982), rev'd, 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 476 U.S.
227 (1986); see also United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373, 1380 (9th Cir. 1980) (approving the use of
various high-technology surveillance devices, but noting that the case did not involve the use of
vision-enhancing equipment to peer into the interiors of buildings), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981);
United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252, 1256-58 (D. Haw. 1976) (prohibiting warrantless use of
high-powered telescope to see details inside residence). But see United States v. Broadhurst, 805
F.2d 849, 856 (9th Cir. 1986) (translucent walls or roof may reduce expectation of privacy in a
building such as a greenhouse).
322. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989).
323. See, eg., United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 305 (1987) (officers' use of a flashlight beam
directed through the essentially open front of defendant's barn did not transform their observations
into a search); United States v. Conner, 478 F.2d 1320, 1323 (7th Cir. 1973) (police officers'
observation of interior of garage from outside prior to entry did not constitute a search); People v.
Wheeler, 28 Cal. App. 3d 1065, 1069, 105 Cal. Rptr. 56, 58 (1972) (observation through open garage
door lawful regardless of whether the illumination permitting the observation is natural light,
artificial light, or light from a flashlight held by an officer).
324. See, eg., United States v. Johnson, 561 F.2d 832, 842 (D.C. Cir.) (not unreasonable for
1991] ARMS CONTROL
erally consider the interior of a building to be shielded from public
scrutiny.325
Some Open Skies sensors, however, may have the capacity to look
through walls and roofs. Advanced radars and infrared cameras can
detect evidence of activities or objects that are hidden from ordinary eye-
sight or photography. The potential to peer through opaque structures-
the fear the Dow Court voiced 32 6-is not as futuristic as it may seem, and
Open Skies negotiators and implementors will have to deal with it sooner
rather than later.
D. Opportunities for Minimization
Courts examining an Open Skies regime will no doubt inquire
whether other procedures or standards could be developed to minimize
the intrusions on privacy without unduly compromising the government
investigation.327 If less invasive alternatives exist for accomplishing the
national security objectives, or if the government could create partial
protections to serve both sets of interests adequately, the courts will pur-
sue them.3
28
One such partial measure could be blanket invocation of an
officer who observed narcotics operation through open window to wait half an hour for
reinforcements before entering), cert denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 9
Cal. 3d 626, 638, 511 P.2d 33, 42, 108 Cal. Rptr. 585, 594 (1973) (unreasonable search where
eavesdropping officer stood upon private property that exhibited no invitation to public use); State v.
Dickerson, 313 N.W.2d 526, 532 (Iowa 1981) (not a search for police to look through window of
front door, take photographs of the interior, and enlarge the pictures to reveal more detail); State v.
Crea, 305 Minn. 342, 346,233 N.W.2d 736, 740 (1975) (not unreasonable for police without warrant
to shine light through basement window to view stolen snowmobiles inside).
325. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718 (1984) (warrantless use of electronic "beeper"
to monitor movement of items on public highways is permissible, but using the beeper to reveal the
presence of items inside a home requires a warrant); Commonwealth v. Williams, 494 Pa. 496, 500,
431 A.2d 964, 966 (1981) (extended, continuous observation via binoculars and startron of private
activities conducted inside apartment is unreasonable). The area surrounding the home also benefits
from special protections. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 n.3 (1986) (government
concedes that "[a]erial observation of the curtilage may become invasive, either due to physical
intrusiveness or through modern technology which discloses to the senses those intimate
associations, objects or activities otherwise imperceptible to police or fellow citizens").
326. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986).
327. In ordinary law enforcement operations, a judicial finding that a "search" has occurred
does not necessarily mean that the activity must come to a halt; rather, it simply requires a warrant
procedure inserting review by a disinterested judicial figure between the law enforcement officers and
the public. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 789-90 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also
Bionic Auto Parts & Sales v. Fahner, 721 F.2d 1072, 1079 (7th Cir. 1983) (state must tailor
inspection procedures to its proper objectives and must minimize the dangers inherent in the
unbridled exercise of administrative discretion). In the context of Open Skies, however, the warrant
requirement would be so inconsistent with the structure of the treaty that the two could not coexist.
328. The entire area of "administrative searches," for example, was a creation of the Supreme
Court, as it attempted to fashion a modus vivendi between the interests of government inspectors and
the concerns of private property owners. See supra note 218 and accompanying text. The Court
developed a modified warrant procedure that permitted the inspections, but still accorded some
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exclusionary rule, specifying in advance (in the treaty or in domestic
implementing legislation) that all information produced by or derived
from Open Skies operations would be inadmissible in any criminal or
other punitive proceeding. This would ease many apprehensions about
undue government searches without jeopardizing the purpose of Open
Skies. This strategy, however, would provide only a partial solution to
the problem, since the purpose of the fourth amendment is to bar certain
unwanted categories of government actions, not simply to deny to prose-
cutors the fruits of unconstitutional acts.329
Negotiators should also address other possible limitations on Open
Skies that might prove interesting to courts. For example, the public
might benefit from advance notice of the inspectors' intended routes.
The government will obviously know the flight plan; perhaps the public
should know it as well. While the short time frame of the inspections
will impede important military-related concealment, it might enable pri-
vate citizens who cared to do so to remove themselves from observation.
At the very least, the notification process could provide the government
another plausible argument to assert in court.
Similarly, Open Skies operators could provide overflown owners or
occupants with copies of the photography and other information
obtained during reconnaissance. The current NATO proposal for Open
Skies does not contemplate this type of sharing of the acquired data, but
it might ease the fears of the overflown populace.
It may be, however, that the government should take exactly the
opposite approach and place greater restrictions upon the dissemination
and use of Open Skies information. The government could perhaps ame-
liorate some of the privacy concerns raised by Open Skies if it assured
citizens that imagery would not be available to the public, leaked to
neighbors or competitors, or displayed in an embarrassing or offensive
fashion. This strategy could also permit distinctions based on the con-
tent of the information: the government could restrict photographs of
homes more than those of uninhabited wilderness; similarly, the govern-
ment could guard imagery from sensors that could penetrate roofs more
tightly than conventional pictures.
protections to the citizenry. See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
329. In the Dow case, for example, the exclusionary rule was irrelevant as a remedy because the
case did not arise as a criminal prosecution; the company initiated the action as an offensive suit,
seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp.
1355, 1357 (E.D. Mich. 1982), rev'd, 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 476 U.S. 227 (1986); see
also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 622 (1989) (finding that a warrant
requirement would contribute little to individuals' protections against improper intrusions under a
mandatory drug testing regime with well-known and narrowly defined regulations). Compare the
fifth amendment's protection against self-incrimination, which the government may circumvent by
granting immunity from prosecution. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460-61 (1972).
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E. Recourse for Abuse
A court might also ask what possible recourse the Open Skies pro-
gram affords to aggrieved individuals attempting to vindicate their
asserted rights. Three possibilities emerge: self-help, damages, or
injunction.
The first recourse for aggrieved individuals is self-help. As noted
above,33 the Open Skies agreement would not impose direct responsibili-
ties or compulsions upon the ordinary citizen. The government would
not require private persons to change their behaviors, admit foreign
inspectors into their homes or businesses, or refrain from concealing or
sheltering their private activities. While Open Skies would thus not
require a privacy-seeking individual to "retire to the cellar,"3 3 the sim-
ple expedient would remain for each individual to withdraw from over-
head view anything he or she did not care to permit foreign crews to
oversee. Ciraolo, Dow, and Riley already require this degree of self-pro-
tection, and Open Skies would add only marginally to people's existing
wariness of conducting activities outdoors. 32
A second recourse would be to sue either the United States Govern-
ment or the foreign inspectors for damages resulting from losses incurred
through the operation of Open Skies. 3 As noted above,3" 4 such a suit
would need to allege invasion of privacy or conversion of trade secrets
acquired through overflight 335 and would have to surmount substantial
330. Supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
331. Amsterdam, supra note 216, at 402.
332. This type of private self-help would not disrupt the implementation of an Open Skies
agreement. Most activities that are large enough to be important to the overflights would be
impossible to conceal or to move indoors. Where arms control negotiators do want to deal with
small, portable items, they will have to draft substantive treaties that include additional verification
procedures aimed at those specific problems.
333. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20 (1980) (damages action for violation of fourth
amendment proper under eitherBivens or the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1988));
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (government agents' violation of
fourth amendment gives rise to private cause of action for damages).
334. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
335. A different type of lawsuit could arise if a government contractor-who had a statutory or
contractual responsibility for maintaining the confidentiality of official secrets in its possession-was
suddenly required to do even more to protect those secrets because of new treaty-required
inspections. For example, the contractor might have to erect a new dome or roof to cover open
areas, bring more activities indoors, or modify the materials used to construct the walls and roofs of
its buildings. Many future arms control agreements may result in this type of lawsuit, and the
potential for such a lawsuit has already surfaced in connection with the INF Treaty, which includes
provisions for a permanent Soviet inspectorate outside the Hercules missile facility near Magna,
Utah. See Morrison, supra note 95, at 2580; Summary and Text of the INF Treaty and Protocols,
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Jan./Feb. 1988, INF Supp. 16. A future chemical weapons agreement
would also likely include inspection provisions that could exacerbate this problem. See Barrett,
Verification of a Chemical Weapons Ban: The On-Site Inspection Burden, in ARMS CON'TROL
VERIFICATION & THE New ROLE OF ON-SITE INSPECTION 139-58 (L. Dunn ed. 1990); Morrison,
supra note 95, at 2581. But Open Skies will not trigger as much new activity in this area, since
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procedural hurdles336 such as sovereign or official immunity337 and the
political question doctrine.338 But some parties might well be able to
frame such a suit to allege the type of concrete, individualized harm nec-
essary for standing,339 and the treaty itself, or its implementing legisla-
tion, could facilitate the process of hearing individuals' complaints by
expressly creating a cause of action.3"
Protecting trade secrets, in particular, will become a major issue in
future arms control negotiations,341 and the Open Skies agreement may
be on the leading edge of this trend a.3 2  As the inspection powers
involved in verification become more invasive and comprehensive, pri-
vate businesses will worry-with good reason-that valuable trade
secrets and production processes will fall into the hands of competitors in
the inspecting state or elsewhere.343 Even if the United States Govern-
routine overflight by Soviet and other reconnaissance satellites has already driven most classified
activity indoors.
336. See J. MOORE, F. TIPSON & R. TURNER, supra note 187, at 1028-29; Rotenberg, Private
Remedies for Constitutional Wrongs-A Matter of Perspective, Priority, and Process, 14 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q., Fall 1986, at 77, 86.
337. See supra note 154 and accompanying text; see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478
(1978) (establishing qualified immunity for federal officials from damages suits); Chagnon v. Bell,
642 F.2d 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (immunity of Attorney General and those working at his discretion
for warrantless wiretapping), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 911 (1981); Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (denying relief in case alleging illegal wiretapping by various federal agencies).
338. Courts have shown considerable deference to the executive branch in the conduct of
foreign affairs, as they are reluctant to complicate interactions with foreign sovereigns. See supra
notes 182-84 and accompanying text. More generally, the political questions doctrine posits the
existence of "certain constitutional question which are inherently non-justiciable. These 'political
question,' it is said, concern matters as to which departments of government other than the courts,
or perhaps the electorate as a whole, must have the final say." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTrrTTIONAL LAW § 3-13, at 97 (1988).
339. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 229 (1973) (defendant who had no reasonable
expectation of privacy or interest of any kind in the premises searched had no standing to contest
admissibility of evidence seized there); United States v. Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849, 851-52 (9th Cir.
1986) (fourth amendment rights are personal, and only the individual whose privacy interests have
been infringed may assert them.)
340. See D. ARONOWrrZ, supra note 144, at 151-53 (arms control agreement could provide
international remedies, create an adjudication tribunal, and mandate the creation of a trust fund to
pay compensation for damage done by inspectors).
341. Id at 150-51 (the unique character of injuries to trade secrets warrants special attention,
and an arms control regime should establish a suitable program of remedies).
342. The chemical weapons convention now under negotiation squarely raises the issue of
protecting commercial secrets, and the negotiators have devoted considerable attention and specific
provisions of the treaty text to addressing industrial concerns. See 1 THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
AND THE PROJECTED CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 30-31 (1986) (Proceedings of a SIPRI/
Pugwash Conference) [hereinafter THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY]; Carpenter, Government Regulation
of Chemical Manufacturing in the USA as a Basis for Surveillance of Compliance With the Projected
Chemical Weapons Convention, in 2 THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY, supra, at 11, 22-24; Hoffmann,
Some Aspects of Verification From the Viewpoint of the Chemical Industry of the Federal Republic of
Germany, in 2 THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY, supra, at 97-104.
343. Most often, overhead reconnaissance does not reveal any important trade secrets that are
not easily obtainable in other ways, but in certain circumstances the layout of a facility, the testing of
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ment does not deliberately misuse the acquired information, it might be
liable if the data acquired under its protection leaked to foreign or
domestic industrial rivals. 3 " Private corporations will therefore have a
significant stake in the implementation of an Open Skies agreement, and
negotiators have already signaled their awareness and understanding of
the issue and have accepted responsibility for guarding against the pros-
pect that aerial observation could provide a cover for commercial
espionage.345
Moreover, it makes sense for public policymakers to deal directly
and prospectively with these unfair competition concerns.346 Open Skies,
after all, is a matter of national strategy, undertaken for the good of the
society as a whole, and its costs should appropriately be spread over the
entire country rather than falling on those few who are affected by the
accidents of chance or the choices of foreign governments.
The third possible avenue of recourse against abuse would be to seek
an injunction against implementing Open Skies. Such a suit would pro-
vide the most direct challenge to the arms control regime, and would be a
plausible approach for testing the constitutionality of a government
action that inflicts a very small amount of actual damage, but may do so
upon millions of overflown individuals.
Again, the procedural problems are profound,3 47 but courts have
issued injunctions in similar cases. In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,34 s for
example, the Supreme Court upheld the grant of an injunction on fourth
amendment grounds, barring the enforcement of a program of warrant-
less inspections undertaken by the Occupational Safety and Health
new products, or the patterns of incoming and outgoing traffic might be revealing. In Dow Chemical
Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986), and in E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431
F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971), a corporation felt sufficiently
threatened by aerial photography that it sustained protracted litigation.
344. See Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (damages for violation of
trade secrets).
345. See Opening Statement by Sergiu Celac, supra note 46, at 4 ("[P]articipating States should
be protected against possible commercial use, without their consent, of the information and data
acquired by the observing state.").
346. In article IX of the PNE Treaty Protocol, the parties specified that proprietary rights in
information would be undisturbed by the treaty, that claims about the protection of those rights
would not impede implementation of the treaty, and that neither party could release information to
the public without the consent of the other. PNE Treaty, supra note 78, Protocol, art. IX, S. Exec.
Doc. N, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 22 (1976), 15 I.L.M. 891, 900, reprinted in ACDA TREATY BOOK,
supra note 2, at 194, 209.
347. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyon, 461 U.S. 95, 106 (1983) (injunction denied where there
was no proof that plaintiff was likely to be injured again in the future by police behavior); Halkin v.
Helms, 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (denying relief in case alleging illegal wiretapping); J. MOORE, F.
TIPSON & R. TURNER, supra note 187, at 1028-29 (describing remedies for fourth amendment
violations); Tanzman, supra note 138, at 39 n.117 (listing cases in which plaintiffs have sought
injunction for fourth amendment violations).
348. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
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Administration.349 The Court did not hesitate to strike down an impor-
tant series of government investigations where it found that the protec-
tions for businesses were inadequate.3 0 While it might be possible for
Congress to pass a statute prohibiting injunctions in arms control cases,
such an act would be complicated and legally and politically
problematic.5 1
CONCLUSION
To a remarkable degree, the concerns of thirty-five years ago are still
the concerns of today. The debates about Open Skies in the 1950s bear
an eerie resemblance to the current haggling over international and
domestic policy, as if a new generation of national security actors were
still reading from the yellowed scripts of its Eisenhower-era predecessors.
From the perspective of arms control, a community that has wit-
nessed stunning revolutions in weapons technology, military strategy,
and Cold War politics, not much has changed on the agenda of issues
relating to Open Skies. The Bush administration echoes the traditional
litany of benefits that a treaty might offer: the amelioration of worries
about the possibility of surprise attack, the hopes for an intelligence
bonanza from new access to the Soviet Union, and the eagerness to put
newfound Soviet openness to the test. At the same time, the traditional
downside risks of arms control are just as apparent today as they ever
were: can we really trust the Soviets to comply; dare we afford them this
degree of access to our secret installations and our advanced observation
technology; and is the operation really worth the financial costs?
From the perspective of constitutional law-a realm that has like-
wise experienced contortions of doctrine and upheavals of precedent-
349. Id; see also National Treasury Employees' Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)
(partially affirming court of appeals' decision to vacate an injunction ordered by district court to
prohibit mandatory drug testing of government employees); Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (permitting injunction against government disclosure of commercial trade secrets);
National Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen, 608 F. Supp. 945, 962-63 (N.D. Cal. 1985)
(granting injunction against state and federal narcotics control agents performing warrantless
searches with low-flying helicopters).
350. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc, involved administrative searches undertaken by OSHA to
investigate compliance with various federal statutes regulating workplace safety. When the Court
determined that the inspection program was so broad as to apply to all businesses engaged in
interstate commerce, it declared inapplicable the reduced scrutiny applied to "pervasively regulated
industries." When judged by the standards of ordinary fourth amendment protections, the
warrantless inspections were improper, and the Court sustained the injunction. Marshall, 436 U.S.
at 313-14.
351. See Tanzman, supra note 138, at 63-66 (considerable congressional controversy has
surrounded efforts to develop a federal statute to restrict remedies for constitutional violations);
Tanzman & Kellman, Legal Implementation of the Multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention:
Integrating International Security with the Constitution, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. 475 (1990) (regarding
constitutional implications of measures to apply "pervasive regulation" to the chemical industry).
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the underlying issues are also the same as they always have been: how to
perform the delicate balancing act required to preserve individual liberty
in an ordered society. The challenges of national security, and the
opportunities seemingly offered by Open Skies, make that precarious bal-
ance even more visible and unavoidable. As the Supreme Court noted in
a different context, "[i]t would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national
defense, we would sanction the subversion of one of those liberties...
which makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile. '352
Perhaps it is only an illusion to suggest that we have made much
progress in either sector. There has certainly been vast movement in
both arms control and constitutional law over the past thirty-five years,
but are we as a society any more free and safe than we were when Eisen-
hower and Khrushchev debated the issues that now bedevil Bush and
Gorbachev? This Section offers a series of observations about the degree
of advancement in both arms control and jurisprudence.
A. Progress in Arms Control
Regarding Open Skies in particular, three observations are in order.
First, a comprehensive multilateral agreement would be both politically
and militarily useful at this time. Politically, Open Skies could provide a
timely symbol of good faith, a vivid demonstration of the world's com-
mitment to finding mutually acceptable solutions to common security
problems by casting aside old reservations. Militarily, aircraft carrying
advanced sensors could provide prompt, regular, low-altitude surveil-
lance, efficiently supplementing satellite observation.
Second, Open Skies, at least in its current format, could be imple-
mented in the United States consistently with the strictures of the fourth
amendment. The slim majority that produced Ciraolo and Dow was
maintained in Riley,3 3 and the principles enunciated are not likely to
unravel in the near future. When the sensors employed are no more
invasive or powerful than sophisticated visible-light photography, aerial
reconnaissance is not a "search," whether accomplished by airplane or
by helicopter, undertaken on a routine patrol or with a directed focus, or
targeted at a domicile or a factory. Where Open Skies negotiators seek to
progress beyond that level of surveillance, the constitutional infirmities
will grow, and no one can confidently predict how future courts will
react to infrared, radar, particulate, or magnetic sensors. A best guess is
352. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967) (discussing the first amendment freedom
of association).
353. It may be noteworthy that Riley, decided in 1989, produced only a four-Justice plurality
decision, with Justice O'Connor's concurrence providing the fifth vote. Vigorous dissents by Justices
Brennan and Blackmun echoed the earlier dissents in Ciraolo and Dow. Commentators have also
criticized the Court's current position as inconsistent with Katz See, eg., 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note
169, § 2.3(g), at 420-23.
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that courts, in support of high-level foreign policy, would find some way
to sustain those intrusions. Nevertheless, the more vigorous the sensors,
the more stringent will be the constitutional scrutiny.
Third, the uncertainty of judicial precedent requires that current
negotiators tailor an Open Skies treaty to meet the demands of our Con-
stitution as well as the constitutions of the other parties. By anticipating
fourth amendment difficulties, the diplomats may be able to rescue those
portions of the treaty they most ardently seek. For example, they should
avoid SIGINT sensors, and they should consider procedures to safeguard
the interests of commercial secrecy and domiciliary privacy. If negotia-
tors can minimize the threat of unfamiliar, invasive sensors and
strengthen protections against abuse, courts will receive the treaty more
favorably.
Beyond those specifics, the confrontation between Open Skies and
the fourth amendment prompts two more generalized observations about
the future progress of contemporary arms control. First, this investiga-
tion proves that there can, indeed, be too much of a good thing. Effective
verification is certainly essential for arms control; if Open Skies can
enhance America's eyes and ears in monitoring potentially threatening
activities inside the Soviet Union and elsewhere, it will significantly pro-
mote international peace and security. But at some point the undaunted
pursuit of verification becomes self-defeating; if taken to excess, our fasci-
nation with technological gimmickry and political transparency can
undercut real progress toward the security they were originally intended
to support. Both the Soviet Union354 and the United States355 have
jumped on the bandwagon of unlimited verification, but both should now
pause to consider the direction in which that vehicle is pointed.
Future arms control accords will inevitably embrace verification
provisions that would have seemed unthinkable only a few years ago, let
alone in 1955. The provisions envisaged for agreements on strategic
nuclear arms, conventional forces, and chemical weaponry will make all
modern inspection precedents seem primitive by comparison.356 Con-
versely, the threats of industrial espionage, compromise of official secrets,
and invasion of personal privacy will also intensify.
354. See Statement by Eduard Shevardnadze, supra note 118, at 3, reprinted in VFsTNIK, at 60
(Soviet foreign minister Shevardnadze stated that "as far as verification measures are concerned,
these can never be in excess..... I would even risk suggesting the following formula: sufficiency in
arms, and an excess of verification measures.").
355. Statement by U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III, supra note 121, at 4 (calling for
an Open Skies treaty that would accord parties "the right to use any technology that will do the
job").
356. See Morrison, supra note 95, at 2580 (predicting that the current United States capabilities




This consideration, in turn, leads to a second generally applicable
lesson of the ongoing experience with Open Skies negotiations. In most
previous arms control efforts, the negotiating states have insisted upon a
tight link between the substantive limitations on arms and the supporting
verification or inspection provisions. A single agreement or treaty, such
as the new Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe,35 7 has governed
both the quantitative or qualitative restrictions on weaponry, and the
procedures and mechanisms that confirm compliance with those restric-
tions.358 Open Skies would, for the first time, sever that link.
Breaking the link between disarmament and verification provides
greater flexibility because it enables arms controllers, in an appropriate
case, to put elements of the inspection process into place in advance of
the substantive restrictions. 359  Creative use of "confidence-building
measures" unaccompanied by arms reductions can immediately reduce
the mutual fears of surprise attack and pave the way for more substantial
reductions at a later stage.3 ° Breaking the link, however, also deprives
the inspection process of its core rationale, and critics may ask why the
negotiating states are creating an expensive and cumbersome apparatus if
it does not lead to any immediate tangible savings or arms reduction.
With the link severed, the inspection system can begin to look too much
like a fishing expedition, with insufficient connection to the real world of
armaments. This severing process can be especially problematic in situa-
tions like Open Skies, where the advent of judicial proceedings may
prompt sharpened inquiry into the true extent of the government's stake
in the intrusions, the possibility of minimizing the burdens imposed upon
the citizens, and the opportunities for balancing the conflicting interests
in a different way.
357. The CFE Treaty, supra note 7, follows the usual pattern, providing, in a single set of
documents, for the arms reductions and the associated verification arrangements.
358. See COMMON SEcurry: A PROGRAMME FOR DISARMAMENT, THE REPORT OF THE
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON DISARMAMENT AND SEcuRTrrY IssuEs 134-37 (1982) (arguing for
greater openness on military matters, but also for a close link between the scope of any arms control
treaty and its means of verification).
359. For example, it may be wise for countries to negotiate and implement an early agreement
on effective systems for monitoring the production of a category of weaponry, even before the states
have reached consensus upon the ultimate numbers of those arms that each side will be permitted to
possess. This type of preliminary verification measure would facilitate a substantive agreement by
reducing opportunities for undetected cheating and by testing the power of the verification system.
360. In the various sets of negotiations concerning military activities in Europe, for example, the
states have sometimes found it convenient to separate the deliberations about real reductions in
troops, tanks, and aircraft from the negotiations concerning "associated measures" that could build
confidence in the military stability of the region. Kirk, Verifying a CFE Agreement, Issue Paper
published by the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Program on Science, Arms
Control, and National Security, at 10-11 (Jan. 1990).
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B. Progress in Constitutional Law
The meaning of the fourth amendment, a single laconic sentence
that has spawned countless cases and volumes of commentary, remains
obscure and uncertain even in its core areas.361 The restriction upon gov-
ernment inquiries imposed by the fourth amendment has been
retrenched, with its tenuous logic muddied, by recent decisions of the
Supreme Court.362
It is clear that courts will defer to the executive in the formulation
and implementation of foreign policy, and a reference to national security
will automatically elicit substantial,363 although not necessarily com-
plete 3 6 deference. There is, however, no persuasive logic for this unu-
sual judicial self-restraint; it is impossible to predict when the Court will
step back, citing the need to avoid embarrassing the executive, 365 and
when the Court will instead play a more active role, denigrating any "tal-
ismanic incantation"36 6 of the foreign affairs power by the President.
More importantly, fourth amendment cases have consistently
exposed the need for the law to keep pace with the relevant technology.
Restrictions upon government investigations should grow apace with the
officials' ability to launch new types of probes into the citizens' lives.3 67
The fourth amendment, rooted in concerns about the English kings send-
ing soldiers to rifle through patriots' papers, 368 has evolved into a bul-
wark against all manner of modern scientific intrusions. Wiretapping,
electronic surveillance, aerial reconnaissance, and a host of other moni-
toring techniques unknown to the founding fathers have come within the
ambit of the fourth amendment3 69 as courts have struggled to adapt
361. See Amsterdam, supra note 216, at 349, 395.
362. See generally Wasserstrom, supra note 187, at 119-30 (describing the gradual weakening of
fourth amendment protections by the Supreme Court, from the Warren Court to the present).
363. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d
593, 608 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974).
364. See Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1200-01 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("The Court has not
denied the reality of dangers from foreign or internal conflicts. Rather, it has recognized the need to
respect constitutional requirements even in troubled times."), aff'd in part, cert. dismissed in part,
452 U.S. 713 (1981).
365. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320-21 (1936).
366. United States v. Robe], 389 U.S. 258, 263 (1967).
367. See, eg., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986) ("[Since] Justice Harlan's
observations [in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967),] about future electronic
developments and the potential for electronic interference with private communications .. . the
Court has required warrants for electronic surveillance .... " (citations omitted)).
368. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-85 & n.21 (1980).
369. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 462 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("If indeed the
purpose of the restraints imposed by the Fourth Amendment is to 'safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals' then it is puzzling why it should be the helicopter's noise, wind, and dust that
provides the measure of whether this constitutional safeguard has been infringed."); United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Electronic surveillance is the greatest
leveler of human privacy ever known. How most forms of it can be held 'reasonable' within the
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eighteenth-century language to twentieth-century conditions.37 ° As
future technological advances increase the potential for further assaults
upon the privacy of the citizenry, the fourth amendment's protection
must continue to apply.371
C. Final Thoughts
This study of an intersection between arms control and constitu-
tional law suggests that stretching either discipline to cover new sectors
may jeopardize the disciplines themselves. The stretching reveals gaps
both in the fabric of the fourth amendment and in the logic of national
security negotiations. Precedents suggest that each subject has only ten-
uous stability even within its central domain; as each ventures into new
spheres, its conventional wisdom is undercut.
We should therefore be wary of novel opportunities, even if they
come dressed in benign first appearances. The fourth amendment exists,
after all, to guard against excesses sponsored by our own government,
and the case law warns us to be attentive even to "the obnoxious thing in
its mildest and least repulsive form. '3 72 "Experience should teach us to
be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes
are beneficent . .. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious
encroachments by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding.", 37
An Open Skies treaty can avoid these pitfalls, and can make a
meaning of the Fourth Amendment is a mystery."); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,475-76
(1927) (Brandeis, L, dissenting) ("Whenever a telephone line is tapped, the privacy of the persons at
both ends of the line is invaded... . As a means of espionage, writs of assistance and general
warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wiretapping.");
Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 116, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585, 588 (1973) ("The Fourth
Amendment guards the privacy of human activity from aerial no less than terrestrial invasion....
Reasonable expectations of privacy may ascend into the airspace and claim Fourth Amendment
protection."). But see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 365 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) ("The
second clause of the [Fourth] Amendment... establishes its Framers' purpose to limit its protection
to tangible things.... A conversation overheard by eavesdropping, whether by plain snooping or
wiretapping, is not tangible and... can neither be searched nor seized.").
370. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1368 (E.D. Mich. 1982)
("mIhe Constitution and Bill of Rights are not to be read as covering only the technology known in
the 18th century." (quoting U.S. v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting))), rev'd,
749 F.2d 307 (1984), aff'd, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
371. See Amsterdam, supra note 216, at 386, 396. To some extent, the coverage accorded by
the fourth amendment has varied according to the wealth and lifestyle of the target population:
those who cannot afford thick-walled, air conditioned housing have had to conduct their daily affairs
in a fashion that is more visible to their neighbors and also to the inquiring eye of the (warrantless)
police. Id. at 404. Open Skies would, in this context, be a "leveler," since it could look into private
lives of all citizens alike, whether in multi-family or single-family housing, or whether out in the
open or surrounded by high walls and shrubs.
372. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
373. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
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worthwhile contribution to national security and international stability.
The fourth amendment can accommodate this new challenge and oppor-
tunity, stretching this far-but not much farther-to embrace the new
investigations.
("History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in times of urgency, when constitutional
rights seem too extravagant to endure.").
